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ABSTRACT
The years i 920-22 constituted a period of unprecedented conflct and
political change in Ireland. It began with the onset of the most brutal
phase of the War of Independence and culminated in the effective
miltary defeat of the Republican IRA in the Civil War. Occurring
alongside these dramatic changes in the south and west of Ireland
was a far more fundamental conflict in the north-east; a period of
brutal sectarian violence which marked the early years of partition
and the establishment of Northern Ireland. Almost uniquely the IRA in
the six counties were involved in every one of these conflcts and yet it
can be argued was on the fringes of all of them. The period i 920-22
saw the evolution of the organisation from a peripheral curiosity
during the War of independence to an idealistic symbol for those
wishing to resolve the fundamental divisions within the Sinn Fein
movement which developed in the first six months of i 922. The story
of the Northern IRA's collapse in the autumn of that year
demonstrated dramatically the true nature of the organisation and
how it was their relationship to the various protagonists in these
conflcts, rather than their unceasing but fruitless war against
partition, that defined its contribution to the Irish revolution.
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CHRONOLOGY
1920
Municipal elections. Nationalists win control of Derr council
and a number of other urban authorities.
(Better) Government of Ireland bil introduced in the
Commons with provision for parition of Ireland.
IRA launch attacks on tax offces and unoccupied police
baracks across the six counties.
Rural county elections. Nationalists win control of Tyrone,
Fermanagh, South Down and South Armagh
Sectaran violence breaks out in Derr.
Colonel G. F. Smyth (RIC Divisional Commissioner for
Munster) shot dead in Cork.
'Shipyard expulsions' begin after Smyth's funeral in
Banbridge. Catholic workers expelled from shipyards and
engineering works. Rioting follows in Belfast, Banbridge and
Dromore.
'Belfast Boycott' inaugurated by Dail in response to shipyard
expulsions.
DJ. Swanzy shot dead in Lisburn. Catholics attacked in
Lisburn, many flee to Dundalk.
Recruitment begins for the Ulster Special Constabular.
(Better) Government of Ireland Bil enacted.
1921
Ulster Unionists win resounding victory in elections to new
Northern Ireland parliament.
James Craig elected as first Prime Minister of Northern
Ireland.
King George V opens Northern Ireland parliament.
Truce implemented.
Attempt to immobilse USC after Truce resisted by the
Unionists. British Government relents (USC remobilsed
September i 92 i).
Second Dail convened by Sinn Fein in Dublin.
Control of policing in Northern Ireland transferred to Unionist
government. Sectaran clashes follow in Belfast.
Anglo-Irish Treaty signed in London.
1922
Michael Collns sets up Nortern Miltar 'Ulster Council'
under Frank Aiken.
Treaty narowly approved by Dai1.
Provisional Government appointed under Collns in tandem
with new Dail Ministry under Griffth. 'Monaghan Footballers'
arested in Dromore.
First Craig-Collns pact agreed.
Over forty unionists in Tyrone and Fermanagh kidnapped by
IRA in retaliation for arest of 'Monaghan Footballers'.
Gun batte between IRA and USC at Clones railway station.
'Clones Affray' leads to savage violence in Belfast.
British government set up Border Commission.
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14 March
18 March
24 March
26 March
30 March
1 April
7 April
14 April
2 May
18 May
19 May
20 May
22 May
28 May
1 June
3 June
June
16 June
17 June
22 June
28 June
16 July
2 August
14 August
19 August
22 August
11 September
November
7December
March
10 April
27 April
Sir Henry Wilson appointed as Miltar Adviser to the Northern
Ireland government.
St. Mary's Hall in Belfast raided by Specials.
MacMahon murders in Belfast.
Army Convention establishes anti-Treaty Executive in defiance
of Provisional Government Army leadership under Mulcahy.
Second Craig-Collns Pact agreed.
Arnon Street murders.
Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Bil introduced by Northern
Ireland government with provision for internment without trial.
Republican IRA faction under Rory O'Connor establishes HQ
in the Four Courts, Dublin.
2nd Northern Division begin planned offensive with attacks on
baracks in Londonderr and Tyrone (6 RIC and Specials killed
over next few days).
IRA attack on Musgrave Street Barracks in Belfast.
3rd Northern Division begin their offensive operations in east
Ulster. Planned attacks called off in Armagh and South Down.
Collns and deValera sign electoral pact to maintain balance of
parties in second Dail at forthcoming election.
Unionist MP Wiliam Twaddell shot dead in Belfast. Unionist
government introduces internment.
Fighting begins around Belleek and Pettigo.
RUC takes over responsibilty for policing in Northern Ireland,
British Army expel IRA from Belleek- Pettigo triangle.
Stephen Tallents arves in Belfast to report for the British
Government.
Pro- Treaty candidates win majority in election for provisional
parliament in Southern Ireland.
IRA attacks on Protestant fars at Altnaveigh.
Sir Henry Wilson shot dead in London.
Provisional Government Army attack Republican garson in
the Four Courts initiating the Civil War.
Provisional Government Army units seize Dundalk.
GHQ meeting with Northern IRA offcers at Portobello
Baracks.
Frank Aiken leads attack to retake Dundalk.
Provisional Government Cabinet offcially adopts a 'peace
policy' in regard to 'North -East Ulster'.
Michael Collns killed in ambush in West Cork.
Proportonal Representation abolished for local elections in
Northern Ireland.
Ernie O'Malley finally orders Republicans to evacuate Donegal.
Northern Ireland parliament votes to opt out of the Irish Free
State.
1923
Seventeen Republicans killed 'clearng mines' in Kerry.
Liam Lynch shot dead in the Knockmealdown mountains on
the border between Tipperar and Waterford.
Republican offensive suspended by new Chief of Staff, Frank
Aiken.
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INTRODUCTION
11
The Irish War of Independence and its aftermath has long been a
fertile period for Irish historical writing. This brutal, although heavily
localised conflct which saw the IRA pitted against the security forces
of the British government has inspired both popular mythology and
weighty academic monographs. From the political manoeuvrings at
Westminster to the squalid realities of revolution in the Irish localities
the period stil retains a strong grip on the historical imagination.
Ironically however one of the most important end results of this
conflct, the partition of Ireland into two new self-governing
administrations, has received only limited attention from historians.
Indeed the events of the revolutionary period in the north-east of
Ireland have themselves been similarly underplayed despite the fact
that by any measure this was a serious, if not defining, aspect of the
conflct.
Even a cursory examination of the period demonstrates that the
subject of Ulster's role in the revolution is far more than an historical
curiosity. In the two years running roughly from June i 920 to June
i 922 what became the province of Northern Ireland was engulfed in
brutal and vicious sectarian violence, most of it confined to Belfast. It
is estimated that around 550 people lost their lives in this short
period due to politically inspired violence. A comparison with the past
thirty years of conflct in the North where approximately 3000 people
have died, the victims of much more destructive modern weaponry,
highlights the intense brutality of this earlier period. It is also
12
comparable to other parts of Ireland during the revolutionary period
itself with Belfast suffering a proportionally higher loss of life than
even the most violent counties in Munster. i
As such this thesis is inspired by what is an obvious historical
question. Obvious because with the importance of partition in the
current political landscape, and also perhaps in the agendas of
present-minded historians, not to mention the huge impact that the
past thirty years have had on Irish historical writing itself, it seems
natural to ask what role miltant republicanism played in opposing
Northern Ireland at the time of its creation, a time when it was
evidently at its most vulnerable. 
2
With this obvious connection in mind it may be expected that such a
question would have received extensive attention from historians.
However, this is not the case. In fact it is arguable that not only the
Northern IRA but also the minority Catholic population as a whole
have, until relatively recently, been very much the forgotten people of
Irish history. While historians such as Eamon Phoenix and Marianne
Ellott have done much to address this anomaly the story of the IRA in
i G.B. Kenna (Father John Hassan) Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom (O'Connell, Dublin,
1922) pp,lOl-112. See also P,Hart The IRA and its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916-23
(Oxford, 1998) p.50.
2 For an analysis of 
the effects of the Northern Irish 'Troubles' on Irish historical writing see D.G.
Boyce, 'Past and Present: Revisionism and the Norther Ireland Troubles' in D,G, Boyce and A.
O'Day (eds.), The Making of Modern Irish History: Revisionism and the Revisionist Controversy
(Routledge, 1996) pp.216-235,
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the six counties stil requires further attention,3 The pioneering work
of Michae1 Hopkinson and Tim Pat Coogan, whilst providing excellent
accounts of the period, form only part of studies whose main focus lies
elsewhere, More recently Jim McDermott has made a significant
contribution to the study of the IRA in Belfast between i 920-22
although there stil exists no dedicated work on the activities of the
organisation in the rest of Northern Ireland.4 The current trend in
Irish historical writing towards local and county studies, tyified in
the work of Peter Hart, Marie Co1eman, Joost Augusteijn and Michael
Farry, has yet to have made any impact on the six counties.s With so
many of these studies now complete, and many more on the way, this
historiographica1 gap becomes ever more noticeable and the reasons
for its existence less and less sustainable. As such this thesis wil
attempt to demonstrate that not only is the subject of the Northern
IRA itself an important and interesting one but also that the reasons
for its neglect are similarly enlightening.
Perhaps the most fundamental reason for this neglect has been due to
the psychological impact of the past thirty years of political upheaval
in Northern Ireland. The sheer length and immediacy of the recent
3 E, Phoenix, Northern Nationalism: Nationalist Politics, Partition and the Catholic Minority in
Northern Ireland 1890-1940 (Belfast, 1994); M, Ellott, The Catholics of Ulster: A History (London
2000),
4 M.A. Hopkinson Green Against Green: The Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988); T,P. Coogan Michael
Collns (London, 1991); J. McDermottNorthern Divisions: The Old IRA and the Belfast Pogroms1920-
22 (Belfast, 2001),
5 See P. Hart, The IRA and its Enemies; M. Fary, The Aftermath of Revolution: Sligo 1921-23 (Dublin,
2000); J. Augusteijn, From Public Defiance to Guerrila Warfare (Dublin, 1996); M. Coleman, County
Longford and the Irsh Revolution, 1910-1923 (Dublin, 2002). See also David Fitzpatrick's seminal
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conflct has relegated earlier periods of violence in Ulster to the
position of mere dress-rehearsals for the main event taking place in
the present. They are the unfinished battles of the past now finally
reaching their conclusion in the modern era. Such attitudes have
meant that the role of the north-east in the Irish revolution is
extremely il defined. Vague or emotive phrases such as the 'Troubles'
or the 'Belfast Pogrom' have been employed to describe what is an
extremely complex set of historical events with distinct phases of
development. This failure to adequately define the period has been
reinforced by a distinct possessiveness of the events of the
revolutionar period on the part of Southern nationalists, typified by
the employment of an identical nomenclature for the various phases of
the conflct on both sides of the border, Thus, for example, the Truce
period running from July-December 1921 is applied to the six
counties despite the fact that more people were kiled in Belfast during
the last five months of the year than in the first seven.6
The context of the recent 'Troubles' in the north-east has also meant
that any historical subject which involves a link between the IRA and
Northern Ireland will almost inevitably be an extremely sensitive one.
This has been demonstrated markedly by the lack of substantial
historical sources for the period. Archival material, such as that now
study of County Clare, Politics and Irish Life 1913-1921: Provincial Experience of 
War and
Revolution (Dublin, 1977).
6 Between 1 January and 11 July 1921 52 people were kiled in Belfast compared to 71 between 11 July
and 6 December. See Kenna Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom pp.103-6, For an interesting
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released today, was simply not available to earlier historians. There
was almost a paranoid fear, especially in Northern Ireland, that new
historical revelations would do little but stoke the fires of sectarian
conflct and either offend or reinforce one of the two competing
ideologies. The absence of available archives meant that those who did
research the subject tended to have something of an axe to grind. This
approach is typified in the work of republicans such as Michael Farrell
and rather defensive unionists, most notably Bryan Folls.7
The absence of archives however is only part of the story. There has
also been a general unwillngness to investigate the Northern aspects
of the conflct because they reflect badly on present-day mythologies.
For unionists any scrutiny of the period will inevitably focus on their
rather woeful security record and the violent oppression of the
Catholic minority by elements within their own police forces,
principally the notorious 'B' Specials. Unionists during this period are
more readily identified as the besiegers of the Catholic minority rather
than the besieged of their own historical tradition. 
8
discussion of the limitations of current definitions of the revolutionary period see P. Hart, 'Definition:
Defining the Irish Revolution' in 1. Augusteijn (ed,), The Irish Revolution, 1913-1923 (Dublin, 1996).
7 See for example M, Farrell, Arming the Protestants: The Formation of the Ulster Special
Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary 1920-27 (London, 1983); B. Folls, A State Under
Siege: the establshment of Northern Ireland 1920-25 (Oxford, 1995),
8 In total 557 people were kiled between July 1920 and July 1922 in Norther Ireland. 455 ofthese
deaths occurred in Belfast (267 Catholics, 185 Protestants and three of unknown religion). However, as
Catholics made up only one quarter of the population of the city the per-capita death rates were much
higher. See Kenna Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom; 1. Bardon A History of Ulster (Blackstaff,
1992) p.494
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Similarly Southern nationalists have little interest in highlighting the
Northern aspects of the independence struggle mainly because it
demonstrates their total failure to avert partition, typified graphically
by their role in the shambolic Boundary Commission of 1925, It also
shows up the extent to which the South was prepared to purchase its
own independence at the expense of Irish unity.9 In this sense, as with
the North, historical anomalies have been jettisoned in order to
provide both states with an unambiguous justification for their
existence. For unionists the events of 1920-22 do little but highlight
the Northern government's rather shaky hegemony over its territory
and its use of brutal methods to maintain it, whilst in the South it
shows up the limitations of nationalist rhetoric in the Irish context.
They have preferred to concentrate on the victory they achieved over
the British in the War of Independence rather than the squalid failure
of armed insurrection in the North. It is notable for example that in
the recent fim of the life of Michael Collns his personal crusade
against partition of the first six months of 1922 is not even mentioned,
let alone dramatised.
Irish republicans themselves have also got distinct reasons for
ignoring the role of their forebears in attempting to undermine
partition. The most unpalatable fact they face is that the Northern IRA
was almost totally destroyed in the period 1920-22, failng to make
9 The most impressive studies exploring southern nationalist attitudes to the North are C, O'Hal1oran,
Partition and the Limits of Irish Nationalism: an ideology under stress (Dublin, 1987) and J. Bowman,
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any inroads into partition and essentially ceasing to exist until the
1960s, so great was their defeat, Irish republican tradition is not
noted for celebrating defeats unless, like the Easter Rising, they are
'glorious' ones and there was nothing glorious about this period, it
was bitter, brutal and sectarian. The vast majority of those kiled, both
Protestant and Catholic, are innocent civilians, an extremely high
proportion of them women and children. The manner of their deaths is
also truly horrfic and the IRA's role is a largely ambiguous and
counterproductive one.
Doctrinal factors, most notably the Northern IRA's perceived pro-
Treaty stance in the Irish Civil War, have also miltated against the
group's acceptance into the republican pantheon. As such it is the
tiny and insignificant anti-Treaty element of the period which has
gone on to secure the mantle of being the true Irish republicans, This
has meant that Northern IRA veterans of the period have reacted with
a mixture of embarrassment and secrecy to their role in the conflct.
Unlike Southern IRA figures such as Tom Barry, Dan Breen or Ernie
O'Malley who became popular celebrities due to their exploits in the
War of Independence, writing best-sellng books and appearing on
television documentaries, virtually none of the key leaders of the
Northern IRA are familar to a general readership.
De Valera and the Ulster Question, 1917-73 (Oxford, 1982). For the complex workings of the
Boundary Commission see G. Hand, Report of the Irish Boundmy Commission (Shannon, 1969),
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Perhaps the most potent example of this historical amnesia is the
almost non-existence of republican songs about the Northern IRA and
the lack of virtually any monuments to IRA actions in the six counties
from the revolutionary period unlike in the South where songs,
monuments and commemorations abound. A typical example of these
forgotten fights is the 'Clones Affray' of February 1922 where in
extremely dramatic circumstances a party of 'A' Specials fought a gun
battle with the IRA leaving five dead and well over twenty wounded, At
the time its impact was enormous leading to the suspension of British
troop withdrawals from the South and nearly forty deaths in Belfast
during the following three days. Today however the incident, like so
many others in the North during the revolutionary period, is almost
completely forgotten receiving only scant attention in even the most
specialised of texts. 
ID The question to be asked is if such an event had
occurred in Cork or Kerry would it have been so easily ignored? This
lack of reference in Irish republican tradition to the Northern IRA,
especially in an organisation so obsessed with its past, is perhaps the
greatest testament to how these events have been quietly forgotten.
The end result of these various practical and ideological barriers has
led to what the historian and political scientist Paul Bew has called
'partitionist history'. Bew argues convincingly that historians have
concentrated overly on the intemal development of either Southern
nationalism or Ulster Unionism. Whilst knowledge of the two
10 This incident is examined in detail in chapter five,
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traditions in Ireland has become increasingly sophisticated this has
been achieved at the expense of all-Ireland perspectives. Obviously the
victims of such a rigid north-south division will be anomalous groups
such as the Northern Catholic minority who do not fit neatly into
either state. This however is the very reason why the story of the
Northern IRA is such an important one as it focuses on the fault-lines
between the two ideologies and their respective foundation-myths
showing up something of their inherent character and ideological
limitations. 
11
The structure of this thesis reflects very much the lack of reference to
Northern republicanism in Irish historical writing. A narrative rather
than thematic approach has been favoured principally because the
story of the Northern IRA is a very complex one and a thematic
approach it was felt would hinder rather than help an understanding
of the flow of historical events in Ireland between 1920-22. As well as
untangling the elements of this often confusing story the study will
concentrate on those attitudes, activities and perspectives which the
IRA in the six counties possessed which makes them deservng of the
prefix 'Northern'. What is key to understanding this group of men, and
one of the main themes which emerges from their history, is how they
both come to define themselves and be defined by others as a distinct
grouping apart from their compatriots south of the border. Indeed it is
11 See P, Bew, Ideology and the Irish question: Ulster Unionism and Irish nationalism 1912-1916
(Oxford, 1994); one potent example of this 'partitionist history' can be found in Dermot Keogh's
20
only through an analysis of the Northern IRA's relationship with its
erstwhile Southern alles that the true nature of the organisation can
be understood. As such the principal aim of this thesis is not only to
examine the part played by the Northern IRA in attempting to
undermine the Northern Irish state in its formative years, but also its
wider role and contribution to the Irish revolution.
Twentieth-CentUlY Ireland: Nation and State (Dublin, 1994) where the North is deliberately left out of
the study.
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PART I
THE WAR COMES NORTH
22
CHAPTER ONE
FINDING THE FIGHT
23
The rebirth of Irish republicanism in the first decade of the 20th
century had a distinct Ulster heritage. The resurrection of the Irish
Republican Brotherhood and establishment of the Dungannon clubs
was in large part due to the energetic activities of the Belfast-based
republican trio of Bulmer Hobson, Sean McDermott and Denis
McCullough, On the surface at least it appeared that Ulster was the
new home for an equally new breed of radical republicans. However
such radicalism was largely ilusory; as the historian Austen Morgan
has written, the republican movement in the north-east consisted of
little more than '...big individuals in small organisations who leave for
Dublin.' i Indeed after the split in the Volunteer movement of 1914
only a mere 200 men in Belfast remained loyal to the IRB controlled
Irish Volunteers.2
The role played by these men in the Easter Rising of 1916 was little
short of farcicaL. McCullough brought a motley band of 132
Volunteers and Cumann na mBan girls by train from Belfast to
Dungannon with vague orders from Patrick Pearse to move into
Connaught and link up with Liam Mellows to defend the line of the
river Shannon. After arriving in Tyone, a combination of opposition
from the handful of local Volunteers, who refused to countenance
leaving their own area, and a realisation of the sheer impracticality of
1 A. Morgan, Labour and Partition: Th Belfast Working Class and the Belfast Labour Movement,
1868-1920 (London, 1991) p, 198,
2 Ibid" p,204,
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Pearse's orders led McCullough to call off the entire operation and
return to Belfast without a shot being fired. 3
In the patriotic aftermath of the Easter Rising McCullough's pragmatic
decision appeared to many young radicals as treachery. Sean Cusack,
later to be an IRA offcer in Belfast, recalled a conversation he had
with McCullough after the aborted insurrection: 'He told me that he
had been asked by his leaders to do something which was beyond the
reasonable expectations of his small force...These reasons prompted
him to discourage action in Belfast after they returned from Co.
Tyone on Easter Sunday. I told Mr McCullough that we all felt that he
had to some extent let us down.' 4 Similarly Roger McCorley, a future
leader of the Belfast Brigade and barely fifteen years old in 1916,
angrily stated: 'I feel that a few determined men could have taken
action which would have compelled most, if not all, of the British
Garrison to remain in Belfast. It was from this that my detestation of
faint-heartedness in war originated.' 5 It would be the
uncompromising attitude of young men like McCorley rather than the
cautious approach of McCullough which would later come to dominate
the outlook of the IRA in Belfast.
3 For a full description of the events in Ulster in 19l6 by some ofits key participants see the statements
of Se an Cusack (Bureau of Military History (BMH), National Archives (NA), WS 9); Frank Booth
(BMH, NA, WS 229); John Garvey (BMH, NA, WS 178), See also Morgan Labour and Partition
pp.205-6; lMcDermott Northern Divisions: p.13.
4 Sean Cusack statement (BMH, NA, WS 402).
5 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
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The post-Rising arrests demonstrated markedly the weakness of
advanced nationalism in the north of Ireland with only 83 of the
estimated 1600 men detained coming from the nine counties of
U1ster.6 As such reorganisation of the Irish Volunteers in Belfast
during 1917 was on an extremely small scale. David McGuinness,
later to emerge as a key IRA Intellgence offcer in the Belfast Brigade,
described the disorganised confusion which surrounded these early
efforts to re-establish the movement: 'The first move to effect a
reorganisation was the notification by word of mouth for Volunteers to
attend a meeting at premises opposite the Forester's Hall at Mil
Street. This meeting was most informal, no proper chairman, each
man had apparently something to say and said it.' 7
Four Volunteer companies, each consisting of at most forty men and
based in the Catholic Falls Road area of the city, were existing in
Belfast by early 1918. Each one was built around a hard-core of
radical members of prominent Gaelic sporting associations and pipe
bands in the city such as the O'Neil Crowley, Michael Davitt, John
Mitchell and Sean McDermott GAA clubs. Added to these were the
remnants of the old Fianna companies whose members would later
graduate to the leadership of the Belfast IRA in the early 1920s. Under
the guise of sporting and cultural gatherings basic miltary training
was undertaken. This involved little more than drillng in the hils
6 Morgan, Labour and Partition p,206. For details of the internees from Ulster see S. O'Mahoney,
Frongoch: University of Revolution (Dublin, 1987) pp. i 70-1,
7 David McGuinness unpublished memoir quoted in McDermott, Northern Divisions p,13,
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around Belfast during the evening or at weekends under the constant
observation of the RIC.8 Such activities defined the extent of Volunteer
operations in the city well into 1919. Roger McCorley, despite his
angry reaction to McCullough's perceived timidity in 1916, would later
confide: 'One of the diffculties was that no one had any clear idea as
to what form our activities would eventually take. There was a general
idea that some day the signal for a rising would come and that we
could drive the enemy into the sea with one fell swoop.' 9
However, such a signal never came and, as elsewhere in Ireland, it
was the wider political context that gave a renewed impetus to the
faltering organisation. The by-election campaigns in South Armagh
and East Tyone, held in February and April 1918 respectively, gave
the local Volunteer organisations a much needed focus for their
activities.1O Volunteers from as far afield as Dublin, Clare and
Dundalk came to the north-east in their hundreds to boost local
attempts to ensure a Sinn Fein victory.ll As well as carryng out
canvassing, voter registration and the protection of pollng stations
the Volunteers also engaged in violent scuffes with the supporters of
the Irish Parliamentary Party in the shape of the Ancient Order of
Hibernians who retained the support of the majority of the Ulster
Catholic population,
8 Thomas Fox statement (BMH, NA, WS 365); David McGuinness statement (BMH, NA, WS417); see
also McDermott, Northern Divisions pp. 13-14.
9 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
10 MA Hopkinson The Irish War of Independence (Dublin, 2002) p.16. See also J. Augusteijn, From
Public Defiance to Guerrila Warfare pp.62-3,
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The rhetoric of these battles, if not the violence, was of the extremist
variety as both sides fought for the role of being the true
representatives of nationalism in Ireland. John Cosgrave, an Armagh
Volunteer, angrily recalled the extent to which their political enemies
would go to defeat Sinn Fein:
'We then saw the unusual spectacle of Hibernians and
Orangemen travellng together in the same public conveyance
with the green Hibernian flag and the Orange Union jack flying
side by side. The Hibernian election slogan "Up Donnelly" was
supplemented by the Orange section with the additional war cry
of "To hell with the Pope". This unholy alliance between orange
and green was the start of an intense opposition by the
Hibernians to everyhing republican in our area,' 12
Despite such claims unionists played a very minor role in this
internecine warfare between the two brands of Irish nationalism.
Cosgrave himself would admit: 'In 1918 an 1919 the Volunteers got
more annoyance and opposition from the Hibernian organisation than
from the Unionists.' 13
The confrontations between the Volunteers and Hibernians in South
Armagh were particularly bitter. John McCoy, second in command of
the IRA's Newr Brigade, recalled Eamon de Valera arriving in his area
11 John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492); see also lMcDenottNorthern Divisions p.14,
12 John Cosgrave statement (BMH, NA WS 605).
13 Ibid.
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with both of his car windows smashed in after an especially violent
campaign rally at Crossmaglen. McCoy later stated that it looked as if
the Sinn Fein leader had been in a fight. 14 The intensity of the political
violence surrounding the by-election would leave a legacy of bitterness
in Armagh that would lead to brutal recriminations over the coming
years. After the election itself many sports and cultural organisations
in the county were broken up as the Hibernians and Volunteers
moved away to create their own separate clubs.
Nevertheless the election campaign had breathed new life into the
previously scattered and lacklustre Volunteer companies in South
Armagh. By the end of 1918 the Camlough Battalion had been formed
under the dynamic leadership of Frank Aiken. Soon after a brigade
was constituted in Newr under Paddy Rankin, with Aiken as his
deputy, covering both Armagh and South Down.1S This brigade would
later form the basis of the powerful 4th Northern Division, which along
with Belfast constituted the two most active IRA areas in the six
counties. Despite the beneficial effects of the by-elections to the
Volunteers, in the longer term the outcome looked ominous for the
potential of republicanism to spread its appeal to the north-east of
Ireland. The Sinn Fein candidates Patrick McCartan and Sean Milroy
were both defeated, temporarily halting the Sinn Fein bandwagon,
14 John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492).
15 Ibid.
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which had been previously victorious in Roscommon, Longford, Clare
and Kilkenny City.l6
Along with the by-elections in the spring of 1918 fears that the British
government would introduce conscription in Ireland to counter the
German spring offensive in France also had a beneficial impact, albeit
a temporary and qualified one, on the Volunteer organisation in the
north-east. As in the south and west of Ireland the conscription crisis
brought about a brief surge in the membership of the organisation
throughout the six counties. In Belfast the number of Volunteers rose
from around 100 to 240 although most of these recruits left when the
threat of conscription had receded.1? It was a similar story elsewhere
and summed up neatly by one Volunteer offcer: 'Conscription in April
1918 brought many in but they did not stop in.' 18 Michae1 Sheerin,
an IRA offcer from Derr, voiced the feelings of many older members
to this new batch of recruits: ' They were no good. Most of them
thought the IRA was some sort of organisation one joined if he wanted
to be protected from conscription escorts. We swore very few of them
into the movement, and saw little of them after the enrolment.' 19
Nicho1as Smyth, a Volunteer leader from Tyone, echoed this view
16 The by-election results were as follows: East Tyrone-Patrck Donnelly (IPP) 2324, Patrick McCaran
(Sinn Fein) 1305; South Aragh-Thomas Harbinson (IPP) 1802, Sean Milroy (Sin Fein) 1222. See B.
Walker Parliamentary Election Results in Ireland 1801-1922 (Dublin, 1978) p,185.For the effects of
these failures on de Valera and the wider Sin Fein movement see Bowman De Valera and the Ulster
Question 1917-73 pp.33-37,17 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016),
is Neil Gilespie quoted in U. MacEoin, Survivors (Dublin, 1980) p,162,
19 Michael Sheer in statement (BMH, NA, WS 803).
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recallng that even some old UVF members had joined up as a means
of protection from the threat of conscription.2o
Despite the impact of these external factors on the Volunteer
organisation in the north -east and the growing miltancy of the
movement south of the border, the six counties remained quiet and
peacefuL. While the threat of partition had played a major role in
allowing Sinn Fein to undermine the IPP, miltant republican activity
was virtually non-existent in Ulster for the first eighteen months of the
conflict. John McCoy noted the marked contrast between the situation
in Ulster and that in the rest of Ireland: 'With us the Republican effort
to organise was so limited in scope and making such slow headway
that no particular notice was taken of it by the British Authorities and
Unionists.' 21 One RIC Constable based at Maghera in County
Londonderr described the rather timid attempts at miltant activity in
his area, 'Ach the (RICl boycott was not too bad, they didn't do that in
Maghera; they didn't boycott you in Maghera. We played football with
them. Life was comfortable enough. As long as you treated them
decent and didn't go too hard on them. The troubles didn't have much
of an effect. There was one ambush. They fired alright but a Sergeant
Ke1ner was with me and Kelner was too wise for them. They didn't see
Kelner until he jumped on them. Kelner gave them the best
hammering ever they got, they went on their knees and begged of him
20 Nicholas Smyth statement (BMH, NA, WS 721), For the effects of the conscription crisis throughout
Ireland see M.A. Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence (Dublin, 2002) pp,16-17, Augusteijn,
From Public Defiance to Guerrila Warfare pp,75-8,
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to let them go.' 22 The industrial disputes of 1919 inflamed by rising
unemployment remained the principal areas of confrontation.23 What
other violence there was involved the usual sectarian scuffing typified
by the attack of a loyalist mob on Catholic Celtic supporters after their
match with Glentoran in the City Cup Final at Windsor Park in May
1919.24
The lacklustre performance of the Northern IRA was not unique to the
six counties when assessed in the wider context of the War of
Independence with most areas outside of Munster and Dublin
experiencing an extremely low level of IRA violence. The particular
reasons for the Northern IRA's inactivity however were specific to
Ulster. The sheer diffculty of organising amidst such a large and
hostile majority Protestant population made any form of IRA activity,
especially that which required some level of acquiescence from the
civilan population, such as the RIC boycott, extremely problematic if
not impossible,25 Unlike in the south of Ireland where the population
were either cowed or displayed tacit support for the IRA, the six
counties contained a strong and aggressive anti-nationalist majority.
Joe Sweeney, the Donegal IRA leader, later outlined his torrid
experience of this opposition after his arrest in early 1920: '.., they
brought us down by lorry to the docks in Belfast where they
21 John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492),
22 James Gilmer quoted in JBrewer (ed,), The Royal Irish Constabulary: An Oral History (Belfast,
1990) p,99,
23 For details of the engineering strike of 1919 and the economic background to the violence see
Morgan, Labour and Partition pp.229-284,
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deliberately left us standing beside a destroyer for about ten minutes
so that the Orangemen there could throw anything they could get
their hands on at us- lumps of coal.. . rivets, bolts.' 26
Extreme reactions such as this from sections of the unionist
population meant that what few IRA units there were remained limited
to areas with strong Catholic popu1ations. Even within these
communities Joe Devlin's United Irish League and its affiliated
organisation the AOH, would maintain their strong grip on the
political loyalties of most Northern Catholics which had been so
apparent in the earlier by-election campaigns, This was confirmed by
the UIL's success in the general election of 1918 where, despite being
decimated in the south and west of Ireland, they managed to win four
seats in the six counties. This included West Belfast where Joe Devlin
won a substantial majority over Sinn Fein's strongest candidate,
Eamon de Valera.27 Even by 1920 there were only 980 Sinn Fein
members in Belfast compared to 6533 members of the UIL. 28
As such when overt sectarian violence erupted in Belfast in mid- 1920
many nationalists stil saw the Hibernians and the old structures of
the Redmondite Volunteers as the natural candidates for the role as
24 Irish News, 20 May 1919,
25 Augusteijn, From Public Defiance to Guerrila Warfare p.316,
26 Joe Sweeney quoted in K.Griffth and T,O'Grady (eds,), Curious Journey: An Oral History of
Ireland's Unfinished Revolution (Dublin, 1982) p,161.
27 Devlin received 8488 votes to de Valera's 3245. For the background to the 1918 election in the six
counties see E, Staunton, The Nationalists of Northern Ireland 1918-1973 (Columbia, 2001) pp, 18-24:
B. Walker Parliamentary Results in Ireland 1801-1922, pp, 185-191.
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defenders of the Catholic community. For example in 1920 Roger
McCorley discovered that a local clergyan had in his possession
sixty Martini-Henri rifles which he offered to the AOH for the defence
of Catholic areas in the city. The IRA managed to intercept this
message and went along to collect the rifles in the guise of Hibernians.
The priest told McCorley that he was only providing them with the
rifles on the express condition that the IRA did not get hold of them.29
Indeed throughout the period the IRA would spend a great deal of time
and energy attacking these political opponents in the nationalist
community, a strategy which would do little but breed further division
within the Catholic minority and miltate against the possibilty of
unified opposition to the new Unionist government.
Such internal opposition meant that the IRA in the six counties lacked
strong networks of support and made the organisation both politically
fragile and extremely isolated. The Northern IRA, already made up of
only a small fraction of Sinn Fein activists in Ulster, itself the junior
nationalist organisation in the region, were by far the smallest political
grouping in the six counties, As the historian Joost Augusteijn has
argued: 'The silent acceptance of the Volunteers as the sole
representatives of the Catholic community, which crossed most
sections of the community in the South, was limited to a few small
28 H. Patterson, Class, Conflict and Sectarianism: The Protestant Working Class and the Belfast
Labour Movements, 1868-1920 (Belfast, 1980) p,185,
29 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389); see also the recollections of two other Belfast
Volunteers, David McGuiness and Sean Montgomery quoted in McDermott, Northern Divisions p,19,
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pockets of hard-core support.' 30 As such IRA organisation was patchy
and scattered in small pockets throughout the north-east with the
majority of districts having no IRA presence whatsoever. 
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The resistance from political opponents in both the Protestant and
Catholic communities also impacted on the IRA's attempts to procure
weapons and equipment. As elsewhere in Ireland the need to acquire
arms became an early and continuing obsession for the Northern IRA.
Weapons were obtained from a wide variety of sources. Guns were
bought from arms dealers and soldiers returning from France
although raids on private houses, barracks and arms suppliers were
the main methods of equipping the Volunteers.32 In 1919 raids such
as those on Ridde1ls gunsmiths in Belfast and a quarry near
Hannahstown in order to steal explosives were as far as the Northern
IRA went along the road to armed insurrection.33 However, due to the
scale of the opposition the organisation faced in the north-east, even
such small-scale activities often led to a violent backlash.
Many weapons were stil in the hands of old UVF members and
presented a tempting, although risky, target for the IRA. These
numerous minor confrontations not only bred further animosity
between both communities but also defined many of the IRA's later
targets. For example, on 12 May 1920 an attack was launched on
301. Augusteijn From Public Defiance to Guerrila Warfare op, cit. p.316,
31 F. O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin, 1954) p, 247,
32 Ibid., p,147-l50,
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Newtownhamilton barracks principally because the town was
perceived as being home to some of the most aggressive members of
the unionist population and '...it was considered advisable to give
them a chance of showing their mettle when up against a serious local
attack on what they had sworn to defend.' 34 Indeed vigorous
opposition from loyalists meant that the Newr Brigade experienced
particular problems obtaining arms. By 1919 the brigade had only six
rifles, which McCoy recalled were '...more appropriate to a museum
than an armoury.' 35 In May an attempt had been made to procure
weapons with a large-scale raid on Ballyedmond castle in South Down
which had previously been the headquarters of a local UVF battalion
and was home to its old commander Sir Arthur Nugent. The attack
had been under contemplation for the previous twelve months and by
the time it was eventually launched all of the weapons had been
removed. Such abortive raids meant that by the start of 1920 the
Newr Brigade had only managed to double its number of rifles to
twelve. 
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The diffculties experienced by even the most miltant IRA units in
acquiring weapons and the resolute opposition presented by large
sections of both the unionist and nationalist communities meant that
the first phase of the War of Independence had virtually no impact on
the north-east. It was only in the spring of 1920 after GHQ ordered all
33 Thomas Fox statement (BMH, NA, WS 365),
34 John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492).
35 Ibid.
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IRA units throughout Ireland to carry out raids on unoccupied police
barracks and government buildings to commemorate the Easter
Rising that the Northern IRA made a concerted effort to begin offensive
operations. In April around six tax offces were attacked in Belfast and
similar raids were recorded in many of the major towns across Ulster.
Thomas Flynn took part in one of these raids on the Income Tax offce
in Queen's Square, Belfast: 'We had Volunteers working in this offce,
and after offce hours, through these volunteers, we were able to gain
admission. We overpowered the caretaker. We administered
chloroform to this unfortunate man and tied him up. It was most
fortunate that he was not suffocated or burned. All the papers and
documents in the offce were collected in trays and burned in the
building.' 37 In Belfast the attacks were organised by two ex-
employees, Joe McKe1vey and Seamus Woods, both of whom would
later take command of the IRA's 3rd Northern Division covering much
of east Ulster. Woods later described his amateurish first attempts at
arson confiding that he set himself on fire as well as the government
records.38 Elsewhere the attacks followed a similar pattern and more
often than not were led, as in Belfast, by men who would later become
key leaders of the Northern IRA including Frank Aiken who personally
entered the Custom House in Newr and set fire to its records.39
36 Ibid. For details ofthe Ballyedmond raid see also Irish News, l2 May 1919.
37 Thomas Flynn statement (BMH, NA, WS 429).
38 Seamus Woods interview with Ernie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, University College Dublin,
Archives Department (UCDAD), P l7b/l 07). For further details of the raids in Belfast see McDermott,
Northern Divisions pp,28-29.
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Aiken and his small band of followers had transformed Armagh into
virtually the only area in the north-east comparable to the more
disturbed counties of Munster. Attacks steadily increased during 1920
after the tax offce raids culminating in the fatal shooting of an RIC
Sergeant near Crossmaglen in June. By the end of the year the Newr
Brigade felt strong enough to launch operations on a larger scale
although strident loyalist opposition doomed their efforts to failure. In
December a plan was devised to launch an attack on the police
barracks in Camlough, the home town of Frank Aiken, with a
simultaneous ambush at the 'Egytian Arch' railway bridge which lay
half a mile from Newr. 40 The operation, carried out on the evening of
12 December, was a disaster. Persistent rain and snow showers made
it impossible to set fire to the barracks and the attacking party were
forced to beat a hasty retreat. The authorities had also been
forewarned of the waiting ambush at the railway bridge and confusion
over the moving of weapons between IRA units allowed the police to
launch their own ambush which left three local IRA members dead
and two badly wounded. The rest of the men fled across the
surrounding fields and escaped into Louth and Monaghan as police
poured into South Armagh and South Down. By way of reprisal they
headed straight for Aiken's home in Camlough and burned it to the
ground.41 Edward Fullerton, a local Volunteer, commented:
'Immediately after the Egytian Arch ambush, the job of evading
39 Edward Fullerton statement (BMB, NA, WS 890).
40 Edward Boyle statement (BMH, NA, WS 647).
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capture was a who1etime occupation with us.' 42 The growing miltancy
of the IRA in Armagh was dealt a severe blow from which it had barely
recovered by the time of the Truce.
Similar attempts to match the militancy of Aiken were poorly prepared
and badly executed. On 20 June 1920 the IRA attempted a raid on
Cookstown Barracks in County Tyone. However the RIC garrison
offered determined resistance and the local Volunteers quickly
retreated. One of their number, Patrick Loughran, was shot in the
stomach during the brief firefight, eventually dying from his wounds a
few hours after the attack, the first IRA member to be kiled in the six
counties.43 Other setbacks were to follow and again it was the
ineptitude of the IRA that was the tellng factor. Frank Donnelly, an
IRA Commandant from North Armagh, took part in one such
shambolic attack on Irish Street Police barracks in Armagh where a
contraption made up of an axle box and a horse cart was filled with
explosives and rolled up opposite the barracks. He admitted years
later that despite the lengthy preparations: 'The explosion did more
damage to the houses opposite the barrack than it did to the barrack
premises.' 44 It was a similar story elsewhere with attempts to capture
Dundrum, Ballynahinch and Crossgar barracks all ending in failure.
41 By far the best account of the Egyptian Arch atIair is given by John McCoy (BMH, NA, WS 492);
see also Peadar Barry statement (BMH, NA, WS 853).
42 Edward Fullerton statement (BMH, NA, WS 890),
43 Albert Tally statement (BMH, NA, WS 884).
44 Frank Donnelly statement (BMH, NA, WS 941).
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The story of this latter attack at Crossgar in East Down, launched in
July 1920, is typical of the IRA's early amateurish approach. A local
RIC Constable Wiliam Britton gave his version of the events as
follows: 'They attacked Crossgar with rifle fire, the police station was a
terrace house. Well they went into both houses beside the Barrack
and tried to blow it up. They couldn't, they weren't well up in
explosives... They mustn't have been well up in explosives because
instead of blowing up, it blew out. They did the same thing at
Ballynahinch. It went off but it went out. Well nowadays ¡i.e. the
1980sJ, you see, they're being trained. They weren't up to the standard
they are now in the use of explosives.' 45
Roger McCorley had been appointed by Joe McKelvey to lead the
attack at Crossgar. His account of the operation demonstrates
graphically the incompetence and lacklustre attitude that pervaded
the Northern IRA during the first two years of the War of
Independence:
'As an indication of the bad training of the men in this area-
there was a bombing party which was to go into the houses on
each side of the Barracks when the attack took place and when
the petrol was pumped in they were to throw in bombs to set
the petrol ablaze. The men who were detailed for this bombing
party had no idea of the mechanism of bombs which were of the
Mils Hand Grenade type so I was given the job of instructing
45 James Gilmer quoted in Brewer, The Royal Irish Constabulary p.99,
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these men, I brought the instruction down to the very minimum
they would need, I instructed them to keep their hands on the
levers after pullng the pins. When I had given this instruction I
told them to remain where they were so they would not get
picked for some other party. I was then called away to fix a rifle
which some fellow had taken to pieces and could not re-
assemble. I just got back in time to find one of the bombing
party with the pin extracted from the bomb and was just about
to let the lever fly off. He appeared to be under the impression
that nothing would happen if he did not throw the bomb. I just
saved it in time. There was considerable diffculty in keeping the
men under control. Sometimes a man would find himself picked
on two or three different parties owing to the fact that they were
moving about the hall. We were practically a full hour late when
we finally moved to attack the barracks.' 46
When the attack eventually began it was indeed the shambles that
Wiliam Britton had remembered. The IRA Engineer, who McCorley
admitted was facing 'the realities of fighting' for the first time, had
placed the charges in the wrong position in the two adjoining houses
which, when they exploded, left the barracks standing alone and
unharmed. Before the bombs went off one of the party panicked and
ran out into the street screaming. With the police now alerted and the
plan compromised McCorley ordered a retreat but again the
46 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
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incompetence of his men caused problems: 'The general signal for the
callng off of the attack was to be a blast on a whistle but the officer in
command forgot to bring a whistle... The attack more or less broke
itself off,' 47 Luckily the men were not pursued in their disorderly
retreat, 'It seemed that the British forces were as ineffcient as we were
but they had not the same excuse.' 48 McCorley's conclusion was that
the timid attitude of his men was to blame for the failure of the attack
blaming '...a certain lack of determination to carry an operation
through even at a certain cost in casualties,' 49 Indeed the few
successes the IRA had in this early period were those which avoided
direct confrontation with the enemy. James McE1duff described his
first action, an attack on Mountfie1d police barracks: 'It was already
abandoned by the R.I.C., so it was a good target to start off with. We
did not burn it. We went in and broke it up. We left it so it could not
be repaired again.' 50
Overall however such attacks, whether successful or not, were little
more than token attempts to show solidarity with more miltant
republicans in Munster and involved at most minor assaults by a few
local radicals causing little significant damage, McCorley himself was
particularly angr at the inactivity of the IRA in Belfast, blaming the
leadership for '...not taking the matter as seriously as the general
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid,
49 Ibid,
50 James McElduff quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p,173.
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members of the company felt they should.' 51 He and a few of the
younger men had tried to carry out attacks but in McCorley's words:
'.. .on1y succeeded in giving us a bad name with the company and
battalion offcers.' 52 In March 1920 for example he and another
Volunteer, Thomas Fitzpatrick, had launched a bomb attack on a
miltary vehicle pool in the Markets area of Belfast although as
Fitzpatrick recalled: 'That was a battalion job and it was done very
quietly. There was no sanction from the brigade for it. At that time the
brigade were averse to activities in Belfast for fear of reprisals on the
Catholic population. Some of the younger men did not agree with this
policy at all, especially Roger McCorley, and we carried out this
operation without getting sanction.' 53 Under such pressure from this
radical element the reluctant leadership eventually relented and
allowed raids for arms to begin in the city although McCorley later
blamed the meagre results on the fact that the raids were offcial and
subject to tiresome restrictions.54
Despite such impatience it would take another year for this radical
young element to feel strong enough to challenge the older
conservative leadership and their activities made little impact on the
largely peaceful relations between Protestants and Catholics in the
north-east. As one RIC constable recalled: '..,relations were very good.
There was very little IRA activity in County Down at that time. I
51 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
52 Ibid,
53 Thomas Fitzpatrick statement (BMH, NA, WS 395),
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thought I was lucky getting to County Down at all, that I wasn't sent
down South.' 55 He goes on: 'You talked to your neighbours and went
about with them. Except, I mean you went to separate churches but
that was it. You drank with them if you were that way inclined and
had the money.' 56
With the IRA campaign in Munster however becoming ever more
vigorous and with attacks, such as that on the barracks at Ballytrain
in Monaghan during February, occurring only a few miles from the
proposed six county border, the spread of violence to the North was
almost inevitable. When it did erupt though, its origins had little to
with the Northern IRA. It was caused instead by unionist unease at
the success for anti-partition candidates in the local elections of
January and June 1920. A combination of Sinn Fein and UIL
candidates managed to gain control over Fermanagh and Tyone
County Councils and ten urban authorities including Omagh,
Enniskilen, Newr and Strabane. In Belfast five Sinn Fein candidates
were elected to the city council and nationalists held majorities in
thirteen other rural councils. However it was their victory in the city of
Derry, the great symbol of Protestant resistance, that would finally
ignite popular unionist opposition to the threat of violent
republicanism spreading to the six counties. After three hundred
years the city had its first Catholic mayor, Hugh O'Doherty, a Derry
54 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389).
55 Wiliam Britton quoted in Brewer, Th Royal Irish Constabulary p.93,
56 Ibid" p.34.
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solicitor, who, along with removing the name of Lord French from the
list of Derry Freemen, also refused to attend any functions where an
oath of allegiance was made to the crown. 
57
Tensions in the city had already been running high over claims that
Catholics had replaced Protestant war veterans in the shipyards, an
issue given greater significance by rising unemployment and the now
'disloyal' activities of the city counciL. Sporadic violence in May was
followed by a far more serious outbreak in June. Between 13-23 June
fifteen Catholics and four Protestants, including the son of the
Governor of the Apprentice Boys, were kiled during rioting in the city.
These clashes dragged into the fray elements of the old UVF who fired
shots from the city walls directly into the Bogside below. Barricades
were thrown up across the city and large numbers of nationalists, of
differing shades of political opinion, came forward to defend their
areas. The IRA was inevitably drawn into the violence although what
Volunteers there were presented flmsy opposition. Michael Sheerin, a
prominent member of the IRA in the city would later admit: 'In the
beginning of 1920 I had a company of about 50 men and was the only
unit functioning in the city. 25% of these I held together by threats,
the remainder were particularly unenthusiastic.' 58
57 For the origins of the Derry violence see Farrell, Arming the Protestants pp.18-20; C. Fox, The
Making of a Minority: Political Developments in Derry and the North 1912-25 (Derry, 1997) pp,68-71.
58 Quoted in Staunton, The Nationalists of Northern Ireland, p.31,
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The violence had caught these few Volunteers off-guard and as
Sheerin recalls an ad-hoc force was assembled: 'On the second day of
the trouble a prominent local member of Sinn Fein who had been in
jail was released. He was held in high esteem by the clergy and
through their influence all Catholic units including Hibernians and
Foresters, soldiers, placed themselves under this orders.' 59 This man
was Paddy Sheils, later to be OjC of the Derry Battalion. Dick McKee
and Peadar C1ancy, two of the most prominent members of the IRA in
Dublin, also arrived to encourage the local Volunteers. This motley
band set up their headquarters at St, Co1umb's College, which they
defended stoutly against attacking loyalist mobs. They managed to
hold out for a week until finally British troops opened fire on the
barricades. All but a few Volunteers fled the scene leading Sheerin to
bluntly report: 'The discarding of rifles and ammunition and the hasty
disappearance of men was not edifying.' 60 British soldiers had
eventually intervened after remaining aloof from the violence for
almost a week and accusations were made by local nationalists that
they had colluded with hastily mobilsed UVF units during the
fighting, eventually using force exclusively against the Catholic rioters.
A truce was eventually agreed between church leaders and the short-
lived violence in Derry was brought successfully to a peaceful
conclusion.61
59 Ibid., p.32.
60 Ibid.
46
It was in Belfast, however, that the outbreak of violence would be
most severe. The annual Twelfth of July celebrations were
overshadowed by the steady rise of miltant republicanism in the
South and the holiday became a period of reflection in unionist circles
resulting in increasingly radical calls to defend Ulster against Catholic
aggression. Numerous letters warning of this impending doom
appeared in the unionist press claiming for example that, 'The Roman
Catholics are pouring into Ulster and increasing rapidly in this
province where Protestants are emigrating and disappearing... the
question is whether Protestants can rouse themselves to do anything
apart from processions.' 620ne writer even outlined where this defence
of Ulster should begin: 'The Protestants of Ulster are asleep whilst
Sinn Feiners, who are pouring into our province, are wide awake; they
are busy organising, while we prate on the deeds of our forefathers
and do nothing ourselves. To the shame of the Ulster Unionists be it
said that Sinn Feiners can obtain situations in both offces and
shipyards, in so called loyal Belfast while our Protestant men walk
about idle.' 63 Another stated angrly: 'What, I would ask are our
Ulster organisations doing to contact this menace of peaceful
penetration? Processions and demonstrations are all very good in their
own way, but we want something deeper than these...The old spirit
which existed in 1914 is stil alive in Ulster-it only needs wakening.' 64
61 See Michael Sheerin statement (BMH, NA, WS 803) and report on Derry violence in Belfast
Telegraph, 22 June 1920,
62 Belfast Newsletter, 15 July 1920.
63 ibid" 15 July 1920.
64Ibid" 16 July 1920.
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The symbols of siege that accompanied the celebrations acted as a call
to arms for an already paranoid unionist population. Sir Edward
Carson in a notorious speech at Finaghy on 12 July spoke to a crowd
of 25,000 loyalists: 'We must proclaim today clearly that come what
will and be the consequences what they may, we in Ulster will tolerate
no Sinn Fein- no Sinn Fein organisation, no Sinn Fein methods.., And
these are not mere words. I hate words without action.' 65
The situation was extremely tense although it was ironically an event
far away in Cork that triggered off direct confrontation in Belfast. On
17 July members of the Cork IRA shot dead RIC Divisional
Commissioner, Colonel Gerard Smyth, in the County Club in Cork
City. Smyth, a Protestant from Banbridge County Down, had made an
aggressive speech to an RIC gathering in Listowe1 County Kerry that
was seen as so extreme that some RIC men resigned on the spot.
Emotions in the North were running high and Smyth's body was
brought back to Banbridge for burial after a short delay caused by the
refusal of railway workers in the South to have anything to do with its
transit. His funeral, set for 21 July, coincided with the return of
Protestant shipyard workers after the Twelfth holiday. Buried with full
miltary honours in a local cemetery the highly charged atmosphere
65 Ibid" 13 July 1920, See also The Times, 13 July 1920 where the meeting is referred to as a 'parade of
anachronistic intolerance' .
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eventually exploded in the town and Catholics and their property were
attacked viciously in Banbridge and nearby Dromore, 66
Frank Aiken and John McCoy were themselves caught up in the
rioting in Banbridge on the evening of Smyth's funeraL. Driving back
into Armagh after a brigade meeting they managed to enter the town
after being warned of the dangerous situation by guards at a miltary
checkpoint:
'A civilian-an Orangeman- came over to us. He had a revolver in
his hand. He enquired who we were and where we were going. I
told him that we had been stopped by the miltary, back the
road, and that they had passed us through as ok and that if he
was contemplating stopping us on our journey we would go
back and report the matter to the miltary. He did not reply to
this but continued to stare into my eyes. He then went across to
the side-car and stared into Frank Aiken's eyes. During all this
time I was enquiring if he was really intending to detain us. He
never spoke. I let in the clutch and told him we were moving off.
I accelerated the engine and moved slowly off again. When we
got some little speed up we found that missiles were being
thrown at us as we proceeded to run the gauntlet through the
town where 10,000 Orangemen lined the streets.' 67
66 For the background to Smyth's assassination see R. Abbott, Police Casualties in Ireland 1919-1922
(Dublin, 2000) pp,96-103. For an account of the assassination itself see Sean Culhane statement (BMH,
NA, WS 746); Sean Culhane interview with Ernie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD,
PI7b/108),
67 John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492),
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In Belfast, Carson's call to action stil ringing in the ears of the
returning shipyard workers, lunchtime meetings of loyalist worker's
association were held at the yards of Workman and Clark and Harland
and Wolff. These meetings soon developed into demonstrations
against the presence of disloyal Catholic workers in the yards,
eventually leading to at first sporadic and then systematic expulsions
of Catholics from the premises. The situation became increasingly
violent with some Catholics having to swim part of the River Lagan to
escape after being pelted with bolts and rivets. The expulsions spread
to the various mils and engineering works in the city with attacks at
Musgraves, Mackies and the Sirocco Works amongst others. Around
7-10,000 Catholics and 'rotten prods', approximately 10% of the
nationalist population of the city, many of who were ex-servicemen,
were expelled, including the later IRA leader Joe McKe1vey who had
worked at Mackies on Springfield Road. 68 It was from the ranks of
these expelled workers that the IRA in Belfast would draw many new
recruits; as the RIC reported on one such new radical '...the
experience here is that many ex-soldiers with good records became
IRA criminals.' 69
68 McDermott, Northern Divisions p.28, For detailed accounts of the expulsions see Morgan, Labour
and Partition pp.265-284; Patterson, Class, Confict and Sectarianism pp,ll5-42; Manus O'Boyle
statement (BMH, NA, WS 289); Kenna, Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom p, 15,
69 File on Patrick Barnes (Ministry of 
Home Affairs files, Public Record Office of Norther Ireland
(PRONI), HA/5/2181),
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The city was plunged into savage sectarian violence with loyalist mobs
launching attacks into the numerous Catholic enclaves in the city
where most of the expelled workers had fled. Bottles, stones and
paving slabs, ripped up from the streets, were hurled at fleeing
nationalists in prolonged bouts of vicious rioting, The fighting in the
Short Strand was particularly savage with Catholic homes and
businesses coming under sustained attack. Burning and looting of
Catholic shops in the Newtownards Road was reported and it was
alleged that the mob, many of them drunk on looted alcohol from
Catholic owned pubs, tried to cut the hoses of firemen tryng to
quench the fires. St. Matthews's church on Bryson Street was
attacked on the 22nd with rioters smashing windows and attempting to
burn the building down. Only intervention by soldiers of the Norfolk
Regiment eventually saw off the mobs. Attacks were also made on
C10nard monastery where Brother Michae1 Morgan was kiled after
being hit by a bullet fired from the attacking crowd. The following day
was marked by a sustained campaign of expulsions of Catholics from
mixed areas who crowded into the congested Catholic enclaves in the
city. Some Protestants were likewise expelled by the Catholic mob,
helping further to delineate the geographical boundaries between both
communities in the city. After five days the attacks finally abated.
Nineteen people had been kiled, eight Protestants and eleven
Catholics with countless others wounded or made homeless.7o
70 Kenna, Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom pp,15-24; Ballymacarret Research Group, Lagan
Enclave: A History of Confict in the Short Strand 1886-1997 (BRG,1997) pp,13-l5; Irish News, 23-27
July 1920; Belfast Newsletter, 23-25 July 1920,
51
The response of the IRA leadership in the city to this eruption of mass
sectarian violence was simply to ignore it. The brigade staff remained
aloof and resolutely opposed to any kind of participation in what was
viewed as the usual 'fracticidal strife'.71 For many IRA members such
an attitude was both unrealistic and unpopular. Roger McCorley later
described the tense atmosphere in the organisation at the time: '...in
the initial stages of this attack the IRA policy was to treat it as a
purely sectarian affair although British troops had opened fire on the
Nationalist areas and kiled a considerable number of people, Brigade
headquarters even went as far as to court-martial one offcer for
taking part in defence of his own particular area against the attacks of
the Orange mob, His defence was that it would not be very dignified
for an IRA offcer to stand by and allow someone else to defend his
home for him.' 72 The rank and fie in Belfast were becoming resentful
at the impotence of their leaders, some complaining that if they
obeyed the brigade leadership they would not even be allowed to
protect their own familes.73 Such protests forced their superiors to
relent but only slightly. Volunteers would be allowed only to attack
British troops, and only if they were making direct attacks on the
civilian population, The younger radicals in the Belfast IRA however
remained unhappy with this half-hearted response and their
71 Roger McCorley statement (BMB, NA, WS 389),
72 Ibid., see also Seamus McKenna statement (BMB, NA, WS 1016),
73 Roger McCorley statement (BMB, NA, WS 389); McDermott, Northern Divisions pp.37-39,
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frustration continue to grow over the next six months, finally erupting
in a virtual coup in the spring of 1921.
Despite these growing divisions the immediate issue for the IRA of
whether to take part in the sectarian battles sweeping Belfast, in
McCorley's words, '...settled itself in a very short space of time when
the Orange mob was provided with uniforms, paid by the British and
called the Ulster Special Constabulary.' 74 The attempts by the older
brigade leadership to rein in its younger offcers proved to be
unrealistic in the violent context of summer 1920. Seamus McKenna,
later to become O/C of the pt Battalion in Belfast, commented, 'After
a week or two, however, it was obvious that, if the Catholic population
were to survve at all, it would be necessary for the Volunteers to
protect them in some way, and accordingly the IRA became involved in
a struggle against disciplined and undisciplined Orange factions,
whilst at the same time having to bear in mind that their main object
was to carry out aggressive action against the British forces of
occupation.' 75
The decision by the brigade staff to reluctantly take on the
responsibilty for defending Catholic areas led to the drawing up of
elaborate plans although McCor1ey was to admit, 'To my mind, at that
time, such an operation was beyond our means.' 76 As such the
74 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
75 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016).
76 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389), See also McDermott, Northern Divisions p.37.
53
defence of nationalist areas was worked out by a process of trial and
error rather than with any regard for the unrealistic strategies of the
IRA leadership. Thomas F1ynn, soon to become a key member of the
city's Active Service Unit, was one of those who had taken unilateral
action to protect his own area from loyalist mobs in the summer. He
later gave an account of how the IRA's defence of the Catholic
community actually worked on the ground. The first move was the
placing of IRA pickets, usually in the upstairs rooms of houses that
lay on the borders between Protestant and Catholic districts. The
violence followed a familar pattern. Protestant and Catholic mobs
would gather at these flash points and indulge in what IRA member
Manus O'Boy1e called a 'stone-throwing competition', which more
often than not the loyalists, with their greater numbers, usually won.
When they proceeded to follow up their attack the IRA would fire shots
at the crowd, which rapidly retreated. Specials and police were then
called in. They arrived quickly in armoured cars and cordoned off the
houses from which the IRA snipers had fired. The Volunteers would
beat a hasty retreat, fleeing across the gardens and backyards of the
houses while the police carried out aggressive searches in the Catholic
properties. It was often during these searches that many of the most
brutal incidents occurred with the now inflamed loyalist crowd
returning to the scene and ransacking the area. 77 Joe Murray
admitted later that despite their strenuous efforts the IRA were not
77 Thomas Flyn statement (BMH, NA, WS 429); Manus O'Boyle statement (BMH, NA, WS 289),
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able to stop the Specials from moving into Catholic areas as and when
they wished.78
Despite the brutal nature of the violence in July such outbreaks and
expulsions had occurred many times in the past when both political
and economic tensions had risen to the fore. Roger McCorley referred
to the sectarian violence of 1920 as taking its 'classical form' of
expulsions from the shipyards.79 Indeed the last major outbreak had
occurred during the Ulster Crisis in 1912 with Catholic workers being
temporarily forced out of Workman and C1ark's.8o In 1920 however
with details of IRA attacks in the south and west of Ireland fillng the
pages of the unionist press in Belfast, and with nationalist advances
in the local elections in the North itself, the usual return to peace in
the city was unlikely. Whilst the IRA had little direct influence in
terms of causing the initial outbreak of violence in Belfast it was their
activities that would ensure that it continued. On 22 August RIC
District Inspector Oswald Swanzy was assassinated in Lisburn. As
with the kiling of Colonel Smyth the previous month this action was
to have dire consequences, leading in the short-term to brutal
reprisals against the Catholic minority and in the longer-term the
reinforcement of unionist fears about the dangerous threat posed by
the IRA in the six counties.
78 Joe Murray statement (BMH, NA, WS 412),
79 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389).
80 Kenna, Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom p.13,
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Swanzy, like Smyth, was a wanted man in Cork. He was allegedly
involved in the murder of Thomas MacCurtain, the Sinn Fein mayor of
Cork City, in March.8i Michael Collns, through his RIC informant
Sergeant Matt McCarthy, had located Swanzy in Lisburn who had
transferred to the North for his own safety. McCarthy met with the
lead Cork assassin Sean Culhane in a Belfast pub, McKearney's of
Rosemary Street, to discuss the plan. Cu1hane then returned to
Dublin where he met Collns in Vaughan's HoteL. As it was GHQ who
would be financing the operation, Cu1hane had to convince the
leadership that the assassination was viable and that he was the man
to do it: '...after a frank discussion, he (i.e. Collnsl remarked that the
job was much too big for me. I probably looked immature as at the
time I was not yet twenty years of age. He said it was a job for
experienced men and mentioned about picking selected men from
Dublin.' 82
Culhane however was determined that men from Cork should carry
out the attack and he managed to convince Cathal Brugha and
Richard Mulcahy that he should be allowed to lead the party to the
North. The assassination squad came from the IRA's Cork No 1.
Brigade. It was led by Cu1hane, the Intellgence Officer of the 1st
Battalion, who was symbolically presented with MacCurtain's own gun
with which he was to carry out the shooting. He was joined on his trip
to the North by Dick Murphy, 'Stetto' Aheme, C. McSweeney and Jack
81 See Hart, The IRA and its Enemies pp,78-9,
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Cody although their first attempt to kil Swanzy in early August was
marred by bad planning and had to be abandoned. The five would-be
assassins had made their way to Belfast where they stayed in the
house of Joe McKe1vey's mother in Cyprus Street off the Falls Road. A
car was acquired and they set off for Lisburn to locate Swanzy,
However the inclusion of so many men in the attack party made the
journey to Lisburn extremely problematic. Sean Cusack, who liased
with Culhane, recalled: 'When the six men proceeded to enter the car
it became very apparent that the car was not large enough to properly
accommodate the men and driver, seven in all, and the driver drew
attention to the overloading of the car. At this stage I drew Culhane
aside and told him I had been worryng over the overcrowding of the
car the previous night. Cu1hane informed me that he could not help it
now as each man of his was determined to be on the job and all must
go on the car.' 83 The car made unsteady progress towards Lisburn
eventually breaking down halfway through the journey. The attack
itself was called off and after the local men had returned to Belfast,
the members of the Cork IRA went back to Dublin.
A second attempt was made two weeks later although Cu1hane
decided to take only one other man with him, Dick Murphy. The
others were sent home, disappointed, to Cork. Joe McKelvey, who
Culhane recalls was 'exceptionally keen to participate', 84 arranged for
82 Sean Culhane statement (BMH, NA, WS 746).
83 Sean Cusack statement (BMH, NA, WS 402).
84 Sean Culhane statement (BMH, NA, WS 746),
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Sean Leonard, a taxi driver, from County Sligo, to take the assassins
to Lisburn, McKelvey was chosen to arrange the transport because it
was felt his Belfast accent would not arouse suspicion. On the
morning of 22 August Cu1hane and Murphy made their way to
Lisburn where they met up with Roger McCorley and Tom Fox, who
had been detailed to act as scouts. Leonard was told to keep the taxi's
engine running and Joe McKelvey was ordered to wait a mile outside
Lisburn to spirit the assassins away after the attack. Culhane
approached McCorley and Fox:
'They informed us that Swanzy had gone to church and gave the
approximate time the service would finish. We remained on the
opposite side of the street near the Church and made ourselves
look as inconspicuous as possible and took special care not to
speak for fear our southern accents would betray us to any
passers- by.
'We were not too long waiting until the congregation
started coming from the Church so when I observed Swanzy and
saw the direction he was taking I gave the tip to Dick Murphy
and we moved towards the corner, about a block away from the
church, where we had provisionally selected for the job, When
he was only a few yards away from us I said to Dick "That's
him". I fired the first shot getting him in the head and Dick fired
almost simultaneously into his body.' 85
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Swanzy was shot around 1 pm shortly after attending a servce in his
local church. He died instantly. Cu1hane, who had also been
responsible for kiling Colonel Smyth, was allowed to fire the first shot
as he had MacCurtain's gun although all four men were apparently
involved in the shooting.86 Directly after the attack they ran towards
their car to where Leonard was waiting to drive them out of the town.
However, a crowd of local Protestants, many of them from the church
congregation, began to give chase, throwing missiles and shouting
insults. The assassins fired some shots in the air but the mob, some
of whom were armed, kept approaching and a bullet hit the
windscreen of the waiting taxi. Roger McCorley later described his
narrow escape:
'When we were running towards the taxi which was waiting
about two hundred yards from where we shot Swanzy the mob
started to run after us. I halted and fired back into the mob
which then cleared off. This left me a considerable way behind
the others. I was then attacked by an ex-British Offcer called
Woods who seemed to have plenty of courage. Although I was
carrying a revolver in my hand he attacked me with a
blackthorn stick and by a fluke I shot the stick out of his hand.
85 Ibid,
86 McCorley to O'Donoghue, 6 March 1964 (O'Donoghue papers, National Library ofIreland (NU),
MS3l313). See also the comments of Sean Montgomery quoted in McDermott, Northern Divisions
pp.50-I. For general accounts of the shooting see Irish News, 23 August 1920, Beljàst Telegraph, 23
August 1920,
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When I got within twenty yards of the car it started off and I was
unable to make the necessary speed to catch it,' 87
McCorley however did manage to clamber aboard, accidentally firing a
shot in the car as he did so. The taxi itself could only manage a top
speed of 30 mph and the local police chased the assassins out of the
town. However, by a stroke of luck one of the wheels of the pursuing
car fell off at an opportune moment and the IRA party managed to
make good their escape.88 After fleeing the scene the men handed
their weapons over to Joe McKelvey who was waiting outside of the
town and the four men made their way across country towards the
Divis Mountains to escape any roadblocks. Only Sean Leonard the
taxi driver was ever convicted for the killng. He received a fifteen-year
prison sentence despite not having fired a shot in the attack. 89
The assassination of Swanzy, whilst being a successful reprisal in the
eyes of the IRA, proved disastrous for nationalists living in Lisburn
with almost the entire Catholic population of the town being expelled
from their homes by rampaging loyalist mobs. Over 300 Catholic
homes were destroyed before the violence fully abated. Fred Crawford,
the old UVF leader, later recorded in his diary the scene of
devastation:
87 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
88 Ibid, Thomas Fox statement (BMH, NA, WS 365); Roger McCorley interview with Emie O'Malley
(O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/98),
89 Sean Cu1hane statement (BMH, NA, WS 746), For general accounts of the attack see also Irish
News, 23 August 1920; Belfast Telegraph, 23 August 1920; Abbott Police Casualties in Ireland
pp,l13-115, For Leonards trial see Belfast Telegraph, 1-3 February 1921.
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'It reminded me of a French town after it had been bombarded
by the Germans as I saw in France 1916, We visited the ruins of
the Priest's house on Chapel Hil. It was burnt or gutted and the
furniture all destroyed. When coming down the avenue I found a
small pair of manicure scissors that had been through the fire. I
kept them as a souvenir of the event. We called at Mr
Stephenson's and had tea there. Mrs Thompson his sister was
also with him. They told me of some very hard cases of where
Unionists had lost practically all they had by the fire of the
house of a Catholic spreading to theirs, and also of some very
decent respectable familes of the brutal cold blooded murder of
Inspector Swanzie (sic) one does not wonder at the mob loosing
(sic) its head with fury...it has been stated that there are only
four of five RC familes left in Lisburn. Others say this is wrong
that there are far more. Be that as it may there certainly are
practically no shops or places of business left to the RC's.' 90
Cu1hane and Murphy left that same night for Dublin after a brief stop
in McKelvey's house in Belfast. Culhane, who travelled in a first-class
train carriage to avoid suspicion, later recalled seeing Lisburn ablaze
in the distance as he and Murphy headed south to safety.91
On arriving in Dublin they made their way to Vaughan's Hotel to meet
Collns and Mulcahy who Culhane recalled '...were profuse in their
90 Quoted in P Buckland, Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland 1885-1923: A
Documentary History (Belfast, 1973) p.445..
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congratulations'. Culhane handed MacCurtain's gun to Collns for
safekeeping and although he promised to return it he never did,92 As
the Corkmen celebrated in Dublin the nationalist areas of Lisburn
were reduced to ruins. Again violence spread rapidly to Belfast a few
days later with similar results. The ten days following 25 August
would see mobs rampaging through the city leaving thirty people
dead, It was only after the imposition of a curfew on 30 August that
the violence began to recede.93
The brutal events of the summer of 1920 had left unionists right
across the six counties shocked and afraid, Attempts to re-organise
the old UVF had begun in an ad-hoc fashion soon after the violence
had started and had provided one of the key forces for quellng the
earlier violence in Derry, Colonel Wilfred Spender and Fred Crawford,
both veterans of the Ulster crisis, were instrumental in reviving the
organisation.94 Fears over the small number and unreliabilty of the
largely Catholic RIC as well as the permanence of the British Army
presence in the North led to calls from James Craig to formalise the
UVF as some form of ancilary police force. Craig would also argue
that the creation of such a force would do much to assuage unionist
anger and channel it into what be referred to as '...a system of
organised reprisals against the Rebels, mainly in order to defeat them,
91 Sean Culhane statement (BMH, NA, WS 746) See also Sean Culhane interview with Emie O'Malley
(O'Malley ntebooks, UCDAD, P17bll 08),92 Sean Culhane statement (BMH NA, WS 746).
93 McDermott, Northern Divisions pp,52-58,
94 For the establishment of the USC see Fan'ell, Arming the Protestants pp.31-43.
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but partly to restrain their own followers from acts which are
regrettable, and in a large measure ineffective.' 95 Despite the dangers
of arming what were highly suspect individuals, many complicit in the
attacks on the Catholic community, and against the complaints of
Macready and Anderson, the British government agreed to the
creation of an Ulster Special Constabulary. It was in this force more
than any other that the Northern IRA would find its most severe
opposition.
Before the creation of the USC the Royal Irish Constabulary had
remained surprisingly united in the face of the increasing tide of
sectarian conflict. Protestant RIC men appeared little troubled by the
presence of Catholic officers in the force. James Gilmer, a constable
stationed in Londonderry, stated: 'Relations were good...it was
different when the RUC and Specials got together.' Similarly Ernest
Brookes, based in the same county, had fond recollections of his
Catholic colleagues in the force: 'They were all very good, I got on well
with them a1L.No trouble, all loyal, fight to the last.' Wiliam Britton, a
County Down offcer recalled that '...there was no hostilty, they were
all good friends'.96 The summer of 1920 ended all this.
The Swanzy episode highlighted what would prove to be an
insurmountable problem for the Northern IRA over the coming years.
It would become increasingly clear that even the smallest of IRA
95 Quoted in Farrell, Arming the Protestants p.37.
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actions would provoke a brutal response from loyalist extremists,
Throughout the conflct periods of violence would be presaged by IRA
actions either along the border or in Belfast itself, Despite the obvious
conclusions to be drawn the IRA were apparently blind to the link and
this horrific cycle of reprisal and counter-reprisal would be repeated
over and over again for the next two years. For the Unionist
government the Northern IRA were a shadowy threat, a disloyal fifth-
column in league with unruly elements in the South who would bring
their nefarious activities to the North once they had reached an
accommodation with the British. However, this support was slow to
materialise and before January 1922 the Northern IRA would offer
little serious threat to the fledgling Unionist regime.
The perception of the threat however proved to be more persuasive
than the reality and was reinforced and perpetuated by both sides.
Republicans, then as now, tended to talk up the level and impact of
their activities whilst the unionist press did their utmost to paint a
picture of Ulster under siege, reinforcing the skewed perceptions of an
already fearful population. In Belfast the events of summer 1920
demonstrated that the IRA were very much following the ebb and flow
of sectarian violence rather than shaping the events themselves,
fighting a fairly hopeless battle to hold off attacks on Catholic areas
and doing little but confirming the belief of the attacking mob that
these areas were indeed under the control of the gunmen. The huge
96 See Brewer, The Royal Irish Constabulmy p,67,
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emphasis the Northern Irish government placed on security would
bear testament to their paranoid perception of the situation. It became
obvious that they mobilsed to fight what they saw as a major
offensive from a large force, thus further undermining the possibilties
of IRA success in the six counties later on.
The outbreak of violence in the north-east had shown up the Northern
IRA for what they were: inactive, small in number and hopelessly
isolated. In their exposed position it quickly became clear that help
was needed to organise some form of cohesive response to the
excesses of the Unionist authorities. This assistance would come from
their fellow revolutionaries in the South. Even accepting the later
claims of Belfast IRA members that the Swanzy shooting had been a
'Belfast Job', it is evident that IRA members from the South had
played a significant, if not crucial, role in the planning and execution
of the assassination plot.97 For the Northern IRA Swanzy marked the
beginning of what would be a long and confused relationship with the
South.
97 Sean Montgomery tyifies this defensive attitude stating that the shooting was a 'Belfast Brigade
job; the Cork men were guests', For this quote see McDermott Northern Divisions p, 51,
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CHAPTER TWO
NORTH AND SOUTH
66
Despite the enormous upsurge in violence seen in the North after
June 1920 the Northern IRA remained, outside of Belfast and parts of
Armagh at least, disorganised and inactive. Whereas the summer of
1920 was undeniably a major turning point in that overt mass
violence finally erupted in parts of the six counties, arguably the most
important period of change for the Northern IRA itself came with the
creation of IRA Divisions in the spring of 1921 and the resulting
development of strong links between the IRA organisation in Ulster
and GHQ in Dublin. The haphazard internal changes of summer
1920 appeared as little more than a confused attempt to adapt to the
new context of spirallng urban violence in Belfast. These somewhat
forced changes would be followed by the more fundamental and long-
lasting influences wrought by the involvement of the South in
Northern affairs.
The interplay between these internal and external factors would be the
driving force behind the violence that would subsume the North over
the next eighteen months. From the spring of 1921 until the brutal
months of May and June 1922 the nature of this violence would be
shaped more and more by the varying levels of Southern involvement
and the influence of key Southern IRA figures on the policies and
strategies of Northern republicans. Whilst at first the Northern IRA felt
its beneficial effects in terms of material and psychological support, it
also became increasingly apparent that it would have less control over
the direction and duration of the conflct. As such in early 1921 the
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seeds were sown whereby the Northern IRA became ever more
dependent on the South. In the spring of 1921 however such concerns
were of far less importance when balanced against the immediate
impact of greater GHQ involvement. Only later when Southern
support wavered, and finally collapsed, would the inherent
weaknesses of the Northern IRA be exposed with devastating and
tragic consequences.
Prior to the spring of 1921 the character of the South's policy towards
the six counties was erratic and opportunistic. The assassination of
Oswald Swanzy and GHQ's despatching of Peadar C1ancy and Dick
McKee to Derry during the previous summer are typical of the Dublin
leadership's sporadic flrtations with initiatives aimed at combating
partition. The failure of Sinn Fein to make a real priority of the North
in its programme would inevitably mean that any future policy would
be based more on expediency than political commitment. Such a
policy would also be closely linked to Southern perceptions and
aspirations. i This was typified by the placing of largely ignorant,
although nevertheless important, Southern politicians in Northern
electoral seats, a mistake which would be repeated again with the
candidates to the new Northern Ireland parliament in May when only
one of the six new Sinn Fein MP's was from an Ulster background. 
2
1 A. Mitchell, Revolutionary Government in Ireland: Dail Eireann, 1919-22 (Dublin, 1995) p.166,
2 M, Harris, The Catholic Church and the 
foundation of the Northern Irish State (Belfast, 1993), Eoin
MacNeil (elected for Derry) came originally from Antrim, The other Sinn Fein M,P's were Aithur
Griffth (Feranagh and Tyrone) , Michael Collins (Aragh) , Eamon deValera (Down), Sean
O'Mahoney (Fermanagh and Tyrone) and Sean Milroy (Fermanagh and Tyrone). See S, Elliott
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Such ad-hoc policy making would leave little room for an appreciation
of the subtleties of Ulster's political landscape. Sinn Fein's 'one size
fits all' nationalism would prove particularly il-suited to the demands
of the IRA organisation in the six counties although the brutality of
unionist opposition would consistently act to mask these fundamental
flaws; as one historian has written: '.. . flaming nationalism had got
them this far and flaming nationalism would see them the rest of the
way.' 3 As elsewhere in Ireland it was local initiative rather than
central direction which dictated the level of IRA violence. In the North
such local initiative was generally lacking. IRA activity was either non-
existent or played a subordinate role in the broader shift to sectarian
conflct within the six counties. The need for a vigorous Northern
policy became apparent due both to the lacklustre activities of the
majority of Northern Volunteers and the limitations imposed by Sinn
Fein's abstention policy which meant that IRA violence was one of the
few ways of combating partition.
The one major Southern policy initiative of the period, the Belfast
Boycott, introduced after the shipyard expulsions of July 1920, would
prove itself to be il judged and counter-productive. The boycott of
goods from Belfast and other Northern towns had developed as early
as August 1919 when shopkeepers in Galway City refused to sell any
items that originated in the Northern capitaL. After a petition from
Northern Ireland Parliamentary Election Results 1921-1972 (Political Reference Publications, 1971)
pp. 3-20.3 Mitchell, Revolutionary Government in Ireland p.167.
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Sean McEntee and Sinn Fein leaders in Belfast the Dail reluctantly
accepted the call for a national boycott in September 1920.4 The
rationale behind the boycott was to hit the unionist community where
it hurt the most, and was based largely on a stereotypical view of
Ulster Protestants as humourless and grasping capitalists. Joseph
Connolly, the Belfast Sinn Fein leader, typified the attitude of many
nationalists in his portrayal of the 'psychological make up' of the
unionist business community: ',..the Belfast business man as a rule,
although there were exceptions, lived, ate, slept and got his major
enjoyment out of his success in business. It was a combination of
Samuel Smiles and Calvin and, however lacking it may have been as a
soul-satisfying existence, it showed results in the ledger accounts in
the ultimate balance sheets.' 5
Despite such views the boycott itself achieved little but to cement
further the commercial ties between north-east Ulster and the British
mainland. It also failed to impact on the shipyards and engineering
industry that had seen the worst of the loyalist expulsions and thus
proved a total failure in achieving its avowed aim of reinstating the
expelled Catholic workers. The boycott also contributed to the
partition of the Irish economy with many Belfast-based banks being
forced to close branches outside of the six counties. Those small
businesses in Ulster that had had little to do with the expulsions were
4 Ibid., p, 168.
5 J, Gaughan (ed,) Memoirs of Senator Joseph Connolly (Dublin, 1996) p,183,
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hit hardest and became even further alienated from the South.6
Indeed some loyalists tried to hit back at the boycott with attacks on
the business interests of known republican supporters. For example
on 7 January 1922 ten masked men raided the railway station at
Trew-and-Moy in Tyrone and destroyed hampers of bread and other
goods made by a company with Sinn Fein connections,7 For the
Northern IRA itself however the Belfast Boycott was greeted as a signal
that the Dublin leadership were finally initiating decisive action
against the Unionist government. Support for the boycott in Northern
republican circles shows up how desperate many Volunteers in the six
counties were for some kind of Southern lead and also provided the
opportunity for inactive areas to contribute something for the cause
whether that be the burning of railway carriages or the breaking up of
bakery vehicles from Belfast. As Patrick Beagan, an Armagh Volunteer
later admitted: 'To carry out any major operations in areas such as
ours was an almost impossible project to make a success of, In
dealing with the question of the Belfast bread carts, our problem was
simplified, as the objectives for our plans came into our areas almost
each day and we were both willng and capable of dealing with the
situation.' 8
6 The economic effects of the boycott are dealt with in detail in D,J.ohnson, 'The Belfast Boycott,
1920-22' in J,M, Goldstrom and IA.Clarkson (eds,) Irish Population, Economy and Society: Essays in
Honour of the late KH Connell (Oxford, 1981).
7 RIC Bi-monthly report, 16 Jan. 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA5/l52),
8 Patrick Beagan statement (BMH, NA, WS 612), See also Patrick McKenna statement (BMH, NA,
WS 911),
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On the ground the enforcement of the boycott in many areas involved
fairly minor activities such as the posting up of the names of
blacklisted shops and the intimidation of traders and their customers.
In some towns, such as Strabane and Cookstown, where the embargo
was enforced vigorously, IRA men attacked the Catholic employees of
boycotted businesses and placed men outside their shops to ward off
any potential customers, Fire however was the main weapon used to
enforce the boycott and incidents of incendiarism on premises and
goods vehicles were reported right along the length of the border from
Warrenpoint to Derry.9 This use of the Northern IRA to attack the
economic heart of the unionist community, itself a hangover from
Sinn Fein's brief flrtation in 1919 with labour agitation as a method
of undermining unionist hegemony in the North, would persist
throughout the period and formed the basic strategy of all miltant
republican activity.10 The joint-IRA offensive of May-June 1922 would
be planned largely as an attempt to cripple the economy and
infrastructure of Northern Ireland. The reduced strength and
inactivity of the IRA in many areas however meant that the
implementation of such policies was patchy at best and in some areas
almost non-existent. As Peadar O'Donnell, the Donegal IRA leader
reported, '...the Belfast Boycott was a bit of a farce in my area.' 11
9 File on the Belfast Boycott (Ministr of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/lll).
10 Mitchell, Revolutionary Government in Ireland pp. 166-7 ,
ii O'Donnell to GHQ, 19 April 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/Al18 (299)),
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The rather naïve and simplistic perceptions of the North which had
inspired the Belfast Boycott were also reflected in the attitudes of the
Southern IRA leadership. Joe Sweeney recalled meeting Michael
Collns in Dublin in 1921: 'He questioned me about the state of things
in the North, and when I told him how short we were he said, "Why
the hell don't you get into the barracks up there and arm yourselves?"
So I said that that was easier said than done. We not only had the
British to fight, but also the Unionists in east Donegal and the Ancient
Order of Hibernians in west DonegaL.' 12 Similarly in April 1921 the
0/ C of the Kilkeel IRA wrote to Richard Mulcahy of the diffculties in
launching offensive action in such a hostile environment pointing out
that 'Owing to the fact that there are so many Unionists in this
district, it is very hard to carry out any ambush.' Mulcahy replied
tartly to his superior: 'Wil you see what this offcer is doing and see
that he understands what work he should be doing.' 13
Despite the uncompromising attitude of the Dublin leadership it
readily acknowledged its failure prior to 1921 to engage with IRA units
in the six counties. Mulcahy later wrote to Kerryan Charlie Daly,
who in early 1921 was a frustrated GHQ Organiser in County Tyrone,
'I feel very much for you that you have to slog away, while feeling, as
you must have done so much out of touch with us.' 14 Indeed despite
the odd 'spectacular', such as the Swanzy assassination, GHQ interest
12 Joe Sweeney quoted in K. Griffth and T. O'Grady (eds.), Curious Journey p.166.
13 Mulcahy to O/C 4th Norther Division, 14 April 1921, (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P71 Al17),
14 Mulcahy to Daly, 20 April 1921, (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7 I Al17).
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in the North had been negligible. A combination of this neglect and the
sheer diffculty of operating in such a hostile environment, not to
mention the lacklustre Northern Volunteers themselves, meant that
by the spring of 1921 most Northern counties stil had no IRA brigade
structure. 
is Furthermore many areas contained no Volunteers at all
especially those inhabited heavily by Protestants. In Lisburn for
example Thomas Fox was only able to recall there being one IRA
member in the entire town. 
16
The North was so quiet that it became something of a safe-haven for
RIC men fleeing more disturbed areas in the South, Constable Wiliam
Britton remembered the arrival of these hardened strangers into his
sleepy area: 'There was a sergeant, he was transferred from Cork and
who was under threat of death or something from the IRA. Well he
was very strict, you couldn't please him, you know and the relations
weren't very good.' 17 Similarly offcers who were considered more
'loyal' (often a euphemism for Protestant) were sent for duty in the
South being replaced by older Catholics who were 'retired' to safer
areas within the six counties. Richard Dawson Bates, the
uncompromising Minister of Home Affairs in the province, would later
write of the RIC that, '... the better type of men were drafted to the
South and men who could not be trusted or who were inefficient were
15 Augusteijn, From Public Defiance to Guerrila Warfare pp,156-9.
16 This Volunteer was W,Gilmore and according to Fox his home was one of the first to be burned
down in the riots following the Swanzy assassination in August 1920; Thomas Fox statement (BMH,
NA, WS 365).
17 Wiliam Britton quoted in Brewer, The Royal Irish Constabulary (Belfast, 1990) p,56,
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sent to Belfast. Over 50 per cent of the force in the city are Roman
Catholics, mainly from the South, and many of them are known to be
related to Sinn Fein.' 18 Such changes in the make-up of the RIC in
the North were to prove crucial in shaping the nature of the opposition
the Northern IRA would have to face over the coming years. The sense
of fear that inspired unionists to secure their own security force in the
shape of the Ulster Special Constabulary was matched only by the
opportunity which Southern IRA leaders saw in the North for
advancing their own national aspirations.
As such the creation of IRA Divisions in Ulster in the spring of 1921
was far more than a re-organisation of existing Volunteer units. It also
signalled the birth of the Northern IRA itself. Whilst in other areas of
Ireland divisionalisation was seen as interference from Dublin and
viewed warily as a sign of political centralisation, in the North the
changes were far more fundamental and it was welcomed as a sign
that GHQ was at last acting positively in prioritising Northern issues.
GHQ involvement certainly made a difference. In the ten months from
May 1920 to February 1921 thirteen members of the security forces
were kiled in the six counties. However in the four months from
March to the Truce in early July this number had risen to 22. In
Belfast the brigade report for April makes this clear: 'The increase of
activity in the Brigade has been fruitful.' 19
18 Dawson-Bates memo, 9 January 1922 (PRONI, CAB 6/37), See also FalTell, Arming the Protestants
pp,13-l4,
19 Belfast Brigade report, 15 May 1921 (Mulcahy papers, P7/A/18 (112-3) ).
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By mid- April the only IRA Divisions formed in Ireland were the 1st,
2nd, 3rd and 4th Northern, originally called 'Ulster' Divisions, and the
1 st and 2nd Southern. Interestingly enough these divisional areas
encompassed some of the most active and inactive areas in Ireland
stretching from the most rebellous parts of West Cork to the sleepy
Protestant-dominated areas of Antrim. The creation of these early
Divisions in such widely differing areas appears to have been inspired
by contrary motives. In the South, as was so often suspected by the
local radicals, the motives were control and centralisation. In the
North the opposite was true. Whereas in the South GHQ Organisers
were met with suspicion, in the North they met only disinterest and
incred uli ty, 20
Of the new Northern Divisions only two, the 2nd and 3rd, were to have
their areas entirely within the six-county borders. Derry was attached
to the Donegal-based 1st Northern Division and Fermanagh was
clumsily split between three Divisions whose main power base lay in
the South. The crucial areas of South Down and Armagh formed the
4th Northern Division along with County Louth under Frank Aiken.21
The shape of these new Divisions demonstrated, at least on paper,
that partition would not be reflected in the organisational structure of
the army. It also made clear that important Southern commanders
20 For the attitude of provincial IRA units in the South to the process of divisionalisation in the spring
of 1921 see Hopkinson, The Irish War afIndependence pp,75-6.
21 See map of divisional areas on page 9.
76
such as Sean MacEoin and Eoin O'Duffy were responsible for large
swathes of the six counties and in particular the crucial border areas.
The failure of GHQ to recognise the unique context in which Northern
Volunteers were acting meant that a unified command to co-ordinate
IRA activities in the six counties did not materialise until January
1922 despite earlier calls by Da1y for fortnightly meeting of all Ulster
divisional commanders.22 The reluctance of GHQ to make IRA
organisation coterminous with the six counties was the cause of
constant problems and finally abandoned with fatal consequences in
the summer of 1922.
With these organisational changes now in place, presaged by a
meeting of Ulster offcers in March 1921 which included Da1y,
McKe1vey, Dan Hogan and Eoin O'Duffy, GHQ spelled out its new
ambitious policy for IRA activity in the six counties.23 On the surface it
appeared both vague and unrealistic: 'Ulster is the English lever for
goveming Ireland. The Miltary importance of Ulster has increased in
proportion as Dublin has passed into National hands. As a result, at
the present time Ulster is becoming a bridgehead that the English
cannot afford to lose and must spend lavishly to defend. Here then it
is necessary to attack them with all the force that can be developed
there. Miltary, Economic, Propaganda and the attack should be
steady and persistent.' 24 Despite the almost laughable Napoleonic
22 Daly to GHQ, 27 May 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/A/18 (73)).
23 Sean Corr statement (BMH, NA, WS458).
24 GHQ memo, 24 March 1921 (Mulcahypapers, UCDAD, P7/A/17),
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rhetoric of such orders one can detect a clear Southern perception
which saw Ulster as a 'bridgehead' for the British from which supplies
and men could be quickly rushed south, What would become
apparent during the last four months of the War of Independence was
that the renewed interest of the Dublin leadership in the North
stemmed more from a wish to further the ends of Southern
nationalism rather than to undermine partition itself.
GHQ's plan for spreading destruction and instabilty in the North,
whilst welcomed by the young radical Volunteers of Belfast, was
viewed by some as inappropriate and dangerously counter-productive.
Memories of the Swanzy riots stil persisted and an aggressive IRA
policy was, for some, the last thing that was needed. In response to
such mutterings of discontent from Sean McEntee, himself a
Northerner with perhaps more insight than many in the Dublin
leadership, Mulcahy was dismissive and scathing: 'I do not see any
reason in the points urged, whether they be opinions of himself or of
"one of the delegates from Antrim" for modifying in any way our
instructions to Northern offcers. I expect that the fact that McEntee is
a member of the Volunteer Executive is fairly well observed in the
North, owing to his total disassociation with any volunteer work,
otherwse his pacifist views, generally, might be very disturbing in
Volunteer circles in the North.' 25 Cahir Hea1y, the prominent
Fermanagh Sinn Fein Leader, also argued against GHQ orders for
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greater IRA activity observing that it would lead '...inevitably to
sectarian warfare.' 26 His advice was also ignored. There would be no
compromise therefore with those urging peaceful protest and it would
take another eighteen months of bloodshed before such voices were
finally heard.
Southern involvement would bring IRA violence to what had
previously been some of the quietest areas in Ireland. From the spring
of 1921 Southern organisers armed with instructions from GHQ
would stir up trouble wherever they could. RIC Constable Wiliam
Britton gave such an impression of his own quiet corner of County
Down, 'Support for the IRA in Kilyleagh was very little, I don't know of
any except the one; he wasn't a native of Kily1eagh...'. 27 Many areas
were not just quiet but had good positive relations. RIC constable
James Gilmer, based in Maghera, found the Catholic population both
friendly and helpful: '... the locals were useful, talk a bit. A lot of them,
principally the priests, they'd give you information. We were very
friendly with them. Relations with local people were good. They would
back me or anybody no matter what I'd do, like, they were very good.'
28 Into such quiet areas the newly invigorated movement urged on by
Southern zealots would spread radicalism and disharmony. Maghera
would become the worst area for IRA activity in County Londonderry
during 1922. Gilmer's optimistic portrayal of the town in 1920 was
25 Mulcahy memo, 7 April 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/A/17),
26 Healy to Slevin, 28 Jan, 1956, quoted in Staunton, The Nationalists of Northern Ireland p,36,
27 Wiliam Britton quoted in Brewer, The Royal Irish Constabulary, p,94,
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replaced by the sullen observation '.,.it was bad all round'.29 Relations
within the Catholic minority were also soured by this new
fundamentalism, demonstrated graphically in early June when two
Ancient Order of Hibernian members Hugh O'Han1on and James
Smith were executed by the IRA as spies near Camlough, County
Armagh. 
3D
These issues are brought into sharper relief by analysing precisely
what Southern involvement actually meant on the ground away from
the ilusory rhetoric of GHQ. Outside of Belfast and Frank Aiken's
rather unique fiefdom of Armagh and South Down the IRA
organisation was in dire need of support. As Joe McKelvey, the O/C of
the new 3rd Northern Division wrote: '...when this Division was formed
the Antrim and Down areas were both in bad need of organisation.' 31
Whilst Antrim and East Down were effectively placed under the
control of hardened Belfast leaders, such as Fe1ix McCorley, brother of
Roger, and Thomas Fitzpatrick, the counties of Tyone and
Londonderry had never been strong. GHQ had sent Charlie Da1y to
Tyone in early 1920, replacing Roger McGinn as GHQ organiser, to
reinvigorate what few local IRA units there were although he appears
to have met with little success.32 He would later confide: 'The slave
mind and lack of enthusiasm and miltary spirit in the population in
28 lames Gilmer quoted in Brewer, The Royal Irish Constabulary, p,95.
29 Ibid.
30 Staunton, The Nationalists of Northern Ireland p.35. lames McElhaw statement (BMH, NA, WS
634),
31 McKelvey to Mulcahy, 16 Aug, 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/A/23 (44)).
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this part of Ireland has a most paralysing effect. This has been my
experience in Tyone.' 33 However GHQ sought to rectify the situation
with the appointment of the Monaghan IRA leader Eoin O'Duffy as the
new Commandant of the 2nd Northem Division, O'Duffy's association
with the Northern IRA would prove vital in the coming years
particularly due to his close relationship with Michael Collns, It was a
combination of this exclusive access to Collns and his powerful IRB
clique along with the trust he inspired amongst Northem Volunteers
during his brief period as IRA liaison officer for Ulster during the
Truce that would make O'Duffy GHQ's unoffcial leader of the IRA in
the six counties.
In the spring of 1921 however such lofty aspirations were far from his
mind. The reasoning behind O'Duffy's appointment was to invigorate
Northern IRA units with the express aim of taking pressure off more
active areas in the South including his own beloved Monaghan. He
wrote to GHQ in April 1921: 'I would like to know my position as
regards my own area Monaghan. After years of hard work building up
the organisation in that county alone and unaided, I naturally do not
like to sever my connection with it or lose my grip with it. In my letter
to the C/S I made this clear, in his letter to me of 26th Jan he told me
that if I accepted this position in Tyrone I would retain nominally and
to a certain extent actually my control over Monaghan.' 34 GHQ
32 Patrick Maguire statement (BMH, NA, WS 693).
33 Daly to GHQ, 24 Aug, 1921 quoted in Staunton, Th Nationalists of Northern Ireland pp, 49-50,
34 O'Duft to GHQ, 28 April 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7 / Al18 (104-7) ),
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responded: 'I can readily understand that you do not like to sever your
connection with Monaghan, but you will easily appreciate the fact that
the greatest help you can afford to your old area would be to get the
surrounding districts up to the same degree of effciency,' 35
O'Duffy arrived in Tyrone in March. What he found left him
disilusioned and angry. Far from an eager but il-supported set of
Volunteers, he found ineptitude and disinterest: 'Generally I find the
standard of effciency at a very low ebb- very little knowledge of close
order dril- no knowledge whatever of extended order- no special
services was heard of and an absolute ignorance of the care and use of
arms...! estimate that as far as 60 rifles are missing altogether, and
practically all the rifles are in a fithy condition,' 36 Thousands of
rounds of ammunition had also been lost or were unusable due to
poor storage methods, The local IRA officers came in for particular
criticism. O'Duffy found them far too 'easy going' and complained that
they ',.,do not command the respect of the men'.37 In the Gortin
Battalion, he found an even worse state of affairs:
'This is by far the worst bn in Tyone- neither the (battalion) nor
the Companies did any miltary work since they were formed,
The C'Dant is recognised as the principal poteen- maker in the
County- his only occupation is going round the county running
stils and the majority of the offcers and men followed in his
35 D/Org to O'Duffy, 14 May 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P71A118 (102-3)).
36 O'Duff to GHQ, 28 Apri11921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/A/18 (104-7)).
37Ibid,
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footsteps. The result is that drink has ruined this area. In one
company Glenally there are 60 men in the company and 44 of
these are recognised poteen - makers and are determined to
continue. It is deplorable that in such a time as this any unit of
the IRA or combination of units should go so far to lower the
prestige of the whole organisation.' 38
Such antics he found had meant that the '...priests and people are
disgusted with the IRA in this area in fact the only decent se1f-
respecting young fellows are those outside the IRA.' 39
The 2nd Northern Division were a shambles and O'Duffy, who one
Volunteer described as 'a stickler for discipline',4o immediately
dismissed large numbers of offcers and men, promising 'drastic
punishment' for those who failed to improve. Wiliam Kelly, a Tyrone
IRA member, later wrote of the local men's dislike of O'Duffy and his
stern methods: 'I am convinced that O'Duffy's appointment was a
mistake as Charlie Daly was a better man for the job, He knew the
area much better and worked with the men for about twelve months
beforehand. He knew all the officers in the area intimately and was a
general favourite with all who had contact with him, This feeling of
mine about Da1y's superior qualifications for the position of Divisional
0/ C, 2nd Northern Division, was generally shared amongst the
38 Ibid,
39 Ibid, Joost Augusteijn has highlighted this disinterest in joining the IRA in his study of County
Londonderr demonstrating that only 1 % of adult Catholic men were members of the IRA compared
to, for example, almost 7% in County Mayo, See Augusteijn From Public Defiance to Guerrila
Warfare p173,
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Volunteer officers over the whole Divisional area.' 41 Another Volunteer
Nicholas Smyth recalls how the quiet situation in Tyone angered the
new radical leadership that had been installed under O'Duffy. Mick
Gallagher, soon to be appointed a brigade OjC, told Smyth that
'...before things could liven up a few men would have to be shot.' 42
This was exactly what O'Duffy had in mind and his brief involvement
in the North bred immediate, if ambiguous, results. John Connolly, an
IRA Volunteer in Ros1ea, was ordered by O'Duffy to shoot a Special
named Lester who had threatened a local Sinn Fein member. The
attack on Lester failed although in response the RIC and Specials
launched drastic reprisals against the Catholic population of the
vilage. Nearly every Catholic house was burned including Flynn's pub
and the Market House, the two largest buildings in the area. O'Duffy,
as Nicho1as Smyth makes clear, decided to respond in kind:
'He called a meeting in Derryhinlish for the purpose of
discussing the question of reprisals. I attended this meeting and
I cannot now remember the number of officers who attended the
meeting, There were various expressions of opinion from some
of the offcers present as to the advisabilty of the (proposedJ
burnings and also as to the number of Unionist houses which
should be burned...During the course of the meeting the door of
the room in which the meeting was held was suddenly opened
40 James McElduff quoted in MacEoin, Survivors, p.174.
41 Wiliam 1. Kelly statement (BMH, NA, WS 893).
42 Nicholas Smyth statement (BMH, NA, WS 721).
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and a stranger stepped into the room. This created a feeling of
shocked surprise to many of us, especially when the stranger
said to General O'Duffy "I have got you at last". It was lucky
that General O'Duffy recognised the stranger as Frank Aiken, or
he might have been shot. After Aiken's arrival, O'Duffy and he
started a discussion of the Ros1ea business-Frank Aiken did not
at first approve of the burnings, as he thought that the B men
would retaliate by burning double the number of nationalist
houses. O'Duffy struck the table and said "When you hit them
hard they will not strike again". Aiken then said: 'Well, burn
them and their houses".' 43
The date for the proposed raid was fixed for 22 March, deliberately
chosen as it was exactly one month after the Specials had launched
their attacks on Catholic homes in the village and O'Duffy wished to
make it clear that the IRA operation was a reprisaL. Members of
O'Duffy's own Monaghan Brigade were brought in to carry out the
attack and, as with the Swanzy shooting, the local IRA were ordered to
act as scouts. They were split into small parties each consisting of 8-
10 members each and given a specific target to attack, all of which
were homes or farms belonging to members of the USC. Twenty-one
houses in all were listed for burning with the attacks beginning at
midnight. Two of the Specials were shot dead and another local man
was dragged from his house and bludgeoned to death. One of the
Specials, Samuel Nixon, was taken from his home and shot in the
43 John T. Connolly statement (BMH, NA, WS 598),
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street although it was decided not to burn his house as he had a large
family. Members of both communities in Fermanagh were outraged by
the incident and a truce was later agreed between Protestant and
Catholic church leaders. For the local IRA fear of the inevitable
unionist backlash left them with little choice but to leave their homes
immediately despite having played only a minor role in the attacks:
'After the Roslea affair we had all to go on the run and sleep away
from home. We could take no chances of either being seen by B. men
or being captured by Crown Forces.' 44
The attacks at Roslea however were only the first act of O'Duffy's plan
to bring the realities of IRA violence into the heart of the six counties.
On 5 April he introduced an IRA levy in Tyone and Londonderry and
ordered that the 2nd Northern Division should begin extensive
offensive operations immediately. Subsequently an RIC Sergeant was
shot dead in Dromore and three Specials were badly wounded in an
ambush near the town. The shooting in Dromore occurred when an
RIC Sergeant, who appears to have suffered a mental breakdown,
came onto the streets and started shouting anti-Catholic obscenities.
He grabbed hold of a local girl, Eileen O'Doherty, and shot her in both
legs. Her brother, a local IRA man, was told of the attack and after
finding the delusional Sergeant shot him in the face 
,45 On the
following day a group of Specials took three suspected IRA members,
John Devine, Dan Dogherty and Charles Slevin, from their homes and
44 Ibid.
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shot them half a mile outside the town, The IRA responded with an
ambush at Dromore where they lost one man, Edward McC1usker,
and wounded four RIC men. The attacks continued in May when a 31-
year-old RIC sergeant Peter McDonagh was kiled near Mountfield.
The IRA attacks in April and May however had been patchy and many
local volunteers refused to take part. Wiliam Kelly was ordered by
O'Duffy to travel thirty miles to attack a party of Specials although he
decided to go home instead.46 O'Duffy himself left for Dublin to
become Director of Organisation at GHQ soon after the attacks leaving
the local IRA to face the wrath of the Specials who carried out 1arge-
scale raids and round-ups in the area. A local Volunteer Captain,
J ames McE1duff, after the shooting of McDonagh realised how
dangerous this new aggressive policy would be for men like him in the
six counties: 'I was not on the job myself but I thought it the best of
my play to get out. I was on the run from then on.' 47
O'Duffy reported the situation in County Londonderr to be slightly
better although he found that the men there were desperately short of
arms, supplies and committed leadership. Derry itself, despite it being
the scene of the initial outbreak of violence in June 1920, had
remained remarkably peacefuL. As one local Volunteer stated:
'...things were very quiet here. There were very few attacks on the
45 Nicholas Smyth statement (BMH, NA, WS 721),
46 Wiliam J Kelly statement (BMH, NA, WS 893).
47 Ibid,
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police, no attacks at all on soldiers within the city, no buildings blown
up, no ambushes, nothing like that. Derry in 1920, was very much a
contented and loyaL.nava1 base. The sort of things we read about in
the South, even in Co. Tyone, were inconceivable to our way of
thinking.' 48 He also recalled that despite the growing chaos outside
the city, relations between both communities remained cordial and
that even in 1920 the British Army fielded a football team, the
Dorsetshires, to play a match against a local Catholic side. He added
tellngly that 'The city was never nationally minded.' 49 The
Commandant of the battalion, Paddy Sheils, appears to have called for
a truce in the city, demonstrating a keen insight into how dangerous
and counter-productive offensive IRA activity was for the local
Catholic population. This insight was sadly lacking in figures like
O'Duffy and Aiken as the events of the spring of 1921 had
demonstrated all too clearly. One of the reasons for this peaceful
outlook was the lack of substantial support for the IRA in the city. As
Donal Kelly, a Sinn Fein local government offcial, admitted: '...in all
truth, Derry at that time did not offer much variety in hiding places,
for the only people to be trusted with important matters were those
who were actually in the IRA movement.' 50 A flying column of twelve
men was organised in the city in December 1920 for operation in
Donegal although only six local IRA men could be found willng to join
48 Neil Gilespie quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p.162,
49 Ibid.
50 Donal Kelly quoted in B. Kelly (ed,) Sworn to be Free (Tralee, 1971) p, i 26.
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up and the other half of the column was made up of men from
different counties. 
51
Michael Sheerin put down the lack of miltant activity in the city to
stern opposition from church leaders and the remnants of the old
Redmondite National Volunteers, as well as a general apathy amongst
the nationalist population. Squabbles between the few radicals in the
city and conservative leaders such as Sheils were frequent. In fact
there were only around ten men in the whole city who could be
described as active IRA members. This group, calling themselves the
'Ten Foot Pikers' (TFP), were an IRB offshoot which had been formed
in 1917 and had attempted unsuccessfully to infitrate all of the
nationalist organisations in Derry. Sheerin, one of their leaders, would
later admit that their occasional shows of aggression were little more
than bravado: 'It merely involved detailng six or seven men to
discharge shots at a fixed time in widely separated parts of the city. In
most cases they fired them in their own backyard or through a
skylight.' 52 He continued: 'The kiling instinct was not developed in
any of the Units and none of us had the serious outlook said to be
prevailng in other areas.' 53 When this instinct did emerge it merely
confirmed how sensible the pragmatic approach of leaders like Sheils
was. In November 1921 members of the TFP shot an RIC Constable,
51 Augusteijn, From Public Defiance to Guerrila Warfare p,13 1.
52 Michael Sheer in statement (BMH, NA, WS 803). The main TFP members were Andy Hegarty, Tim
Doheny, Lorken McGrath, Dan McCandy, Tom Riehey, Jim Kerby, J. McGlynn, Sean Haughey and
Michael Sheerin.
53 Ibid.
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Patrick Waters, during a bungled attempt to disarm him outside the
General Post Offce in the city, In response the Specials carried out
vicious reprisal attacks on Catholic homes and businesses.
This peaceful situation however would be placed under strain during
the spring of 1921. The threat stemmed from the aggressive activities
of the maverick socialist republican Peadar O'Donnell. O'Donnell had
been on organiser for the ITGWU in the city and attempted to organise
a small Citizen Army detachment in the Bogside before finally
throwing in his lot with the IRA. O'Donnell and his small but
committed flying column, which included his brothers Frank and Joe,
were quickly removed from the quietude of Derry although their
destination lay not within the six counties but west across the border
in DonegaL. 54 Another column under Charlie McGuinness was also
despatched to Donegal although its members were quickly rounded up
and imprisoned in Ebrington Miltary barracks back in Derry.
McGuinness would later escape only to return in February to rescue
Frank Carty, the Sligo Brigadier, one of the few successes the IRA had
in the city. 
55 As with O'Duffy in Tyone and, as we shall see, the
Belfast men in Cavan, GHQ's principle aim appears to have been to
use Northern Voluntet?rs for its own Southern priorities. In such cases
Northern men would either directly fight in the South or be
54 The members of Q'Donnell's column were Alfie McCallon, Wiliam Cullen, James Tyler, Seamus
McCann, James McKee, Con Connolly, Wiliam Dohert, Jim Walsh, Tom Sullvan, Frank Q'Donnell,
Joe Q'Donnell and Con Boyle. See Seamus McCann statement (BMH, NA, WS 763). For Q'Donnell's
career prior to joining the IRA see D. Q'Drisceoil, Peadar 0 'Donnell (Cork, 2001) ppA-17.
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responsible for easing the pressure on it. The reason why GHQ
respected the Derry truce, and wished to maintain it, was because the
city's men would be of far more use to the South fighting outside of
the Six-Counties than inside it. GHQ orders to the Derry IRA
graphically show the ulterior motives of the Dublin leadership:
'Engage the maximum enemy force and take the pressure off the
South,' 56
O'Donnell however proved to be no respecter of such subtle
conspiracies. He would time and again flout direct orders requesting
that he remain outside of Derry and the six counties. In early 1921 he
pulled off the first in a long list of blatant acts of se1f- promotion. After
persuading Joe Sweeney that he could obtain arms from his Citizen
Army contacts in Dublin, O'Donnell arrived at GHQ and with
breathtaking audacity presented himself as the representative from
DonegaL. The process of divisionalisation was well underway and
amidst the confusion at headquarters he was appointed as the new
OjC of No2. Brigade by Mulcahy. He also met Michae1 Collns on this
trip. Liam Archer, an IRA offcer from the Dublin Brigade, was later
sent to Donegal to investigate O'Donnells activities. His report was
damning: 'The feeling is therefore prevalent that an injustice has been
done by the appointment to this position of a man who is only some
six months a member of the IRA, who was an organiser for an
55 Pax O'Faolin quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p,142, See also Dominck Dohert statement (BMH, NA,
WS 846).
56 Michael Sheerin statement (BMH, NA, WS 803),
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organisation regarded as being unfriendly to the IRA, who possesses
little volunteer experience, and whose abilty had not yet been proved.'
57 In other respects also O'Donnells antics appeared to be rapidly
going out of control. He was said to be intercepting GHQ orders
destined for other commands and constantly returned to Derry where
he and his men set about gathering recruits and carrng out random
attacks.
The most damaging of these incursions occurred on 1 April when,
after a day of sporadic violence, two RIC men, Michael Kenny and
John Higgins, were kiled in the city. The April attacks occurred
simultaneously at 8pm when the attackers, after gathering in the
Shamrock Hall on the Bogside, moved out in small parties to attack
selected targets. After the shootings O'Donnell and Seamus McCann,
the kiler of Sergeant Higgins, along with other column men left the
city and made their way by bicycle to the relative safety of DonegaL. 58
O'Donnell's men were also implicated in two bank robberies as well as
spreading scurrilous rumours about the abilties of Paddy Sheils.
Another concluded angrily: 'The result of the foregoing is that the 0 j C
Bde (O'Donnell) is looked upon in Derry as untrustworthy and
incompetent and matters have now reached a point, if he remains in
command, where the OjC Derry will probably refuse to serve under
him any longer and request transfer to another area.' 59
57 Report from Liam Archer, 3 June 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/N18 (277-297)).
58 Seamus McCann statement (BMH, NA, WS 763).
59 Report from Liam Archer, 3 June 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/N18 (277-297)).
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The one man who could have solved this conflct was the new
Commandant of the 1 st Northern Division (and thus O'Donnel1's direct
superior) Frank Carney, a prominent IRB man and Commandant of
the South Fermanagh Brigade. The relationship between the two men
was soured when O'Donnell cast aspersions on Carney's abilty and
accused him openly of 'skulking in Derr'.6o He later told Ernie
O'Malley: 'He was always in trouble for he was not liked, neither was
he any good.' 61 One of Carney's first moves was to dismiss O'Donnell
as brigade commander and request from GHQ that he and his column
be suspended from the Volunteer organisation. Carney however was
captured at Sweeney's Hotel in Dung10e and subsequently imprisoned
soon after taking up his command.62
He was replaced as O/C by Joe Sweeney, who was far more lenient
with O'Donnell's case and reinstated him as brigade O/C although he
suggested that Derry be removed from O'Donne11's charge and become
an independent battalion. GHQ leaders had made a similar
suggestion: 'If Derry city Battalion is given to O'D(onneiii just now the
new Divisional 0/ C will have local difficulties to attend which might
hamper him in the rather responsible work he has undertaken.' 63
Despite O'Donnell's many transgressions it was his stirring up of
trouble in Derry which was most unwelcome and notably the only
60 ibid.
61 Peadar O'Donnell interview with Emie O'Malley (0' Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/98),
62 Seamus McCann statement (BMH, NA, WS 763),
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matter on which GHQ and his local superiors were agreed. In order to
avoid any further 'local diffculties', seemingly a euphemism for
un sanctioned IRA actions in the city, Derry was indeed made into an
independent battalion command. GHQ's bold idea of integrated cross-
border divisional organisation had collapsed in this area after only a
few months. Although no-one mentioned it at the time, the existence
of the border had made such a system unworkable in Derry. As such
it was the reality of partition, rather than any nationalist belief in the
primacy of Irish unity, which proved decisive in shaping the
organisation and activities of the Northern IRA,
For the rest of the period Donegal's role in the conflct would continue
to present something of a paradox. Its northern geographical position
sat uneasily with its Southern political affiiation. Local factors, such
as the remarkably high level of migratory labour also robbed many
areas of Volunteers for lengthy periods each year. As one local RIC
man commented: 'There was a lot of them used to go to Scotland, you
see, for the harvest as labourers, Everybody went. They stopped then
til the potatoes were done, and then they came back and whatever
money they had they usually drank it.' 64 Added to this were the
constant incursions by Ulster Specials into East DonegaL. Sean
Lehane, the Cork flying column commander who fought in Donegal in
1922, later confided: '... the Specials at that time were right almost up
63 D/Org, to C/S, 21 June 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/N18 (270)).
64 Wiliam Britton quoted in Brewer, The Royal Irish Constabulary p.34.
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to Letterkenny.' 65 However such peculiarities, along with the county's
persistent identity crisis, also made it the most favourable position
from which to launch attacks against the territory of the Northern
government. As such Donegal would be inundated with strangers in
the shape of IRA Volunteers seeking either to attack Northern Ireland
or to escape from it. Friction between these outsiders and native IRA
units would play a crucial part in undermining Collns' Joint-Army
offensive in the late summer of 1922 which signalled the final collapse
of the Northern IRA.
Whilst events in Tyone and Derry hinted at the cynical undercurrent
which lay beneath the South's use of Northern Volunteers, events in
Cavan during May 1921 showed the relationship between North and
South to be little short of blatant exploitation. On the 1 April, the
same day as O'Donnell's attacks in Derry, GHQ ordered the strongest
brigade in the North, Belfast, to prepare and equip a flying column.
This unit however would not be for use in the city or even within the
six counties. Its destination lay over eighty miles away in Cavan, a
'quiet' county in IRA terms wedged between the more active areas of
Longford and Monaghan.66 The reasoning behind this decision
65 Lehane to Miltary Pensions Board, 7 March 1935 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS 31340). For a
rather idealised but still informative description ofIRA activity in Donegal from 1917-1921 see 1.
Sweeney, 'Donegal and the War of Independence', CapuchinAnnual, 1970.66 Tom Garvin contradicts this interpretation arguing that Cavan was, relative to population, the most
active IRA county during the War ofIndependence, He argues that the majority ofIRA activity in
Ireland was confined to, 'The old two- focus pattern of cental Munster and border Ulster' , However
only three RIC men were kiled in the county during the whole of the conflct, one of the lowest totals
of all Irish counties, The necessity for the Belfast column to be sent to Cavan in May 1921 is itself
evidence ofthe lacklustre performance oflocal Volunteers, For direct comparisons between counties
see Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence pp, 105-149, For Garvin's argument see T, Garvin, The
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appears to have once again been to alleviate the pressure on these
stronger and better organised areas although it proved a total failure
and collapsed in dramatic fashion after less than a week. Despite this
a closer examination of the events themselves ilustrate something of
the nature of the early relationship between the South and the
Northern IRA in the latter stages of the War of Independence.
The column consisted of thirteen men from the four companies of the
1 st Battalion of the Belfast Brigade under the nominal leadership of
Joe Magee, although that was as far as Belfast control was allowed,67
The unit was to be wholly disassociated from the 3rd Northern Division
and placed under the direct control of the GHQ Organiser for Cavan,
Seamus McGoran. A similar number of Cavan men were to join the
Belfast party to bring the column's strength up to around twenty-five
men.68 The local Cootehil Battalion in North Cavan was to make all
the necessary arrangements for the arrival of the Belfast men
although communication problems meant that they were only
informed ten days before the advance party arrived. 
69
The Belfast men were transferred to Cavan in small groups, travellng
by train via a circuitous route through Redhils and Ballyhaise so as
Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics (Dublin, 1981) p,123. For the course of the revolution in County
Longford see M, Coleman, County Longford and the Irish Revolution, 1910-1923 (Dublin, 2002),
67 The members of the column were Joe Magee, Seamus McKena, Paddy McMahon, Seamus Fin,
Charlie McKee, Joe McGlinchey, Pat Brannigan, Sean McCann, Peter O'Callaghan, Patrick Dougan,
Sean McCartney, Thomas Fox and John McDermott. See Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS
1016).
68 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA , WS 10 16),
69 Report from Flying Column HQ Cavan, 10 May 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/A/18 (98)),
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to avoid suspicion, the last group crossing the border on Tuesday 3
May. Their weapons were brought into Cavan, wrapped in rugs and
carried in golf bags by a number of Cumann na mBan volunteers,
some of who were related to members of the column including the wife
of Thomas Flynn.7o The final destination of the column was an
abandoned farmhouse high up on Lappinduff mountain near
Carrickallen, The timing of their arrival could not have been worse as
a few days earlier, on 1 May, Cavan had been rocked by the shooting
of two RIC constables near Arvagh in the south of the county,
probably the work of members of the Longford IRA. The majority of the
column arrived at the base on 5 May although immediately things
began to go wrong. The Cavan IRA had made few preparations and the
exhausted Belfast men were forced to spend two whole days
organising the base themselves. The large quantity of supplies and
weaponry promised by GHQ had also failed to materialise.71
By Saturday all of the Belfast men had arrived although Magee made
what would prove to be a fatal decision by allowing three of them to
travel to a local pub for a drink that evening. Seamus McKenna, his
second-in-command, had complained angrily to his superior, although
Magee assured him that the men could be trusted. McKenna believed
the idea of letting anyone leave the base was foolhardy arguing that
even from their accents it was obvious they were from Belfast. He also
showed mistrust of two of the men because they were both ex-British
70 Thomas Flyn statement (BMH, NA ,WS 429),
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soldiers, a feeling that would be echoed by many members of the
Northern IRA throughout the period. The men however did return
after spending around four hours in the vilage pub.72
A party of local Cavan Volunteers who arrived with a message that
more would soon follow joined them in the early hours of Sunday
morning. A few hours later, around 4am, a sentry reported seeing men
at the bottom of the hil moving towards the camp. They were greeted
originally as the second contingent of local men although were in fact
a small party of British soldiers and police who had approached the
base unseen from the North. In an effort to avoid such raids all roads
leading to the mountain had been trenched although the local
Volunteers had left them unguarded and they were quickly filled in by
the police under the cover of darkness with the aid of forced local
labour. Shots were fired at the sentries and the whole camp was
awakened. The column, many of whom were asleep, were caught
totally off guard and ran out quickly to engage the enemy forming
themselves into three parties and dispersing in the woods which lay to
the front of the camp. Sean McCartney, who had been sent down the
hil to reconnoitre with John McDermott, was shot dead as the two
men tried to clamber back to the safety of the base.
71 Ibid,
72 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016).
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Thomas Fox, one of the Belfast men, recalled his experience of the
night:
'Our position was on the forward slope of the high ground facing
east overlooking a little valley with houses dotted here and
there. To the right of the valley was a hil which shut off our
view in that direction.,. The rising sun was shining briliantly in
our eyes, and it was diffcult to locate objects in the valley. After
some time I distinguished British soldiers and police at different
places in the valley with whom we exchanged shots, they made
no attempt to advance against us. Suddenly on our right where
the hil was located I saw soldiers dashing from behind cover to
reach our hil. Their purpose was obviously to outflank us, I
succeeded in stopping some of them but others, including an
offcer got across and after some time fire was opened on us
from the hil above us. Between the fires from above and below
it was impossible to move. Others of the column who had less
cover than we had were in a hopeless position. In the
excitement nobody had thought of bringing a suffcient supply
of ammunition to last for a couple of hours or more, and at this
stage, about 7 am, very little was left. Shortly afterwards the
party in the centre having become untenable with only two or
three rounds left and there being no escape we also
surrendered.' 73
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The report of Joe Magee was far more damning: '...from the start no
discipline was maintained. Fire was opened and early in the
engagement we had one kiled and one wounded all parties were
disconnected and communication impossible, enemy attempted to
storm position on right but were forced to retire with I believe ten
casualties. Desultry (sic) firing and sniping was kept up by both sides
until we were practically surrounded and one party of four compelled
to surrender. This caused remainder to break up and retire as best
possible. In this retirement another of our men was slightly wounded.
The entire parties were moving in different directions and were picked
up by parties of enemy forces.' 74
A mixed party of around eighty miltary, RIC and Black and Tans had
swiftly surrounded the base. The IRA party numbered seventeen in
total consisting of the Belfast contingent and what remained of the
local Volunteers. Only Magee of the column managed to escape along
with two of the Cavan men into County Leitrim.75 He appears to have
fled the scene soon after the shooting started. Indeed Seamus
McKenna, stil smarting from his argument with his superior of a few
hours earlier, blamed Magee directly for the catastrophe: 'I felt it was
time for the 0/ C of the column to take control and I began looking for
him. I could see no sign of him and I started callng him by his
Christian name during lulls in the firing. The echoes of my voice and
73 Thomas Fox statement (BMH, NA, WS 429),
74 Ibid,
75 Freeman's Journal, 12Jan,1922.
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of the shots were the only answers to my callng. I continued this
callng, at intervals, for about an hour, I am sure, and my voice was
heard all over the hilside. In fact, the enemy heard it and questioned
us afterwards about it. Magee must have heard it before he cleared off
as he apparently did.' 76 All of the weapons except for seven rifles and
forty rounds of ammunition were captured. Only Sean McCartney was
kiled although all of the other members of the column were captured.
One Volunteer, Seamus Finn, was wounded along with one British
soldier, The fighting had lasted for around three hours with the IRA
surrendering at 7 o'clock in the morning.
McGee himself later blamed the disaster on '...friction in the working
of the unit' and the ineptitude of the local IRA who were '... very very
slow and do not seem to grasp anything at alL. They are just typical of
this sleepy place and seem to hold enemy forces in great dread.' 77 He
was especially critical of their failure to alert the base about the arrival
of the RIC despite the fact that many of them actually lived along the
route itself. In fact the Cavan men were next to useless and McKenna
was shocked to discover during the fight that they had never even
used a rifle before. When the fighting began the Cavan IRA simply
melted away. After the fighting ended a British offcer had to discipline
some of the Black and Tans who had started beating a few of the
captured Belfast Volunteers. 78
76 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016),
77 Report from Flying Column HQ Cavan, 10 May 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/ Al18 (98) ).
78 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016),
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The following day a party of Black and Tans returned and demolished
what was left of the base and its surrounding buildings after which
they set up a permanent post on the site. Local support in the area
had been woeful and it seems likely that an informer had told the
police of the presence of the Belfast men after seeing them in the local
pub that evening. The captured Volunteers were all sentenced to
death by court martial although they were to be saved by the signing
of the Truce two months later after an abortive attempt to rescue them
from Crumlin Road Gaol on 3 June was made by members of the
Belfast ASU including Woods, McCorley and Sean O'Neil. Mulcahy, on
hearing of the disaster, was outraged and gave short shrift to claims
from the Cavan IRA that the attack had inspired local Volunteers to
action, blaming it on a '...most appallng lack of training or negligence
which, in view of the fact that it involves the lives of men and the
morale of the county generally, is criminaL.' 79
Despite the anger at GHQ it was made clear that the unit must be
reconstructed, '...we cannot afford to drop the column idea now'.80
There is little evidence however that a new Belfast unit was being
prepared before the Truce, The reason appears to have been primarily
financiaL. The Cavan experiment had virtually bankrupted the already
poverty- stricken Belfast Brigade. McKelvey wrote to GHQ in August
1921: 'The arming, equipment and transport of this unit cost
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approximately £150. One of the men of the unit was kiled in action
and the Belfast Brigade had to bear the expense of the funeral which
amounted to £27, The Brigade was seriously affected by such and I
would like to learn from you if it is expected to bear this cost.' 81 With
so many members of the Belfast IRA unemployed funds were a
constant problem and one of the principal reasons why Southern
support had been so welcomed in the city, The Captain of the
Ballymacarret Company later stated that every member of his 120-
strong unit was unemployed 
,82
Greater GHQ involvement however did not apparently involve greater
material help. McKelvey complained that his Division had received no
arms whatsoever from GHQ and could not find money from his own
men: 'The Belfast Brigade has never at any time been in a very sound
financial position: 75% of the men are out of work and after hostilties
resume it is practically certain that the remainder will be also thrown
out of work. The weekly subscriptions under these circumstances do
not amount to much, accordingly I could not levy this Brigade, Antrim
and Down could not raise funds to cover internal expense.' 83 He
concluded bleakly: 'I intend after the Truce to strike a levy throughout
79 C/S to GHQ Organiser Cavan, 24 May 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/A/18 (100-1)).
80 Ibid,
81 McKelvey to Mulcahy, 16 Aug. 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/A/23 (44)),
82 Manus O'Boyle statement (BMH, NA, WS 289),
83 McKelvey to Mulcahy, 16 Aug, 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/A/23 (44)),
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the Division but I candidly believe that its enforcement wil be
diffcult.' 84
The spring of 1921 had seen both the creation of the Northern IRA
and something of the role its Southern leadership saw it playing in the
broader national struggle. The arrival of the Truce in July however
would in many ways mask the realities behind these changes. The
fundamental shift in power between North and South which occurred
during the latter stages of the War of Independence was both
interrupted and overshadowed by the hiatus of the Truce period in the
latter half of the year. Despite the Dublin leadership's insistence on a
homogeneous political settlement for all thirty-two counties and the
strengthening of its control over the Northern IRA, events in the north-
east would continue to demonstrate how unrealistic such demands
were.
84Ibid,
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CHAPTER THREE
BELFAST AND THE TRUCE
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Whilst the vagaries of Southern involvement seeped into IRA circles in
the six counties it was, as ever, in Belfast that its greatest impact
would be felt. Sporadic rioting and shooting had continued to plague
the city, albeit on a much reduced scale, during the six months
following the initial violent outbreak in the summer of 1920, From the
spring of 1921 however the shape of the violence in Belfast would
change dramatically. The IRA would now be waging a war against the
backdrop of dramatic constitutional and political change which would
punctuate and intensify the violence for the rest of the year: the
elections in May, the Truce in July, the handing over of security
powers to the Northern government in November and the arrival of the
Treaty in December all led to cataclysmic periods of violence. Northern
IRA activity would now be increasingly linked to the political
machinations of its Southern leadership and the growing bond
between North and South would finally be sealed.
Pror to the disaster in Cavan the IRA in Belfast were becoming more
aggressive and confident in their activities. They also became more
professional; the mass of ex-servce men and expelled shipyard
workers who had manned the barricades in the previous summer had
melted away leaving only a hard-core of committed Volunteers,
McCorley observed that '...the fight became more and more a fight
between two disciplined bodies'J Indeed Belfast fighting was not for
the faint-hearted. To be a Catholic gunman in the city was a
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dangerous occupation, arguably more dangerous than in any other
part of Ireland. Roger McCorley's offer to GHQ to exchange officers
from Belfast with the Dublin Brigade was politely refused,2 Seamus
McKenna later noted the difference between the two cities arguing
that, whereas in Dublin 'the majority of the population were
sympathetic and those who were not were afraid to display hostilty in
any way. The position was different in Belfast where we had three-
fourths of the population bitterly hostile (and many of them actively
so) worse than one would find in an English city.' 3
The Belfast IRA's new professionalism would be matched by its
opponents. The USC had been readied for action by the end of 1920
and the hard-pressed RIC was reinforced by full-time 'A' Specials
allowing for over twenty previously abandoned barracks to be re-
occupied across the six counties. In Belfast itself the 'B' Specials were
held back until Februar not yet being viewed with the loathing they
would later inspire in the Catholic community, Even then they were
only to be allowed to patrol Protestant areas in the company of regular
RIC officers, This idea however proved to be both unpopular and
impractical and was increasingly ignored due in part to the perception
of a growing IRA threat but also to a greater level of unity between the
i Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389).
2 Roger McCorley interview with Emie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/98).
3 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 10 i 6),
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previously aloof and often mutually hostile branches of the security
forces.4
The increasing security role of the 'B' Specials would do much to
embitter community relations in the city. Allegations of drunkenness
and looting began to surface almost immediately and raids on suspect
houses by combined groups of RIC and Specials became
commonplace.5 Their late night visits, heralded by the sound of
banging dustbin lids, brought fear and confrontation into the heart of
the Catholic community. Senator Joseph Connolly, a Sinn Fein
notable in the city at the time, later described the stressful
atmosphere: '.,.looking back over the period as we lived through it in
Belfast, the memory of it is one of day-to-day strain, of constant
tension of incidents, raids and arrests.' 6 Due to the part- time role of
the 'B' Specials most of the raids occurred between midnight and 3am.
There were only occasional daylight raids, usually a swift reaction to
an IRA attack in the city during the day. The nature of the raids
varied, often depending on the offcer in charge, Some were polite and
courteous, others merely arrogant and destructive whilst a small
anonymous minority set out to kil. Connolly's house in Divis Drive
itself was raided no less than twenty-five times before the Truce. He
regarded himself however as lucky because the local RIC Sergeant
4 See A, Hezlet The 'B' Specials: A History of the Ulster Special Constabulary (Belfast, 1977) pA3.
5 For examples of the excesses of some sections of the use see Farrell, Arming the Protestants pp. 51-
3.
6 Gaughan, Memoirs of Senator Joseph Connolly p,195,
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'...always did his utmost to restrain his companions'. 
7 After a
Christmas break in 1920 he was delighted to return home and find
that, although his house had been raided and ransacked, little lasting
damage had been done.8
The increasing number of raids meant that many Belfast IRA men
spent long periods on the run in the city, rarely spending two nights
in the same location, creeping from safe-house to safe-house in
daylight or attending clandestine meetings after curfew to plan or
carry out an attack. Most of these operations took weeks to plan,
especially those in hostile areas of the city, and more often than not
were cancelled before even being attempted. The experiences of
Thomas Flynn, a Belfast IRA offcer, were typical of those suffered by
many Volunteers in the city during the last few months of the War of
Independence: 'The position in Belfast for about seven weeks before
the Truce was so critical and the pressure on our Nationalist districts
so great that I did not get any clothes off for most of the time. I was
getting no regular sleep and I was reduced to a state of extreme
exhaustion.' 9 Despite being on the run many IRA men would stay
within view of their own homes so as to be ready to respond to a visit
from a murder gang, RIC Constable Robert Crosset, later made clear
how central reprisal attacks were to crushing the threat from the
IRA:'...we the Unionists of us, we didn't let them away with it, for if
7 Ibid. p.187.
8 ibid.
9 Thomas Flynn statement (BMH, NA, WS 429).
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they shot three police, they shot three police in Ballyronan, you see,
well we went and shot three of theirs, do you see.' 10 The number of
such tit- for- tat kilings would increase dramatically all over the six
counties from the spring of 1921 as both sides began to grow in
confidence and proficiency. In South Armagh the notorious Igoe gang
began operating in the area in 1ate- 1920. Operating from a makeshift
base at the Beresford Arms Hotel in Armagh City they put up notices
all over the county warning the IRA that severe reprisals would be
carried out in response to any aggressive moves by the Volunteers. 
11
In Belfast itself reprisals had started as early as the summer of 1920.
On 25 September two IRA members shot dead Constable Thomas
Leonard on the Falls Road after he resisted their attempts to disarm
him. Leonard was the first RIC man to be kiled in the city. The
following evening a number of reprisal gangs led by D /1 Harrison left
Springfe1d Road police barracks and proceeded to the houses of three
prominent republicans, Edward Trodden, Sean McFadden and Sean
Gaynor. All three were shot dead. 
12 The attacks brought to a head the
ongoing disagreements between the young radical offcers of the 1st
Battalion, led by Roger McCorley, and the more conservative brigade
staff who, as in the summer of 1920, were reluctant to sanction
reprisal attacks. The tension within the Belfast IRA was further
inflamed when many of the IRA leaders fled the city for the safety of
10 Robert Crosset quoted in Brewer, The Royal Irish Constabulary p,94,
11 James Short statement (BMH, NA, WS 534).
12 Belfast Newsletter 27 July 1920, Irish News 27 July 1920,
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Dublin fearful that they would be the next targets of the murder
gangs,13 In South Down there was a similar reaction by the brigade
leadership. After the shooting of RIC Head Constable John Kearney in
Newr on 21 November, they too fled over the border to safety. Patrick
Casey, a Newr IRA offcer, later stated that the leadership were
'..,moving too slowly for the more active spirits. The senior Volunteer
offcers, really men with feet of clay, vanished overnight, and so for a
time the organisation in South Down was 1eaderless.' 14
The timid response of the brigade leadership led the younger members
of the IRA in Belfast to take matters into their own hands. A covert
meeting was held whose principal aim was, in McCorley's words '...to
unseat what was called the peace party from power.' 15 Seamus
McKenna, the Vice-Commandant of the Cavan column and one of the
most miltant members of the 1 st Battalion, recalled his own sense of
frustration with his conservative superiors: 'I made the threat that I
would begin operations myself, along with another man or two, by
shooting a couple of RIC men more or less indiscriminately, but I was
asked to stand firm and wait patiently for a while as there was a
change coming in leadership of the battalion and that the new man to
be appointed, Roger McCorley, would not look to the Brigade for
sanction for actions against the enemy.' 16 McKenna felt, like many of
13 According to Seamus McKenna the leaders who left includedWish' Fox, Paddy Wynne and Andy
O'Hare, See Seamus Mckenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016),
14 Patrick Casey statement (BMH, NA, WS 1148).
15 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
16 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016),
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his youthful colleagues, that the brigade council were too 'moderate
minded' and was particularly critical of Joe McKelvey who he believed
was only appointed as Divisional O/C due to his membership of the
IRB rather than his personal fighting abilties. 
17
Indeed the influence of the IRB on the activities of provincial IRA units
during the War of Independence was as varied as the level of IRA
activity throughout Ireland. Whereas GHQ in Dublin was dominated
by the IRB, its influence in the localities was more patchy. In some
counties, such as Cork, IRB members formed the most radical
elements of the IRA and were responsible for transforming the
organisation into a brutal guerrilla force. In the North however the IRB
acted as a force for restraint, holding back more radical IRA members
through their domination of key commands. For example, John
McCoy was informed by the O/C of the Newr Brigade, Paddy Rankin,
a prominent IRB member, that if he failed to join the organisation his
promotion to Brigade Adjutant would not be sanctioned. McCoy
however refused, as did many of the young radicals in Belfast, most
notably Roger McCorley, Sean O'Neil and Seamus McKenna. As such
the later splits which developed within the Belfast leadership were
caused not simply by the youthful impatience of these men but also
17 Ibid.
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by broader divisions in the republican movement between IRB and
non-IRB members. 
is
In response to the mutiny of the 1 st Battalion, the Belfast Brigade staff
threatened to severely punish any man who engaged in un sanctioned
attacks on the police. This threat however proved counterproductive
and led to what Joe Murray described as '...a more or less open
breach between the Company offcers and Brigade. At this time a
threat of unoffcial operations was made by members of 'c' company.'
19 The situation was finally brought to a head when two local Sinn
Fein leaders who had practically no Volunteer experience were
appointed to the brigade staff. This move proved to be the final straw
for McCorley who demanded that the men be removed. The brigade
council backed down and the initiative passed to the young miltants
of 'B' and 'c' companies with McCorley being appointed as Vice-
Commandant of the 1st Battalion. McCorley claimed the support he
had received in this struggle was due to the fact that he was '...one of
those who strongly advocated that the executions (of RIC menl should
take place irrespective of the consequences.' 20
One of McCorley's key alles in his struggle against the brigade
leadership was the Captain of the radical 'B' Company, Seamus
18 John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492); Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 803),
For the influence of the IRB on key provincial IRA units during the War ofIndependence see
Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence pp,104-106, 127-8.
19 Joe Murray statement (BMH, NA, WS 412).
20 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
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Woods. The two men, would remain extremely close friends
throughout the period and both would rise to be key leaders of the IRA
in east Ulster. On the surface at least they were unlikely alles,
McCorley's toughness and cold brutality sat uneasily with Woods'
more sensitive nature and aptitude for administration. Seamus
McKenna described McCorley as '...apparently devoid of any feeling of
nerves, and would undertake any operation with no sign of
disturbance or emotion on his innocent looking face'. Conversely he
found Woods to be '...a different type, more human in his reactions
but quicker at making a decision and carrying it out. To work with
them on these street shooting jobs was a pleasant thrilL.' 21 McCorley
later said of his friend: 'I always found Woods worthy of the greatest
admiration. He was by nature highly strung but very cool in action.
Never, on any occasion did he try to avoid any operations.' 22
With McCor1ey and his miltant supporters now in the ascendancy
they felt free to launch the attacks that they craved with or without
the sanction of their leaders. Their first operation was a plan to
assassinate numerous members of the Auxilary police who were
constantly passing through Belfast on their way to the South. Many of
the Auxilaries, before they made their way to Dublin, would stay at
the Railway View Hotel, also known as Roddy's Hotel, close to
Musgrave Street Barracks. At around 9pm on 26 January Roger
McCorley, Seamus Woods, Joe Murray and Seamus McKenna were
21 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH NA, WS 1016).
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ushered into the downstairs bar by a friendly employee, Vincent
Watters, who directed the men to the snug where they waited until the
very busy pub had emptied of customers. Seamus McKenna recalls
the events that followed: When closing time came, we pretended to
leave the pub by a side door. Watters, however, pointed out the way
up the stairs and said our quarry was there. The four of us went
upstairs. We opened the door of the wrong room. It was empty but, by
that light, we saw another room, The three RIC men were in bed, two
of them in one bed and one man in another, a single bed. They knew
our purpose immediately. We threw open the door, switched on the
light, and they started screaming. It was a particularly ghastly
business, but we had to do it and it was done.' 23 The three victims,
Thomas Heffron, Michae1 Quinn and Denis Gilmartin, had been in the
hotel drinking all day and had just retired in a drunken state to their
beds: Heffron and Quinn were both kiled outright although Gilmartin
survved with terrible wounds; as Manus O'Boyle commented 'All were
kiled except one who, although he received fifteen wounds, recovered
but was a maniac.' 24
The shooting of the Auxilaries and the refusal of the conservative
brigade leadership to sanction further aggressive activities by the
young radicals deepened the tension between the two rapidly
polarising factions. After the burning of Cork City in early December
22 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
23 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016).
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1920 Joe Murray claimed that GHQ ordered the Belfast IRA to burn
down half of Belfast city centre by way of reprisaL. This order
highlighted not only Southern nationalist perceptions of Belfast as a
'foreign' city but also the unwillngness of the IRA leadership in the
Northern capital to agree to what they felt was a reckless and
dangerously counter-productive policy. For the extremist wing of the
organisation however the decision of the brigade council to overrule
the order merely confirmed them in their hostilty to those who they
felt had little stomach for the realities of revolution. Joe Murray
himself witnessed McCorley's angr response to the cancellation of the
arson campaign: '...he was very upset on the receipt of these orders
and expressed the opinion that some so and so on the Brigade Staff
should be shot.' 25
The decision proved to be the final straw for McCor1ey and Woods
who, invigorated from the success of the Roddy's Hotel attack,
initiated an open breach with the brigade leadership and set about the
creation of their own Active Servce Unit. Joe Murray, later to be a key
member of this unit, recalled: 'After this operation of Roddy's Hotel we,
the younger members of "B" and "C" companies, decided that now that
we had made a start on miltary activities we would force matters on
the Brigade Staff either to give us their blessing to form an Active
24 Manus O'Boyle statement (BMH, NA, WS 289). For further details of the attack see Irish News, 27
January, i 92 i.
25 Joe Murray statement (BMH, NA, WS 412),
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Service Unit or we would "push them out".' 26 Similarly McCorley
himself noted: 'From this point on, the younger element, who had
control of the 1 st Battalion, took the bit in their teeth and travelled
under their own steam. We were stil subject to a number of
restrictions from the Brigade Staff who took up the attitude that our
activities might jeopardise activities which the Brigade might decide to
carry out. The attitude of the 1 st Battalion was that it would be
ridiculous to hold up activities merely on the off chance that the
Brigade would decide to carry out something in the future.' He
continued: 'We stil had the diffculty of dealing with certain elements
on the Brigade Staff who were not very favourably disposed to active
service unit activities. However we ignored this influence.' 27
The members of the ASU were the elite of the IRA in Belfast.28 The
later leadership of the Belfast Brigade and divisional staff would be
drawn from this small pool of miltant activists. Woods and McCorley
had to all intents and purposes taken control of the IRA organisation
in the city. They immediately abolished the old system of elections for
offcers, and appointed men themselves after holding a series of grisly
auditions for each prospective candidate which were, in McCorley's
words, to '...see how he reacted to the strain of service with the unit'.
26 Ibid.
27 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389).
28 The nucleus ofthis group was made up of Woods, McCorley, Joseph Muray, Seamus McKenna,
Sean Keenan, Thomas Flyn, Tom Fox, Seamus Fin, and Seamus Heron, See Roger McCorley
statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
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Only those who came up to standard managed to gain a place on the
ASU.29
The unit consisted of thirty-two men, eight from each of the four
companies of the 1 st Battalion. From their headquarters at Daniel
McDevitt's tailor's shop in Rosemary Street small patrols were sent
out day and night to hunt for targets.30 This involved closely following
suspect individuals around the streets of the city and listening to their
accents; if they were English the men would conclude that they were
Black and Tans or Auxilaries and word was sent back to Woods and
McCorley who would then set out to do the shooting. Indeed the
leadership of the ASU were uncompromising and brutal, a fact
endorsed by McCorley's instructions to the members of the unit: 'I had
issued a general order that where reprisal gangs were cornered, no
prisoners were to be taken. The enemy, after a short time, offered to
surrender but our men in obedience to the order, refused to accept
their surrender.' 31
The unit's crude methods were employed dramatically on 11 March
when they gunned down a party of Black and Tans in Victoria Street.
Two were kiled instantly and a third, Wiliam Cooper, died the
following day from his wounds. McCorley, McKenna, Woods, Keenan
and Heron were responsible for the shooting. They had followed the
29 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
30 McDevitt was a veteran Belfast republican, McDermott, Northern Divisions pp, 221-2. See also fie
on Daniel McDevitt (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA5/650),
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three men, who were laughing and chatting with two local girls,
through Victoria Square towards Musgrave Street barracks where they
were shot down in a hail of bullets. The IRA party fled immediately
after the attack leaving the three Black and Tans and the two girls,
both of whom were wounded, sprawled out on the pavement. A
passer-by Alexander Allen, a Protestant shipyard worker and father to
eight children, was also kiled although Seamus McKenna later
claimed that he had died when one of the Black and Tans had fired
wildly as he staggered away mortally wounded. McKenna himself
called the kilings '".one of the neatest shooting jobs done in Belfast'.
32 Sean Montgomery, another Belfast Volunteer, described the brutal
scene: 'The OjC (i.e. McCorley) put four or five rounds into one and he
said it took him a long time to falL.' 33
Just over a month later the ASU struck again. On 23 April two
Auxilaries, Ernest Bolim and John Bailes, were gunned down in
Donegall Place at around 9pm. Bailes and Bolim had only arrived in
the city the previous day and were in fact due to leave on the day they
were kiled although their journey had been delayed.34 Joe Murray
later left a detailed account of the attack that gives a fascinating
insight into the workings of the ASU:
31 Ibid,
32 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016).
33 Sean Montgomery quoted in McDermott, Northern Divisions (Belfast, 2001) p,72. For further details
of the shooting see Irish News, 12 March 1921.
34 Belfast Brigade report for April 1921, 15 May 1921 (Mulcahy Papers, UCDAD, P7/N18),
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'We assembled at the O'Donovan Rossa Football Club in Berry
Street in the city centre. The Battalion O.C. (R.McCorley)
outlined the scheme of attack on the Auxilaries should they
appear that afternoon, and he stressed the importance of getting
in the first blow and that we must carry the fight to the enemy
at the very first opportunity even at the risk of our lives, We left
the club shortly after this and patrolled the city centre for a
radius of about a mile in each direction. The fact of this being a
Saturday evening in an industrial city where the streets were
crowded with pedestrians, made the going very diffcult and
tedious. Our eyes and wits were strained with being on the look
out for the enemy and at the same time keeping within range of
each other and watching for signals. We had spotters on the
look out at various points and we patrolled for a couple of hours
but no sign of the enemy. A few of the Squad complained of
fatigue and I, feeling much the same, brought this to the notice
of the O.C. who then decided to abandon the hunt. Woods,
McCorley and myself were returning home along Donegall Place.
I crossed over to the opposite side-when I saw two Auxilaries
about a hundred yards in front travellng in the same direction.
I made an effort to cross the street to join Woods and McCor1ey
when a tram came between us and stopped. I ran around the
tram and as I did so I heard four or five shots. When I passed
the end of the tram I saw the two Auxliaries lying on the ground
and saw McCorley disappear around the corner of Castle Lane.
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In the confusion caused by the pedestrians rushing here and
there I ran in the opposite direction to McCorley and Woods. We
all succeeded in making good our escape.' 35
Unlike the case of the Black and Tans the shooting of the two
Auxilaries led to swift and brutal revenge from the security forces. On
the same evening, just before midnight three armed men visited the
home of the Duffn family in C10nard Gardens. They entered the house
and found Dan Duffn and his brother Pat in the kitchen. Both were
shot several times in the chest and died instantly. Dan was 24-years-
old and an IRA Lieutenant although his older brother Pat, a teacher,
had no connection with the organisation. There is little doubt that
their kilers were from the RIC, District Inspector Ferris, an associate
of Swanzy in Cork, was implicated in the kilings after he was noticed
returning to the scene of the shootings to collect a dog that had been
left behind by one of the attackers. Two weeks later he was ambushed
himself by McCorley and his men after leaving his local church
although, despite receiving gunshot wounds to his stomach and neck,
he managed to survve. 
36 The ASU would continue a savage
underground war with Ferris and his RIC squad based at Springfie1d
35 Joe Murray statement (BMH, NA, WS 412), For details of the shootings see Belfast Telegraph, 24
April 1921.
36 John Duffn survived the attack on his brothers, See his account of the events immediately after the
shooting in the Belfast Telegraph, 25 April 1921. For details on Ferris see Belfast Telegraph, 9 May
1921; Irish News, 9 May 1921. See also McCorley to O'Donoghue,6 March 1964 (O'Donoghue
papers, NU, MS 31313).
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road barracks although despite numerous attempts to kil him, he
managed to survve eventually becoming an RUC County Inspector.37
Other members of the gang however were not so lucky. Constable
James Glover, who was believed to be responsible for the shooting of
Gaynor, Trodden and McFadden the previous September, was shot
dead on the Falls Road in early June. Glover was the only member of
the three-man RIC patrol to be kiled. McCorley later stated that the
wounding of his two companions was deliberate, as he wanted to send
a message to the RIC that the shooting was a reprisa1.38 The activities
of the ASU continued right up until the Truce and its members were
responsible for numerous arson and bomb attacks including those on
the Reform Club and the Clonard and Tivoli picture houses, all of
which were occupied by members of the miltary. The ASU however
suffered a severe blow in early May when many of its key members
were ordered to join the il-fated column in Cavan. After the failure of
McCor1ey and Woods' attempt to rescue their colleagues from prison
failed, the activities and effectiveness of the unit reduced dramatically.
The increasing intensity of this subterranean war took place against
the looming backdrop of the elections to the first parliament of
Northern Ireland held in accordance with the Government of Ireland
Act. Whilst in the South the elections were hijacked by Sinn Fein as a
mechanism for establishing the second Dail, the decision on what
37 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016),
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posture to adopt to the poll in the six north-eastern counties became
the subject of much debate during the spring of 1921. Some
nationalists argued for a complete boycott of the proceedings believing
that their involvement would give legitimacy to the new Northern
government. Others however pointed out that a strong showing in the
polls would do much to undermine the basis of partition. De Valera
himself was wary of taking this gamble; warning that a poor result
would allow their opponents to claim that the six counties formed an
'homogeneous political entity'. The importance of keeping the
Northern nationalist vote united against Unionism and the need to
bury, at least temporarily, the bitter feelings between Sinn Fein and
the UIL led to a meeting between de Valera and Joe Devlin in February
1921. An election pact between the two nationalist parties was
eventually agreed, after lengthy negotiations, the following month.39
The decision to join temporarily with Sinn Fein, although a pragmatic
political strategy, caused anger in many Hibernian circles especially
considering the hostilty the IRA had shown to the AOH over recent
months. One such complaint, sent to Devlin after IRA attacks in
County Monaghan, stated angrily: '...how could you as a Hibernian
speak on behalf of such cowards. They went into the house of poor
Mrs Philips...took out her poor son aged twenty...and shot him dead
for no other reason than that he was a Hibernian. That's the
treatment meted out to Nationalists at Sinn Fein hands. Partition is a
38 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389),
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glorious thing, compared with the rule of those boys, and I wonder
how any Nationalist can stand up and defend such men,' 40 Indeed
IRA attacks on Hibernians and their property had become increasingly
vicious during 1921 especially in areas, such as South Armagh, where
miltant republicanism was the dominant force.
Despite such hostilty the pact remained largely intact and hopes for
success were running high, especially after witnessing the widespread
anger in many unionist circles at Craig's decision to meet with
deVa1era in early May. There was also a belief that labour candidates
could potentially split the Protestant vote in some key areas. Such
hopes however proved ilusory and the 'Partition Election' held on 24
May 1921 saw a sweeping victory for the Ulster Unionists and disaster
for the Catholic minority. Every Unionist candidate who stood was
elected and Sinn Fein and the Nationalists managed to acquire only
twelve seats between them to their opponents forty. Complaints of
intimidation during the election began to surface immediately. Joseph
Connolly later wrote: 'Those of us who went through the six- county
election campaign are not likely to forget it. Here the combination of
police, Orange mobs and the whole personnel of the election
machinery was set in motion to make it difficult, if not impossible for
Sinn Feiners or Nationalists to record their votes.' 41 There is little
doubt that many of these claims were true although the fact that
39 Phoenix, Northern Nationalism p.l 08.
40 Monaghan AOH member quoted in Phoenix, Northern Nationalism p.118.
41 Gaughan, Memoirs of Senator Joseph Connolly p,195,
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turnout had been almost 90 per cent, demonstrated that such tactics
had very little impact on the final result. The strong and unified
performance of the Ulster Unionists had been a far more tellng factor.
Despite the failure of anti-partition candidates to secure large
numbers of seats they managed to poll almost a third of the votes with
Fermanagh and Tyone returning a nationalist majority. The elections
also saw a shift in the balance of power in Northern nationalist
politics with Sinn Fein overtaking the UIL as the principal opposition
to the Unionists. Sinn Fein received over 20 per cent of the vote
compared to only 12 per cent for the Nationalists.42 For the Northern
IRA the political upheavals of May appeared to make little impact on
their activities or outlook. Sean Milroy wrote to Mulcahy later in the
year that the Volunteers displayed virtually no interest in politics or
any desire to engage with the wider Sinn Fein movement, reporting
'...an attitude of aloofness on the part of the Volunteers and implied
attitude that the Sinn Fein clubs were not servng any useful purpose
and that it was a waste of time and energy to trouble about them.' 43
Indeed McCorley, like many other miltant IRA members, later
42 The election results were as follows: votes %
Ulster Unionist Patty 341,622 66,7
Sinn Fein 104,716 20,5UIL 60,577 11.8Ind, Labour 3,073 0.6Independent 926 0,2
See Ellott, Northern Ireland Parliamentary Results 1921-1972 p,89,
43 Milroy to Mulcahy, September 1921 quoted in Staunton, The Nationalists of Northern Ireland 1918-
1973 p,56,
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confided that he resented any activity that had about it the 'smell of
politics.' 44
The rise to prominence in the North of Sinn Fein and the IRA, given
impetus by the May elections, would be sealed by the signing of the
Truce in early July, Sinn Fein's domination of the nationalist political
agenda, and the Catholic minority's faith in the Dail government's
rhetoric on the primacy of Irish unity in any future political
settlement, brought the Northern IRA unprecedented popularity. Peter
Carleton, a Fianna member from Belfast, described the reaction of the
Catholic population of the city: 'I can remember when the Truce was
declared in July 1921 "Thank God, said my mother, that I have lived
to see this day". Everyone that could dig up a flag hung it out. The
Truce meant far more to us than to the rest of Ireland,' 45 Similarly
Seamus Woods, soon to become one of the most important IRA leaders
in the North, recalled that prior to the Truce only 25% of Catholics
were behind the IRA but '...with the signing of the Truce the Catholic
population believing for the moment that we had been victorious and
that the Specials and UVF were beaten, practically all flocked to our
standard.' 46 Indeed when IRA internees were later released from
Ballykin1ar camp they received standing ovations from the Catholic
44 Roger McCorley statement (BMH NA, WS 389). For other examples of the IRA's disdain for
politics see Hopkinson Green against Green pA 1.
45 Peter Carleton quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p.305,
46 Woods to Mulcahy, 27 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77),
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population of Belfast and volleys of shots were fired into the air in
celebration. 
47
Unionists reacted in a very different way to the prisoner releases. In
Banbridge in early December a train carryng a group of internees
home to Belfast was attacked by local loyalists who threw stones and
fired shots into the carriages injuring one of the occupants. The mob
then set to work attacking Catholic homes and business premises and
sporadic violence spread throughout the town.48 The timing of the
Truce 11 July, only twenty-four hours before the traditionally most
confrontational day in Ulster society, led, as in the previous year, to
savage sectarian violence in Belfast. The 10th of July 1921, Belfast's
'Bloody Sunday', as it came to be known, resulted in fourteen deaths
in the city and over 150 Catholic homes burnt down, with Specials
joining loyalist mobs in attacking Catholic areas. The violence was a
reaction to both the imminent cease-fire and an IRA ambush in
Raglan Street the day before where one member of the security forces
was killed and two others wounded.49 July and August 1921 would
witness some of the bitterest clashes yet seen in the city and the
highest number of casualties since the shipyard expulsions of the
previous summer,
47 RlC Bi-monthly report, 15 Dec, 
1921 (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA5/152), See also
Belfast Telegraph, 9 Dec, 1921.
48lbid,
49 For the violent events of 
the day see Irish News 11 July 1921, Belfast Newsletter 11 July 1922. See
also Kenna, Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom, p,42,
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Whereas in the rest of Ireland the July cease-fire was a period of
uneasy peace and miltaristic bravado, in Belfast the situation
remained menacing and violent with more people losing their lives in
the city during the last five months of 1921 than had done during the
final seven months of the War of Independence. Thomas Fitzpatrick
admitted many years later: 'The Truce was not observed by either side
in the north', with David McGuinness callng the whole thing a
'farce'.50 Roger McCorley himself wrly observed that '...the Truce
lasted six hours only'.51 Despite the ilusory nature of the Truce in
Belfast the early signs in the rest of Northern Ireland were that the
cease-fire would largely hold although after a few months the situation
also began to rapidly deteriorate.
Uncertainty over the negotiations taking place in London was the
principal reason for the steady rise in tension across the six counties,
increasing as they did the fears of unionists whilst at the same time
raising the hopes of nationalists. With the Southern issue now
approaching a settlement, unionists became fearful that Northern IRA
units would be reinforced by hardened rebels from the South whilst
the British would try to appease Sinn Fein by giving ground on the
Northem issue. This latter fear would prove to be unfounded although
the former was proved correct in almost every respect with Southern
IRA initiatives becoming the principal means of overcoming partition.
50 See statements ofDavid McGuinness (BMH, NA, WS 417) and Thomas Fitzpatrick (BMH, NA, WS
395).
51 Roger McCorley interview with Emie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/98),
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Conversely the Catholic minority looked forward to a change in their
fortunes and the swift end to the brief experiment of partition and
their inclusion in some form of self-governing all-Ireland state. For the
nationalist population in the north-east it was the ending of partition
rather the extent of any new state's independence which was of
primary concern.
Although the Truce was an il-observed ilusion in Belfast, and
increasingly so in the rest of the province, the same regulations
applied in the north-east as in the other twenty- six counties. The
USC, much to the dismay of the Unionist government, was
demobilsed and the IRA given offcial recognition. Liaison offcers
were appointed for Ulster, the chief of which, Eoin O'Duffy, set up his
headquarters at St Mary's Hall in Belfast which had long played a
central role in charitable relief for the expelled Catholic workers in the
city. On 16 July O'Duffy announced an end to all offensive IRA activity
in the six counties and Volunteers began to tentatively police their
own areas.
The increased prestige which accompanied this new role brought not
only respect for the Northern IRA from the Catholic minority but also
large numbers of eager new recruits. As elsewhere in Ireland
thousands of young Catholic men flocked to join the IRA although
with the Truce having little real meaning in the North they would not
have the luxury of six months of prestige and peace afforded to similar
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'Trucileers'in the South. Ironically it would prove to have been safer to
join the movement during the relative quiet of the War of
Independence and many of these new recruits would be involved in
intense fighting right up to the summer of 1922, many also suffering
the hardships of internment or life in the Provisional Government
Army, Before the Truce the three IRA Divisions based in Ulster had an
active nominal strength of only 1639. By October the number of
volunteers had risen to well over 3000 with many brigades almost
doubling in size. In Antrim for example the pre- Truce 'Brigade'
consisted of a mere 111 Volunteers. This number increased to 260
after July although the average Company strength was stil only 21
with some areas managing to raise fewer than ten Volunteers. 
52
In order to accommodate this new influx of recruits numerous
training camps were established across the province. Based in isolated
areas, such as the Sperrin mountains and around Glen Swiley, most
consisted of little more than a few old or abandoned buildings which
acted as a temporary headquarters and arms dump. GHQ training
officers were appointed from the South including such figures as
Emmett Dalton, Ernie O'Malley and Dan Breen.53 Some Belfast men
also made their way south to Wicklow for further training. The ulterior
motives of Southern involvement however, as in the spring of 1921,
were again in evidence; Breen later writing that the training was
52 Divisional strengths June, July 1921 (Mulcahy papers, P7/A/23); Divisional strengths October
1921(Mulcahy papers, P7a/18); 'Report on No,2 Brigade Training Camp, 23 Sept. 1921', Documents
found in S1. Mary's Hall, 18 March 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs files, PRONI, HA 32/1/130),
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undertaken '...in order that, if the fight were to be renewed, they (i.e.
the Northerners) would play a more active part and thereby lesson the
burden on the southern counties'. 54 Raids by combined forces of
Specials and RIC were commonplace and by November there were
believed to be only two small camps based in Fermanagh stil
operating in the province although sporadic revivals of training were
reported throughout the Truce period. The 2nd Northern Division
reported that 375 men went through the camps between September
and mid-October before they were broken up.55
Some of these new recruits appeared reluctant to extend their
activities beyond anything more than symbolic membership of the
organisation. In December a party of fifty IRA men raided a number of
Catholic homes in Claudy and Dungiven where, after dragging fifteen
of these raw recruits from their beds, they frog-marched them along
the road to Sperrin camp. A subsequent raid by the USC released the
captives and after a short gun battle five IRA men were arrested and
charged with kidnapping. 
56
When Joe Murray returned to Belfast during the Truce he noticed the
significant impact which the arrival of these new recruits had made on
the Belfast IRA recallng that his old Company was now made up
53 Nicholas Smyth statement (BMH NA, WS 721),
54 D, Breen, My Fightfor Irish Freedom (Tralee, 1964) p. 166,
55 Report on 2nd Northern Division Training camps (Mulcahy papers, P7/A/26). See also captured
reports on 3rd Northern Division Training Camps in 'Documents found in St. Mary's Hall, 18 March
1922' (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA32/130),
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entirely of strangers,57 By January 1922 the Belfast IRA had around
800 members although the new men proved to be deeply unpopular
with many of the older veterans. Seamus McKenna angrily stated that
'. ..about two thirds of these recruits- possibly three fourths- joined the
IRA for sectarian reasons only, to fight defensively or offensively
against the Orange gangs. Few of them had any conception of Irish-
Ireland principles. Some of them undoubtedly became Republican as
the result of their association with the old type of Volunteers, but, in
my opinion, the majority of these pogrom recruits were lacking in the
ideals and principles which inspired the men who joined the
movement in Belfast and remained in it between 1916 and 1920.' 58
The Trucileers were viewed by many old IRA hands as little more than
the Catholic mob under arms. These men, for some, had extremely
dubious motives for joining the organisation, many merely wishing to
continue their street battles with their Protestant counterparts as they
had done before the Truce.59 Thomas Fitzpatrick commented bluntly:
'...we had a lot of trouble with the corner-boy crowd on both sides'.6o
Many of these new members were ex-British soldiers. They inspired
mistrust and at times open hostilty from veteran IRA members and
most were not given any positions of responsibilty in the organisation
or provided with key information such as the names of leading offcers
56 RIC Bi-monthly report, 31 Dec. 1921 (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA5/l52),
57 Joe Murray statement (BMH, NA, WS 412),
58 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016).
59 Joe Murray statement(BMHNA, WS 412).
60 Thomas Fitzpatrick statement (BMH, NA, WS 395).
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and the location of headquarters.61 Some however did manage to rise
through the ranks, much to the annoyance of some veteran offcers
such as Seamus McKenna: 'I was amazed how these ex-British
servcemen had gained the confidence of the old senior offcers of the
battalion and brigade and were holding rank. I will give one example.
The two sons of a man, who was kiled by Orange terrorists, joined the
Volunteers late 1920 or early 1921. Both these sons were ex-British
servcemen and they had not the slightest shred of national ideals or
principles. They joined the IRA as a means of avenging the death of
their father.' He was particularly angr to find that two of the Belfast
battalions had been placed under the command of ex-British
servicemen during the Truce. Overall he concluded that the cease-fire
had a negative effect on the IRA organisation: 'The Truce was, in my
opinion, responsible for a considerable amount of decay in the
Volunteer spirit and also for a lowering of values. I was in prison, of
course, during the Truce but I kept myself in touch with events
outside. The Belfast Brigade was so keen on building up its strength
numerically that little thought was paid to other factors.' 62
The Truce itself was not expected to last and as elsewhere in Ireland
the Northern IRA used the time to obtain weapons and settle old
scores. These two aims would often coincide. Guns were readily
available at the homes of 'B' Specials who could also be attacked and
robbed into the bargaIn. In Claudy for example four masked men
61 Joe Murray statement (BMH, NA, WS 412),
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called at the house of a local loyalist during the Truce and took £6
and his revolver. Shortage of arms remained a constant problem. Joe
McKe1vey, stil smarting from the debacle in Cavan, wrote to Mulcahy:
'We are at a great disadvantage for want of arms and ammunition,
and if a concerted attack is again made on a large scale there is a
possibilty of our being completely swamped.' 63 Indeed the IRA went
to often extreme lengths to obtain guns during the Truce often with
disastrous results. On 17 December a party of Volunteers attempted
to buy arms from members of the Royal Artilery Mounted rifles at
Balmoral camp but were quickly discovered leaving four of their
number behind badly wounded.64 Attempts were also made to procure
arms from the USC camp at Newtownards with unknown results.65
Such activities led consistently to retaliation from local unionists. In
the case of the Claudy attack a gang of Specials attacked six IRA men
attending C1audy Fair, beating them savagely.66
Such small-scale confrontations dictated the character of the Truce
outside Belfast. In Loughbrickland in early October a local Special
Sergeant, Joseph White, harassed a party of local Volunteers and after
beating them about the head with a stick, told them '.. .he would not
allow more than three of them together, as they were low, bad
62 Seamus McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 1016),
63 3rd Northern Division report on Belfast during the Truce (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7 / A/23),
64 RIC Bi-monthly report, 31 Dec. 1921 (Ministy of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/152)
65 'Documents found in St. Mary's Hall, 18 March 1922' ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/130),
66Reports on Truce breaches ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/1/4).
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ruffans, and that he would soon put down Sinn Fein.' 67 At Hiltown
during a Saturday night dance in early December two Cross1eys full of
RIC and Specials raided the hall and 'threatened to scatter the dance',
One of the Constables, after recognising a local Volunteer, approached
and said: 'You are a refugee from Dromore and I will soon leave you in
Hell or Heaven.' 68 Two days earlier in the same area two brothers,
Bemard and James Murphy, were arrested and taken to the local
police barracks where they were badly beaten during a two hour
interrogation. 
69
The IRA responded with similar attacks, abducting Specials in
particular who, after being beaten senseless were adorned with crude
placards reading 'Truce Breakers Beware', The situation in Armagh
was particularly unstable with reprisal beatings and robberies
becoming almost a daily occurrence. During the Truce Specials raided
a Sinn Fein Dance and shot dead an IRA member named McKeown.
Edward Boyle recalled: 'They put the girls outside of the hall and then
attempted to force the men and boys remaining in the hall to get down
on their knees and curse the Pope.' 70 Gerard McCourt, a Captain in
the Armagh Brigade, wrote in October that things were so serious that
some of his men were already practically on the run, During the same
month in Ballymaghery, County Down, local nationalists went on the
rampage and a crowd of forty men abused an RIC Constable as he was
67 'Documents found in St. Mary's Hall, 18 March 1922' ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/130).
68 Reports on Truce breaches ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/4),
69 Ibid.
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leaving church, They followed him to the local police station which
they promptly surrounded shouting 'We will kil the Orange bastards
in the Barracks.' 71 Patrick Maguire, a 2nd Northern Division offcer,
admitted that the IRA did their best to provoke unionists during the
Truce marching back and forward through Protestant areas carrying
arms, most of which had been stolen from unionists during the War of
independence.72
The Catholic community also felt the IRA's wrath as the newly
confident movement sought out perceived collaborators and spies. In
one such incident a servant girl of the local RIC District Inspector in
Tyone was dragged from her house and had her hair cut off by a gang
of Volunteers. The IRA also launched attacks on their traditional
enemies in the Hibernians, breaking up meetings, burning their halls
or firing shots at individual members.73 John McCoy recalls that some
young Hibernians, in an attempt to hijack the Truce, stole guns from
the IRA during the Truce and made their own attacks on the
Specials.74
The growing acceptance of Sinn Fein and the IRA as the foremost
representatives of the Catholic minority during the Truce increased
the tension between the two organisations dramatically. Hibernians
70 Edward Boyle statement (BMH, NA , WS 647).
71 Ibid,
72 Patrick Maguire statement (BMH NA, WS 693).
73 RIC Bi-monthly reports, Nov-Dec. 1921 (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA5/152),
74 John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492).
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were angered at the new prestige and political dominance the
agreement had given the IRA and Sinn Fein. Roger McCorley
remembered the tense situation that arose during the Truce within
Belfast's Catholic community:
'The people in the Nationalist areas turned out in thousands
and started to wave table cloths and handkerchiefs. That same
evening a most unexpected state of affairs came about. An
element of Nationalists, under the control of the Hibernians,
started to loot the Unionist business premises in the Falls Road
area. They also set fire to the stabling yard of Messrs. Wordie,
Haulage Contractors. It was obvious that this was due to pique
at the fact that our people were now accepted by the British as
the offcial representatives of the Irish people. On several
occasions during the day our men had to tum out and fire on
this mob. They fired over their heads but later on in the evening
I gave instructions that if the mob gave any further trouble they
were to fire into it. We also sent our patrols to arrest the ring-
leaders of this group and bring them to Brigade Headquarters.
This was done and we ordered several of the ring-leaders to
leave the city within twenty-four hours, otherwse they would be
shot at sight. This action ended this Hibernian attempt to break
the Truce.' 75
In Januar the IRA, in a struggle over the symbols of this new
ascendancy, raided the house of a Hibernian member in Keady to
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recover band instruments which were taken from Sinn Fein members
in Dartley over a month earlier. One Hibernian was badly injured in
the attack.76 Tom McNally, an IRA man from Armagh, later confided
that the '...Hibernians were a menace because of their weakness,.77
Outside of Belfast such brutal and localised violence made the latter
part of the Truce period little different from what had preceded it or
would follow. The continuing spiral of violence and disorder had also
seen a huge rise in the number of robberies and petty crimes by those
intent on taking advantage of the situation, further adding to the
growing instabilty across the province. Charlie Daly related his
experience of the dire situation in the Dromore and Cooks town areas
of Tyone: 'The position of our people in the district was always bad
but since the truce, it is becoming desperate.' In Cookstown attacks
by Specials had meant that '... the Volunteers of this company are
unable to sleep in their own homes at night. They sleep together in a
vacant house without any arms to protect themselves and in hourly
expectation of being massacred. Raids on houses, indiscriminate
shooting, holding up and abusing helpless people at night have
become such common occurrences of late that they almost pass
unnoticed...On1y yesterday the Quartermaster NO.3 Brigade who lives
in Dromore came along to report that his home had been raided that
moming by about 100 armed Orangemen who took his sisters from
75 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389).
76 RIC Bi-monthly repmi, 31 Jan. 1922 (Ministry of Home Aftàirs fies, PRONI, lW5/152)
77 Tom McNally interview with Emie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/99).
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their beds and compelled them to stand with their hands up in the
yard while they were wrecking the house and furniture.' 78 The raiders
stole £100 and some arms before firing shots over the terrified girls'
heads. The leader of the group was a local man believed to be
responsible for the kiling of the three Volunteers the previous April in
Dromore. The report ends tellngly: 'Such cases as this and even ones
more serious are becoming so numerous that Truce or no Truce the
Volunteers must take action to protect themselves and their people.
There is nobody else to do this.' 79
Daly's feeling of isolation however was soon proved to be misplaced as
from now on the Northern issue would increasingly play a major role
in the political and miltary strategies of the Southern IRA leadership.
On 4 September 1921, in order to appease growing discontent in
Northern IRA circles over the direction of Sinn Fein policy, both
Michae1 Collns and Eoin O'Duffy attended a 10,000 strong republican
rally in South Armagh, Collns' Dail constituency. At this gathering
they would spell out the two strands of policy, coercion and
conciliation, which were to shape North-South relations for the next
nine months. Collns played the role of conciliator, callng on
unionists to join with the South in forging a new Ireland also
promising Northern Catholics that '... we shall not desert them'. 80 It
was O'Duffy who was left to spell out the alternative if this offer of co-
78 2nd Northern Division report, 14 Oct. 1921 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/A/26).
79 Ibid.
80 Armagh Guardian, 9 Sept. 1921.
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operation was refused: '...if they (i.e. unionists) decided they were
against Ireland and against their fellow countryman we would have to
take appropriate action. They would have to put on the screw- the
boycott. They would have to tighten that screw and if necessary, they
would have to use the lead against them.' 81
This carrot-and-stick approach would be played out time and again in
the first half of 1922 and directly inspired such seemingly contrary
policies as the Craig- Collns Pacts and the joint-IRA border offensive.
At a meeting in Enniskilen in November O'Duffy repeated the
message. He was reported as saying that unionists '...would not stand
in the path of the march of the nation to freedom. He did not want to
advocate the use of 1ead- he had always been the first to give the right
hand of fellowship to men of a different religion to his,' 82 Collns' calls
for conciliation however were half-hearted at best and he would
consistently turn to his more familar conspiratorial methods. Even if
genuine, unionist opposition was increasing day by day and as the
two republican leaders left Armagh their car was pelted with stones by
outraged local loyalists.
The final hardening of unionist opposition, to either coercion or
conciliation from the South, was virtually complete when, on the 22
November 1921, security powers were handed over to the new
Northern Ireland government. Under its new hard-line minister
81 Ibid, lames McElhaw statement (BMH, NA, WS 634).
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Richard Dawson- Bates, the Ministry of Home Affairs would wage a
constant and unceasing war against any form of dissent from within
the Catholic community. Brutal outbreaks of violence inevitably
followed and from this point on the Northern conflct began to
increasingly resemble a civil war. The Northern government were given
full responsibilty for the USC with Westminster maintaining control
over the army and the RIC, although the former would be conspicuous
by its reluctance to engage in internal Northern security for the rest of
the period, whilst the latter finally lost what little credibilty it had in
unionist circles and became more and more insignificant after the
signing of the Treaty. The British had learnt their lesson from the War
of Independence and equipped local loyalists to combat the IRA rather
than shipping in auxilary police from the mainland, a tactic which
would be used in many other parts of the Empire, such as Palestine,
in later years.
The nature of the forces that would ensure Northern Ireland's security
was spelled out in November in a notorious memorandum from
Charles Wickham, the RIC Divisional Commissioner. He made it clear
that the re-established force would be an amalgamation of the various
Protestant vigilante groups that had sprang up since the summer of
1920 including the Ulster Protestant Association and the Imperial
Guards who had paraded around during the Truce in an ominous
imitation of the IRA: 'Owing to the number of reports which have been
82 Irish News, 15 Nov, 1921.
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received as to the growth of unauthorised loyalist defence forces, the
government have under consideration the durabilty of obtaining the
services of the last elements of these organisations. They have decided
that the scheme most likely to meet the situation would be to enrol all
who volunteer and considered suitable into Class C (Specials) and to
form them into regular miltary units.' '83
The stage was set for a sectarian showdown and the November
violence would see the IRA matching the actions of its enemies in
making such a war inevitable, Their new targets were blatantly
sectarian. Bombs were thrown into trams bringing home Protestant
shipyard workers in Corporation Street and Royal Avenue kiling eight
and wounding nine others. On 23 November Harbour Constable John
McHenry was shot around 6pm in the Docks area and one week later
a Protestant shipyard worker was also kiled on his way to work. The
reprisal of the Protestant mobs was predictably brutaL. On 22
November fifteen people were kiled and around 80 wounded with St.
Matthews Church again being the symbolic centre of the storm.84 The
IRA themselves were also to suffer the wrath of the Specials, On 27
December an IRA offcer David Morrison would be the last victim of
the year, After shots were fired on a group of 'B' Specials, leaving one
wounded, Morrison was caught in his home on Mayfair Street
83 Irish Bulletin, 17 Nov. 1921. See also Kenna, Facts and Figures of the Be((ast Pogrom p.57,
84 For details of the tram bombings and the subsequent violence see Irish News, 22-23 November 1921,
Belfast Telegraph, 23 November 1921.
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preparing for mass and shot six times, once in the back and five times
in the head.8s
The blatantly sectarian nature of the November violence boded il for
the future and it was indeed 1922 rather than 1921 which would see
the greatest number of casualties in Belfast. On 6 December, with the
signing of the Treaty in London, the Unionist authorities ominously
ordered an end to the Truce following a week later with instructions to
disregard the liaison arrangements. For the Northern IRA the Truce
continued theoretically until March, ironically one of the most brutal
months of the conflct. 
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The Northern IRA's place in the conflct had become increasingly clear
during the year, They began as a small and inactive part of a national
struggle, and a curious addendum to a local one, and ended it with
committed, if qualified, leadership from the South and formalised
un stinting opposition in the North. While the situation in the South
was well on its way to a resolution, the Northern issue would finally
move centre stage presenting a new set of problems and challenges for
the Northern IRA, The signing of the Ang1o-Irish Treaty in early
December would add further confusion to the already highly volatile
situation in the North and once again, as with the enactment of the
85 Irish 
News, 28 Dec, 1921.
86 Reports on Truce breaches ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/l/4) ; E, Blythe 'Memo on north-
east Ulster 1922-26' (Blythe papers, UCDAD, P24/554),
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Government of Ireland Bil in 1920, the end of the year would bring
further ominous signs of the reality of partition.
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PART 11
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE OPENING OF THE BORDER CAMPAIGN
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The six-month period between the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty
and the start of the Civil War in late June would be a defining period
in the history of the Northern IRA. On almost every level the
organisation would be transformed, receiving not only ideological and
practical support from both sections of the otherwse bitterly divided
IRA south of the border, but also playing a key role in broader political
initiatives aimed at overriding the growing divisions over the Treaty.
The shape of the conflct in the six counties would therefore be largely
dictated by events in the South and the relationship between the
Northern IRA and its Dublin leadership became an increasingly close
one, Such an allance however depended heavily on republican unity,
as any wavering in the extent of Southern support would prove
disastrous for the beleaguered Volunteers in the North. The events of
1922 would bear out this fact and the Northern IRA would become
one of the most tragic victims of the wider splits that precipitated the
outbreak of the Civil War, Before this final collapse however the
organisation would make one final attempt to undermine the ever-
hardening reality of partition by launching an all-out offensive against
the recently established province of Northern Ireland.
The signing of the Ang1o- Irish Treaty in early December 1921,
following hard on the heels of the Government of Ireland Act, left
Northern republicans confused and divided. For the Catholic
population in the six counties it was the issue of partition rather than
constitutional matters such as the oath which was the overriding
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concern and as such Northern reactions to the Treaty were heavily
influenced by the role any proposed Boundary Commission would play
in the future. Whilst many nationalists living in the border regions
and the majority Catholic counties of Fermanagh and Tyone saw the
Treaty as their opportunity for swift inclusion in the proposed Irish
Free State, those in Belfast and east Ulster would never be able to
secede from Northern Ireland no matter how generous the findings of
the Boundary Commission. One Belfast republican later stated: 'The
Treaty was a tragedy when it came. We all knew that, We knew in the
North that we had been left out.' i
This fundamental division in Northern nationalist circles was further
inflamed by the ambiguous way in which the border issue was dealt
with in the Treaty. With Article 12 stating vaguely that the boundary
would only be adjusted '...in accordance with the wishes of the
inhabitants, so far as many be compatible with economic and
geographic conditions',2 This imprecise phraseology and the lack of a
definite timetable made it almost the ideal document to cause even
further conflict and uncertainty in the North between and within both
communities, raising as it did the hopes of many nationalists whilst at
the same time causing further alarm in an already paranoid
Protestant population. Furthermore this lack of a clearly defined
mechanism for dealing with partition allowed both sides to place
radically differing interpretations on what the shape of any future
1 Patsy O'Hagan quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p,169,
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settlement would look like and increased the likelihood of further
violent outbreaks in the coming months,3
The unique political position of the Catholic minority meant that
attitudes to the Treaty in the North were far more complex than those
that developed in the South and as such cannot be understood within
the same narrow parameters.4 For the Northem IRA their primary
concern lay in undermining the increasing permanency of partition
and they would welcome support from whichever side of the Treaty
divide seemed most able to accomplish this end. This pragmatic
attitude meant that the organisation in the North resembled, more
than any other part of the Sinn Fein movement, the pre- Truce IRA and
were essentially beyond categorisation as either pro-or anti-Treaty. As
one contemporary observer remarked: 'The IRA in the six-counties are
all anti-Treaty almost to a man. They however, are out against
partition rather than the Treaty. They feel they have been let down.' 5
John Grant, an IRA officer from Armagh, later explained his
particularly Northern perspective on the Treaty:
2 'Aricles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland', National Museum of Ireland,
3 For the British perspective on the border issue see K. Matthews 'The Irish boundary crisis and the re-
shaping of British politics, 1910-1925.' PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 2000; R. Fanning,
'Anglo- Irish Relations: Partition and the British Dimension in Historical Perspective' Irish Studies in
International Affairs vo1.2, no,1 (1982).
4 For a detailed analysis of the Treaty-split in the twenty-six counties see G. Maguire, 'The Political
and Miltary Causes of the Division in the Irish Nationalist Movement, January 1921- August 1922'
(DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1985).
5 McCartan to Maloney, 31 March 1922 quoted in Staunton, The Nationalists of Northern Ireland
1918-1973 p,53,
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'As a Northerner and Six-Counties man I could not willngly
accept partition. I do not mention this as an excuse for my anti-
treaty attitude or as an apology for my republican activities as I
realise that people born in any other part of Ireland were
entitled to object on the same grounds if they so decided. The
only difference, if any, is that in my case I did not have to
ponder over the arguments used in the heavy Treaty debates in
An Dail at the time the acceptance of the Treaty was passed, to
decide the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. My
reason for rejecting the Treaty ("partition") was all too evident at
home.' 6
The already heterogeneous political outlook of the Northern nationalist
community was further splintered by the arrival of the Treaty
especially when de Valera failed to amend the boundary clause in his
alternative settlement, Document No.2.7 The Catholic minority became
increasingly divided into a set of even smaller, and often mutually
hostile, minorities. Opinions ranged from the traditional divide
between Sinn Fein and Devlin's nationalists, now given an added
dimension by splits between border nationalists and those in Belfast,
to ideological conflcts over the Treaty. As such the situation was
extremely confusing. For example in Tyrone, one of the counties which
had strong reason to believe it would soon come under the control of
the Free-State government, 32 out of the 34 Sinn Fein Clubs came out
6 John Grant statement (BMH, NA, WS 658),
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against the Treaty and areas such as Dungannon became a hot-bed of
anti-Treaty activity.s In County Down a Sinn Fein convention also
plumped for the anti- Treaty side although this rejection of GHQ
support was tempered with fears over the future; as one Sinn Fein
leader in County Doviin put it: ',., the majority of clubs are anti-treaty
but nervous over our position here in Ulster'. 9
Increasing tension between these various strands of Northern
nationalist opinion led to further outbreaks of violence within the
Catholic community. On 18 January it was reported that a group of
100 IRA men raided a Hibernian Hall in the Falls Road: 'The men, a
number of whom carried revolvers, took possession of the HalL. On
arrival of the Miltary it was found that they had left. It is believed that
they entered the Hall for the purpose of stopping "English Dances",' 10
A similar fracas at a Hall in Kileenan led to the death of a Hibernian
member. The occurrence of such incidents began to increase rapidly
as confusion grew over which side would hold influence in the North
after the de stabilising arrival of the Treaty,
Into this political vacuum stepped the figure of Michae1 Collns who
more than any other politician would take on the role as unoffcial
leader of the Northern Catholic minority. Along with his IRB
7 For details of de Valera's alternative to the Treaty, 'Document nO.2' see The Times, 5 January 1922.
8 Irish News, 28 April 1922, See also RIC Bi-monthly report, 3 I January 1922 (Ministr of Home
Affairs files, PRONI, HA5/l52),
9 John Kig repmi on South Down Comhairle Ceanntair, 24 Jan, 1922 (NA, S1801Q),
10 RIC Bi-Monthly report, 31 January 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA5/1 52),
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colleagues in the Provisional Government Army leadership, O'Duffy
and Mulcahy, he would move swiftly to assure the Northern IRA that
its interests were high on their list of priorities. Frank Aiken recalled
O'Duffy tellng a meeting of Northern IRA offcers in Clones early in
1922 that the Treaty was 'only a trick' and agreed to only in order to
obtain arms and supplies to fight the British.11 Whatever the realities
it would be Collns' conspiracies, rather than any abstract belief or
opposition to the Treaty, which would define the loyalties and
activities of the Northem IRA during the first half of 1922.
Collns' Northern policy has remained something of a mystery for
historians. Interpretations have tended to founder on the issue of his
ultimate motivation, Some historians see his aggressive policy as
being driven by a sincere commitment to the beleaguered Northern
Catholic minority whilst others view it as principally an issue on
which he felt he could unite the IRA and stave off confrontation in the
South, The real answer is probably a mixture of the two and although
Collns obviously cared deeply about the fortunes of the Catholic
population in the six counties there is also a pragmatic element which
can be portrayed as a crude attempt to avert a war in the South by
starting one in the North.12 Collns' role is certainly an ambiguous one
although not ultimately unfathomable. The policy is perhaps better
11 Aiken interview with Ernie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/193),
12 Various attempts have been made to explain Collins' motivations and thus account for his Northern
policy, See Coogan, Michael Collns ; Hopkinson, Green Against Green; E. Phoenix, 'Michael Collins:
TIie Northern Question 1916-22' in G Doherty and D, Keogh (eds,) Michael Co/tins and the making 0.(
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understood as an ongoing conspiracy just as much a reflection of
Collins' personality as his political commitments. Whatever the
realities Collns would engage in an immediate and sustained political,
propaganda and miltary campaign against the Unionist government
and would vigorously pursue his role as defender of the Catholic
minority until his death in August 1922. However, the campaign itself,
despite its many vicissitudes, would prove a tragic and total failure.
Collns' first moves to assert his authority over the Northern situation
began soon after the ratification of the Treaty, At the behest of the
British government he met with James Craig, the new Prime Minister
of Northern Ireland, on 21 January. The principal aim of the meeting
was to create a fresh context for North-South relations and agree a
framework for future relations between the two new Irish
administrations. The resultant agreement, later referred to as the First
Craig-Collns Pact, promised an end to the Belfast Boycott in return
for the reinstatement of the expelled Catholic shipyard workers in
Belfast, Its most significant agreement however was that the
representatives of Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State would
deal with the boundary issue themselves outside of British
government interference. This inevitably reinforced the implication in
the Ang1o-Irish Treaty that the South, and Collns in particular, were
the acknowledged representatives of the Northem Catholic minority,
the Irish state (Cork, 1998) and more recently J. Regan, The Irish Counter Revolution 1921-1936
(Dublin, 1999),
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and for good or il gave the South a key role in defending and
furthering their interests. 
13
The Craig-Collns Pact made the convoluted debates in the North over
the Treaty even further divorced from the wider attitudes of the IRA in
the twenty-six counties. It also kept the situation very fluid and
further militated against a hardening of attitudes to the Treaty in the
North. Collins' first foray into Northern politics was not a popular one.
His failure to consult the Northerners on any level caused
consternation and vehement opposition from within the Catholic
minority, far more than had ever been inspired by the Treaty, The
changes to the workings of the Boundary Commission caused
particular anger amongst border nationalists who feared that such
tinkering would hinder any future smooth transfer of territory to the
South which they felt was inherent in the original clause. For those in
east Ulster it was his unilateral decision to end the Belfast Boycott,
which came in for particular criticism.14 Joseph Connolly expressed
the anger of the majority of nationalists in the Northern capital: 'It
showed a complete lack of appreciation on Collns' part of the realities
in Belfast. They realised that Craig has as much power to have the
Catholics admitted to work in the shipyards as he had to give them
visas to take them past St. Peter into heaven. It was "a tongue in
13 See M.A. Hopkinson, 'The Craig-Collins Pacts of 1922:two attempted reforms of the Northern Irish
government' Irish Historical Studies, vol, xxvii, 1990.
14 See Phoenix, Northern Nationalism pp,170-73,
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cheek" promise on Craig's part!' 15 Despite the fact that the embargo
had achieved little in the way of constructive results it remained an
important symbol for the Catholic minority of the unity of the
nationalist cause in Ireland.
While Collns began his first tentative moves in his individual crusade
against partition, the Provisional Government, convinced that Craig
could not deliver on his promises to reinstate the expelled workers,
especially after a failed second meeting with Collns in Dublin on 2
February, continued along the familiar road of non-recognition and
civil disobedience. From February, Northern teachers in Catholic
schools were to be paid by the new Northern Ireland Ministry of
Education. As a gesture of solidarity with their Southern co-
religionists they opted out, as had some local authorities eighteen
months before, pledging allegiance to the Dail government. They were
to be paid by the Provisional Government in the South and this offer
was eventually taken up by 800 schoolteachers in 270 Northern Irish
schools. The payments continued until October 1922, achieving little
but draining the fledgling Southern government of much needed
resources. 
16 These rather half-hearted attempts to impede the
establishment of Northern Irish institutions were accepted by Collns
as the necessary and respectable face of Southern intransigence.
However, in private Collns was to revert to his more characteristic
15 Gaughan, Memoirs of Senator Joseph Connolly p,185
16 For a thorough examination of the Northern Schools issue see Phoenix, Northern Nationalism
pp.188-191.
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conspiratorial methods. His principal weapon in this campaign would
be the Northern IRA. 17
The first test of Collns' new aggressive policy came about almost by
accident. On the same day that the Provisional Government was
established in Dublin, senior officers of the IRA's Monaghan-based 5th
Northern Division, including the Divisional Commandant Dan Hogan,
were arrested at Dromore in County Tyrone en route to Derry. The
'Monaghan Footballers', as they came to be known, included Eamon
Carroll, Pat Winters, Tommy Donnelly and John McGrory, all of them
divisional offcers.18 Ostensibly they were journeying as part of a
Gaelic football team to take part in the Ulster championship final,
although in reality this served as a front for a reconnaissance mission
aimed at eventually releasing three IRA men imprisoned in Derry Gaol
who were to be hanged on 9 February. The three Derry prisoners had
been captured during the last few months of the War of Independence.
Ironically their death sentences were passed after a bungled escape
attempt by fifteen IRA prisoners in December 1921 where two warders
were kiled with an overdose of chloroform. One of the three men
charged with murder was Patrick Leonard, himself a warder who had
17 This dichotomy between the policy of Collins and his Provisional Government colleagues is dealt
with in Ernest Blythe's 'Memo on north-east Ulster 1922-26' (Blythe papers ,UCDAD, P24/554).
18 Nicholas Smyth, Vice OIC of the Fintona Battalion, recalled a song the local Volunteers made up
about the affair:
'Dan Hogan, a Peter the Painter had he,
And Domielly had a Webley, the finest you would see;
McKenna had a Bulldog of very small bore,
And they lost the whole lot when they came to Dromore', Nicholas Smyth statement (BMH, NA, WS
721),
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assisted the escape.19 Later Eoin O'Duffy indicated that his belief that
the increasing level of violence between the IRA and the USC was due
principally '.,.to the evident intention of the Northern government to
hang the three Derry prisoners' and the anger and instabilty this
caused in border areas, 
20
Collns seized on the opportunity these arrests provided for
demonstrating his new hard-line policy to his IRA colleagues. After
dispatching two of his 'Squad' members, Char1ie Byrne and Joe Do1an,
to England to assassinate the two hangmen detailed to execute the
prisoners, a plan which misfired as the intended victims had already
left for Ireland, a decision was taken to kidnap large numbers of
unionist notables from across the border and detain them in return
for the recently taken IRA prisoners,21
The kidnapping raids were to be planned by a shadowy new body
established by Collns in early January 1922 called variously the
'Northern Command' or the 'Ulster Council'. Its aim was to co-ordinate
IRA activity in the six counties and along the border although it can
also be seen as an early attempt to gain at least nominal loyalty from
Frank Aiken's well equipped 4th Northern Division, The council was
headed by Collns and its leadership acted under the auspices of the
IRB of which Collns was President of the Supreme CounciL. Locally
19 See Blythe 'Memo on north-east Ulster 1922-26' (Blythe papers, UCDAD, P24/554).
20 Irish Independent, 15th February 1922.
21 Coogan, Michael Collns p.346,
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the Ulster Council was under the command of Frank Aiken as
'Director of Operations' with Sean MacEoin, 0/ C of the Midland
Division, as his second-in-command. It included all of the
commanders of the Northern Divisions and also paid the salaries of all
Northern IRA officers and later the Belfast City Guard. The Divisional
QM of the Midland Division was appointed as a general QM for the
council and all supplies were placed in a central dump in Cavan.22
Eoin O'Duffy, arguably the most important IRA figure in Ulster, was
instrumental in persuading Collns to endorse the kidnap raids. As
the former leader of the Monaghan Brigade in the War of
Independence he had maintained strong links with the local
leadership, especially his close colleague Dan Hogan.
As such O'Duffy looked to his mentor Collns for approval to escalate
the Northern situation. He wrote to Collns on 30 January: 'I have
information from many sources this morning that there is grave
consternation in the counties of Monaghan, Fermanagh and Tyone
over the continued detention by A- Specials of Commandant Hogan,
and the offcers of the 5th Northern Division and they demand
authority from me to take immediate action to bring public opinion to
bear on the situation.,. You understand that I have arranged for the
kidnapping of one hundred prominent Orangemen in Counties
22 O'Duff to Collins, 10 March 1922 (NA, S 1801/ A). Evidence of the planning of offensive IRA
activity in January is given in 'IFS report on 1921 Northern developments relating to claims for
pensions' referenced in Hopkinson, Green Against Green p,288. This item was available in the
Fitzgerald family papers before they were reorganised but is no longer in UCDAD.
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Fermanagh and Tyrone.' 23 He also reminded Collns of the need to
appease criticism from the local IRA at this very sensitive time in
terms of the burgeoning Treaty-split. The action itself had been
planned for the 24 January but was postponed so as to give the Craig-
Collns pact a chance to work. This strategy of de-escalating IRA
activity around periods of political negotiation was a characteristic of
Collns' early Northern policy and would be repeated again with the
Second Craig- Collns pact in March.
Ironically on the 7th of February the situation was further complicated
when the British reprieved the three original Derry prisoners after
direct pressure on Craig from Churchil and Chamberlain. Craig,
angry and frustrated, insisted that this would be the last politically
inspired release of prisoners he would allow, also callng for the
Southern government to recognise the Northern courts blaming their
policy of abstention for the severity of the punishments being meted
out. Craig had seen the Derry prisoners as ',.."trump" cards to be
played if Sinn Fein failed to fulfi their promises' 24 and although now
released he had other 'trump cards' to play in the shape of Hogan and
his imprisoned offcers. As such the kidnap raids went ahead as
planned and on the night of the 7 _8th February the IRA raided across
the border in large numbers causing widespread devastation in Tyone
and Fermanagh.
23 O'Duff to CoB ins, 30 January, 1922 quoted in Coogan, Michael Collins p.344.
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The raids were organised from a headquarters at Blacklion just over
the border in County Monaghan, From here the attacks of the various
IRA units from Longford, Leitrim, Monaghan, Armagh and Mayo were
co-ordinated.25. A number of vehicles were acquired and the IRA men,
some wearing Provisional Government Army uniform, were organised
into small mobile units and instructed to make their way to various
pre-arranged points along the border. Each group appears to have had
specific targets although as one of the raiders informed his captive the
general aim was to ',..pick up all Regulars and Specials we can find
tonight'. '26
All of the raids were carried out simultaneously and the methods of
attack were all very similar: 'In almost all cases the motor cars were
driven up to the houses, the victim held up at the point of the
revolver, hustled into the motor car and taken away before the people
quite realised what was happening,' 27 In some cases the raiders made
other demands on their victims. At Ashfield Park in an attack on
Captain Anketell Moutray, the 72 year old County Master of the
Tyone Orange Order, it was reported that '...the raiders told his
housekeeper that they wanted him to sign a paper for the reprieve of
the Derry prisoners and that after he signed the papers he would be
24 Craig to Northern Ireland Cabinet, 26 January 1922 (Cabinet Conclusions, PRONI, CAB 4/30/1).
25 See for example the recollections of Mayo IRA man Tom Ketterick (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD,
P17b/95),
26 File on kidnappings in Tyrone and Fermanagh (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/175).
27 Ibid,
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permitted to return.' 28 The abduction of Moutray caused extreme
anger in the local community with the RIC District Inspector writing
ominously: 'I am afraid that drastic actions will be taken by the
Unionists.' 29 The raids were most successful in the Aughnac10y area
where the IRA managed to kidnap twenty-one local unionists and
remove them unimpeded over the border.
In Fermanagh however things went less smoothly and the attacks,
which began around 1 am, were met with considerable resistance
from the local unionist population. Two gangs of IRA men in motor
cars raided the home of James Cooper, a Unionist MP, although
Cooper himself managed to open fire on his attackers who fled off into
the night. A similar incident occurred at the home of a 'B' Special
Sergeant named Ellot in an attack on his home in Enniskillen. He
was able to beat off the raiders who went on to make further attacks
on other houses in the local area although here too they met with stiff
resistance, The local Specials were quickly alerted and eleven of the
raiders were rounded up in the town, later being imprisoned in Castle
Barracks along with three men captured hiding in the local Gaelic
halL. All of the men were IRA officers from either Longford or Leitrim
and were captured after an unsuccessful attempt to abduct a Major
Falls who was absent from his home on the night of the raids. The
attacks in Enniskilen had proved disastrous and it became obvious
that isolated communities, such as those in Tyrone, rather than towns
28 Ibid.
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were preferable targets, A few miles away what remained of the
Enniskilen raiders made another attempted abduction in the village
of Lisbellaw. Around 4am the house of J.N. Carson, an ex-High
Sheriff, was broken into. Carson, after making a frenzied attempt to
resist, was shot and severely wounded. Again the IRA tried to make
their captive sign a document, believed to be a call for the release of
the Monaghan Footballers. Carson later commented that all of the
men spoke with distinct Southern accents.30
John Connolly, who had been detailed by O'Duffy to shoot Special
Constable Lester in Roslea during March 1921, was personally
ordered to kidnap the same man in the February attacks, His
experience shows something of the opportunistic nature of the kidnap
raids in Fermanagh:
'I went to Roslea but failed to get Lester as he was not there. I
then looked around to see what would be the next best and I
decided to kidnap a policeman. I went into Keenan's pub in
Ros1ea, but found no policeman there. I got information,
however, that there was a policeman in a house outside Ros1ea
vilage where he was visiting a girL. I then went to a Mr. Kerr
who had a car for hire and I asked him to have a car at my
future brother-in-1aw's place as I was taking my future wife to a
dance. I was waiting outside this place when the car arrived. I
showed Kerr a revolver and told him I was on an offcial job and
29 Ibid.
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he was to drive me as directed. I was driven to the house where
the policeman was. I knocked on the door and the owner-
Robert Martin- opened the door. I said "Goodnight, Robert" and
I walked past Martin in the doorway and the policeman in a
room sitting with Martin's daughter. I told him that I was taking
him to Laughbawn Camp as a reprisal for the arrest and
detention of our officers. When I got time to examine my
prisoner I found that he was a fine big fat Sergeant. The poor
fellow was so scared that I purchased a half-pint of Whiskey for
him in Scotstown and I gave it to him. When I arrived at Bawn
Camp I found that I had the first prisoner of the night there.' 31
The attacks in Fermanagh were not only more erratic and poorly
organised than those in Tyrone but also far more brutaL. An attempt
to kidnap John Doonan at Lisnaskea was made diffcult when he
violently resisted. He was subsequently shot in both legs and when his
servant girl tried to intervene she too was hauled to the ground and
shot four times. The alerting of the USC to the attacks in Fermanagh
led to a swift change of tactics by the IRA. In an opportunistic attack
three 'B' Specials were kidnapped at Kilturk while two others were
shot near Be1coo barracks in an ambush by a party of eight IRA men.
The raids also spread to the area around Newtownbutler and at
30 Ibid,
31 John T. Connolly statement (BMH, NA, WS 598),
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Lisnaskea the IRA were ambushed by Specials while attempting to
remove eleven of their prisoners over the border.32
Such diffculties meant that the raids in Fermanagh became quickly
bogged down in prolonged firefights with the USC and many groups of
IRA men remained behind to lay ambushes to impede pursuing
Specials, One such incident occurred at Lough Kiley Green on the
Clones to Newtownbut1er road where the IRA ambushed a Special
platoon using machine guns and rifles. The Specials ran for cover and
their attackers took the opportunity to burn their vehicles in order to
slow the pursuit. Further firefights occurred near Wattle bridge and
the RIC and Specials later found an abandoned machine-gun
emplacement on the side of the road. Many of the local roads had also
been trenched, and numerous trees were felled and laid across the
main routes over the border. Telephone wires had also been cut to
further impede the Specials and delay any moves to gather
reinforcements for a concerted counter-attack. In all five Specials were
wounded and twelve kidnapped along with two civilians in County
Fermanagh.
The local IRA appeared to have little to do with the raids although
attacks were made in County Londonderry and a number of unionist
properties in the Limavady district were burned. Despite their lack of
involvement it was the local IRA who would suffer most from the
32 File on kidnappings in Tyrone and Fermanagh (Miistr of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/175),
164
unionist backlash and Specials immediately began raiding suspect
houses and rounding up local Volunteers. In all forty-two unionists
had been abducted and the majority were taken over the border into
County Monaghan. Over twenty of them were observed under guard at
Ballybay and it was believed that all finally ended up being held in the
Clones Workhouse, the headquarters of the Ulster Council, and soon
to be the scene of the most momentous confrontation since the start
of the border campaign 
,33
After the raids Collns wrote to both Arthur Griffth and Lloyd George
feigning ignorance as to the kidnap plot. His response would become
familar over the next six months; publicly he would play the role of an
outraged constitutional politician while covertly he and his tiny IRB
clique made their own plans for spreading destruction and instability
in the North. While diplomatic efforts to release the 'Monaghan
Footballers' continued apace the local situation became extremely
tense, In response to the kidnappings, Specials poured into the border
areas. Bridges were blown and all but major roads were mined or
trenched. The Specials set up checkpoints at the remaining border
crossings and local farms were abandoned by their owners (the
miltary build-up and the IRA's penchant for shooting farm livestock
made both family and business life untenable). A stalemate ensued
and both sides exchanged fire across the now fortified border areas.
This sniping continued unabated until 28 March just prior to the
33 lbid,
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Second Craig- Collns pact being signed. Craig threatened angrily to
deport members of Sinn Fein to the South and cross-border traffc
dwindled to almost nothing.
The tension was further increased on the 10th of February when a
party of IRA men entered the village of Clady in County Tyone and
attacked the homes of local 'B' Specials, one of whom Charles
McFadden was kiled. The first phase of the border campaign had
reached stalemate as both sides watched each other warily across the
frontier awaiting a new series of attacks. Ironically however, the
incident which broke this stalemate and pushed both North and
South to the brink of open armed conflict, occurred almost by
accident.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE CRISIS OF SPRING 1922
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On Saturday the 11th of February 1922 at the railway station in the
small border town of Clones, County Monaghan a gun battle took
place between the IRA and a party of Ulster Special Constabulary. It
resulted in five deaths including four of the Specials and the local IRA
Commandant, Numerous other combatants and civilans were
wounded. The events at Clones were inevitably interpreted in radically
different ways by both unionists and nationalists. Both Craig and
Collns would seize on the event as a tool in their wider political
campaigns against each other and both made outraged pleas to
Churchil for condemnation. For unionists what became known as the
'Clones Affray' was a massacre, ruthlessly planned and carried out by
the IRA, Nationalists tended to paint the Specials arrival in Clones as
akin to some form of invasion of Free State territory enhanced by the
brutal and unprovoked murder of the local IRA commander whilst he
was dispensing his duty lawfully upheld by the Truce arrangements.
In reality the truth was neither of these.
Clones lay at the heart of the IRA's border campaign, The town was
home not only to the recently kidnapped loyalists but also the
headquarters of both the 5th Northern Division and, due to its
strategic position only a few miles from the Tyrone and Monaghan
borders, had also become the headquarters of the Ulster Council,
within easy reach of both Aiken and MacEoin's commands in Armagh
and Longford respectively, It was from here also on the 21st of April
that plans would be finalised for the il-fated joint-IRA offensive of May
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1922. Both geographically and politically Clones lay at the centre of a
storm that would soon erupt on its very doorstep.
The arrival of the Specials on 1 1 Februar was not their first
excursion into Clones. Just over one year earlier on 23 January 1921
a platoon of fifteen 'A' Specials from Newtownbutler drove into Clones
and broke into a local pub, proceeding to loot its contents and
terrorise the local population. The RIC were alerted and opened fire
kiling one, later admitting that they thought them to be IRA men or
rowdy civilans. The whole event proved to be deeply embarrassing to
the government and the platoon was later quietly disbanded. 1
The party which arrived in Februar 1922 consisted of nineteen
uniformed 'A' Specials led by Sergeant Wiliam Dougherty. Six of the
constables were armed. They had left Newtownards via Belfast earlier
in the day. Their final destination was Enniskilen where they were to
reinforce the local USC platoons as part of the wider build up of forces
along the Monaghan border. This route however involved changing
trains at Clones and catching the 5.40 train travellng north from
Dublin to Omagh, It certainly was a provocative route to choose
especially when one considers that the British Army had evacuated
Clones only days before to concentrate at the Curragh and Dublin.
i See Hezlet, The 'B' Specials, pp,56-7. See also comments of Finance minister ('Cabinet
Conclusions', 9 October 1922 (CAB4/55/2, PRONI),
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The IRA had taken over responsibility for security in the South from
the British Army and the RIC, which was being steadily wound down. 
2
The clumsy choice of route did cause some consternation after the
event within the Unionist government. General Macready, the
commander-in-chief of British forces in Ireland, was also very critical
of the decision to send the Specials through Southern territory.3
However no evidence exists to suggest it involved any sinister motives,
some kind of administrative blunder being the favoured interpretation
especially considering that the order had been given on 7 February,
some hours before the kidnap raids and days before the military
build-up along the border. The journey itself involved a wait of around
twenty- five minutes at Clones station with the Newtownards train
arriving around 5.15.4
The mood of the Specials appears to have been relaxed and joviaL. One
anonymous witness recalls their kindness in helping him with his
bags and parcels as they alighted at Clones.5 Another witness,
Reverend G.T, Boyd, the Presbyterian minister of Lisbellaw, was in a
compartment with several civilians and with two of the Specials, one
of whom was chatting with a local girl.6 If this was an invading force
they were curiously relaxed about their mission. On arrival at Clones
2 For details of the trip see fie on Clones shooting ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/l!11). For
post-Treaty policing arrangements see T. Garvin, 1922: The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin, 1996)
pp, 104-122,
3 Hopkinson, Green against Green p,80,
4 File on Clones shooting ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/l!11),
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Sergeant Dougherty gathered the six-man armed party together on the
platform. Wiliam Preston, one of the armed Constables recalled: 'He
formed us up two- deep and we answered our names.' 7 The rest of the
men made their way to the refreshment room. As Constable A1bert
Lyttle made clear in his statement: 'I, together with eight or ten more
of the party proceeded to the buffet, where we remained til the train
came in.' 8
According to Constable Wiliam Flannery there were no other civilans
in the buffet except for the servng staff. One or two others strolled
about the station mingling with civilians and kicking their heels until
the train arrived. No IRA men appeared to be present at the station
although Constable John Guinness recalls noticing '...some
suspicious looking young men on the platform all the time'. 9 It is
likely that at least one of these young men was responsible for alerting
the IRA to the presence of the Specials and thus inadvertently turning
an innocent journey into a tragic confrontation.
Meanwhile in the IRA's divisional headquarters at the Workhouse in
Clones, Commandant Matt Fitzpatrick had recently arrived with some
other officers. He was only twenty-five years of age at the time
although he already had a long and active IRA career behind him.
5 Belfast Newsletter, 13 February 1922,
6 Statement ofG,T, Boyd ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HN32/1/11),
7 Statement ofWiliam Preston, ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI HN32/l/ll).
8 Statement of Albert Lytle, ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI HA/32/l/11),
9 Statement of John Guiness, ('Secret Series' files, PRONI HN32/1/11),
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Fitzpatrick had been one of the leaders of the Ros1ea attacks in March
1921 and according to John Connolly it was his party that was
responsible for the shootings.1O He rose quickly in the movement,
beginning the War of Independence as Captain of the Wattlebridge
Company and finishing it as a key offcer in the flying column of the
North Monaghan Brigade where he formed a strong friendship with
his then senior Dan Hogan. Hogan would later succeed his other
friend Eoin O'Duffy as Brigade Commandant in Monaghan and was
later appointed 0/ C of the 5th Northern Division. The link between
o 'Duffy, Hogan and Fitzpatrick was a close one in all probabilty
strengthened by their membership of the IRB, which as we have seen
lay at the centre of local involvement in Collns' plans for releasing the
Derry prisoners.
Fitzpatrick's importance to the local leadership was underlined after
he was injured in an attempted ambush in March 1921 and
hospitalised under armed guard in Monaghan County Infirmary. On
30 March 1921 Hogan himself led a rescue party, consisting of almost
the entire flying column, into the hospital and released Fitzpatrick
who was due to be transferred to Belfast Gaol a few days later to face
probable execution.ll Fitzpatrick in February 1922 must have been
wishing he could return the favour for the now imprisoned Hogan. His
mood at the time can of course only be imagined but he would
10 John T, Connolly statement (BMH, NA, WS 598).
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certainly have been wary and keen to respond to any aggressive moves
by the Specials in his area,
Fitzpatrick responded rapidly to the news of the Specials' arrivaL.
Quickly arming themselves he and three other offcers leapt into a car
and headed for the station, informing others to gather more men and
follow him up as soon as possible. One of these offcers, Lieutenant
Patrick Rooney, refers to this being the 'first car' and it is certainly
possible that these were the vehicles used a few days earlier in the
border kidnapping raids. In the car with Fitzpatrick and Rooney were
Battalion Vice-Commandant Joseph McCarvlle and another offcer,
probably Peter McKenna. They sped off, quickly covering the short
distance to the railway station within minutes. 
12
Meanwhile the Specials were preparing to leave. The Enniskilen train
had arrived and some of the party had taken their seats while others
dawdled on the platform and drifted towards their carriages. The
Specials sat together towards the rear of the train in four
compartments. Three other trains were present on platforms at Clones
at the same time but the Enniskilen train sat right in front of the
station entrance. Sergeant Dougherty was very insistent on the
Specials being seated together. Reverend Boyd had spoken to
Dougherty before the train was due to leave. He had known him 'well
i 1 The rescue part included many IRA men who would later play a key role in the Clones Affay
including Seamus O'Donoghue and Joe MacCarvile, See account ofDonal O'Kelly in Kelly, Sworn to
be Free,p.130,
173
for the past ten years' and recalls that Dougherty had ordered the two
Specials who were in Boyd's carriage to the rear of the train.13
Doughert was twenty-three years of age and had served in the British
Army with distinction during the Great War. He had only recently
been promoted to Sergeant, the Clones trip being his first command.
As the last half-dozen or so Specials climbed aboard the train Special
Constable Peter Martin, recalls that one of the railway porters came to
the door of his compartment and pointing to the recently arrived IRA
offcers said 'They have it in for you boys'. 
14
Fitzpatrick and his three offcers had entered the main door of the
station and walked towards the engine. Fitzpatrick's first move was
actually in the opposite direction to the Specials. Revolver in hand he
walked to the engine to stop the train from leaving. Meanwhile other
IRA units had began to arrive. Rooney recalls the events as follows:
'When we got on the platform we turned towards the engine as the
train was due to start. We then saw the engine was not attached. We
turned back towards the rear of the train. Commandant Fitzpatrick
was leading the men down the platform. I was behind him. On
reaching the first compartment where there were Specials the
Commandant shouted "Hands up! Surrender", Immediately there was
12 Irish News, 15 February 1922.
13 Statement ofG.T, Boyd ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/11),
14 Statement of Peter Martin ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/11),
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a shot from the compartment and Commandant Fitzpatrick dropped
dead in front of me.' 15
Two unarmed Specials had responded to Fitzpatrick's call and put
their hands up. One of these men was John Cummings who later
recalled: '...Immediately behind me when I looked round there was a
man coming after me with a revolver. He said hands up...I was
unarmed and my back was then to the rest of my comrades.' 16
Joseph McCarvile, one of the closest witnesses to the shooting
claimed that the shot came '...from the compartment opposite which
the Specials were standing'.l7 However Robert Wilkinson, an offcial in
the Department of Agriculture from Enniskilen, relates events
differently. Sat in the centre of the train opposite the entrance he says
he '...saw a gang of armed men come rushing in. They were shouting
"hands up", "Put them up" and fired some shots immediately. The first
shots were fired by the IRA in uniform into the compartment next to
me, At the same time I saw an IRA man fallng.' 18 The issue of which
side had initiated the violence would become the subject of bitter
argument over the following weeks with both sides claiming
vociferously that they were the innocent victims of an unprovoked
attack.
15 Irish News, 15 February 1922.
16 Statement of John Cummings ('Secret Series' fies, PRONT HA/32/1/11 ),
17 
Irish News, 15 February 1922.
18 Statement ofRobert Wilkinson ('Secret Series' files, PRONI HA32/1/11),
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What followed these few disputed seconds however is more certain,
Fitzpatrick, shot in the head with a single bullet, fell dead between two
carriages. Immediately the situation exploded into chaos. The IRA
dived for cover and a hail of bullets was launched at the Special's
carriages. The IRA now numbered around twenty, Robert Henry, a
reporter for the Daily Express, stated: '." some of the Special
constables were in the train and others on the platform. Some men,
who were in good formation, a sort of echelon, were firing with rifles at
the Special Constables... a few minutes later a machine gun came into
play from somewhere about the rear of the train,' 19 According to
Corporal Chinnery, a soldier travellng on the train, there were two
bursts of firing about ten minutes apart although other witnesses
claim the fire was continuous. 
20
An anonymous witness relates the chiling scene as follows: 'After we
had been seated about two minutes shots suddenly rang out, about
six being fired into our carriage in quick succession, one of the bullets
flashing across my face and grazing my hat... I could hear shots being
discharged all over the train mingled with the yells and screams of the
men in the other carriages. I heard one man appeal for mercy, and
another call for his mother.' 21 Frederick Browne of Enniskilen
recalled seeing several individuals jumping out of the train on the
opposite side only to be held up by an armed IRA man who forced
19 Statement of Robert Henry ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI HA32/1/11),
20 Ministr of Home Affairs statement ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/12),
21 Belfast Newsletter, 14 February 1922,
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them back into the carriages where the main attack was being
launched: '...severa1 of the civilians with pistols and revolvers were
moving up and down the platform and firing shots between the
carriages, evidently at the escaping passengers at the far side of the
train.' 22 Hector Jeffers, a British soldier who was in a compartment
with one of the Specials, stated: 'I heard the thud of a bullet coming
through the woodwork of the carriage, a few minutes after this the
Special constable, said 'I am hit', and when I looked round he was
bleeding from the mouth,.. His eyes closed and I think he died in a few
minutes.' 23 The scene on the platform was chaotic. Some of the
Specials caught in the open attempted to surrender only to be raked
with machine gun fire whilst others either fled or returned fire from
the wrecked carriages,
By all accounts Constable Robert MacMahon was the first Special to
be kiled. Three others were to follow: Sergeant Dougherty and
Constables James Lewis and Wiliam McFar1and. The train had been
riddled with bullets, concentrated mainly on Carriage 85 where the
Specials were located, Countless civilians were wounded including
Patrick Crumley, the former nationalist MP for South Fermanagh. It
was little short of a miracle that only four people were kiled after such
indiscriminate firing into a packed train. Eight other Specials were
wounded to varyng degrees, Constable John Cummings was hit by
machine gun fire below the waist and as a result lost his right leg.
22 Statement of Frederick Browne ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/l/l1).
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Constable George Lendrum had six machine-gun bullets in him but
somehow survved. Others escaped unscathed although most, like
Albert Lytt1e, were very lucky. A bullet knocked off his cap and
another passed harmlessly through his tunic,
As the firing began to die down many other civilans and Specials
made their escape in any way they could. Robert Henry along with a
few others jumped aboard a train on the next platform which was just
moving out.24 Despite the presence of IRA men all over the station a
number of Specials had escaped from the train on the offside during
the shooting. Constables Flannery (who had been shot in the neck),
Irwn, Murray and Hamilton after getting out of the train in Flannery's
words '...ran til we got behind a stone wall, and lay there til 7pm that
night until the firing stopped. Myself and one of the men made our
way into Newtownbutler and reported the matter to the Police.' 25
A1bert Lyttle escaped through the front entrance of the station and
made his way to what he thought would be the sanctuary of the local
RIC barracks: '... the IRA followed me on a motor car and demanded
me from the District Inspector'. Lytt1e remained under siege at the
barracks until Wednesday night when he was smuggled out by the
RIC hidden in the mail car of a train heading north,26
23 Statement of Hector Jeffers ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA/32/1/11).
24 Statement of Robert Henry ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA/32/1/11),
25 Statement ofWiliam Flannery ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA/32/l/ll),
26 Statement of Albert Lyttle ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/11).
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For other Specials their escape was far more dramatic. Wiliam
Preston described his own rather bizarre version of events after
jumping from the train later in the piece: 'We went into an old house
and loaded up again. I took up a street and saw about 50 men in the
road. I opened fire on them and shot 3 men. I took to the fields and
lay behind a ditch til dark...Constab1es Porter, Martin and Johnston
were with me.' He then proceeded to hold up four local men: Peter
McGovern, Francis McCadden and a father and son Robert and
Wiliam Gregg: 'I made these men lead me to Newtownbutler station.
Then I allowed Peter McGovern and Wiliam Gregg to go back. I
brought Francis McCadden and Robert Gregg to the barracks... Gregg
told me he was in Clones and saw about 100 men with a machine gun
that was at 5.30pm in Clones.' 27 Preston's story although interesting
is almost certainly an extreme exaggeration. None of those who
escaped with him mention anything about his gun battle with fifty
men or the reports of 100 men in Clones as early as 5.30pm. It is
unlikely whether Fitzpatrick himself had even heard about the arrival
of the Specials at this time.
Whilst this handful of Specials struggled north across open country
back at the station the situation had finally calmed down. The IRA,
now arriving in large numbers, gave orders for everybody to leave the
train. The civilians were separated from the remaining Specials of
which only three were unwounded, An anonymous witness told the
27 StatemenfofWiliam Preston ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/l1),
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Belfast Newsletter that he '... saw these together with one wounded
man, being whipped away prisoners in two motorcars. As I emerged
from the carriage I saw the prostrate form of a constable lying flat on
his face on the platform with blood streaming from him onto the
railway line. As prisoners were removed I heard members of the IRA
speak of the number of rifles and quantities of ammunition they had
captured.' 28 Most of those items belonged to the Specials but also to
Corporal Chinnery who, much to his annoyance, lost his entire kit
including an offcer's sword. Another anonymous witness related his
view of the terrible aftermath: 'A number of passengers were ordered
to clear the dead and wounded out of the carriages... The victims,
numbering upward of twenty were carried from carriages and laid
prostrate in the ladies waiting room. The passengers having completed
the gruesome work of clearing the carriages, returned with their faces,
hands and clothing saturated with blood,' 29
After being forced to clear away the dead bodies of the Specials all of
the civilans were taken into the station yard and searched by the IRA.
The intention seems to have been to arrest everybody present and
take them to the local barracks for interrogation. However, an IRA
offcer arrived to calm the situation and ordered his men to put the
shell-shocked passengers back on the wrecked train. Some members
of the local IRA however, enraged by the shooting of Fitzpatrick, were
bent on revenge. One of the Specials R.W. Gallagher was put against a
28 Belfast Newsletter, 14 February 1922.
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side wall of the station platform as if to be executed. Two IRA men
then fired shots at the wall near his head and body taunting him as
they did so. Luckily for Gallagher the same IRA offcer arrived and
halted the mock execution. In the confusion, whilst his would-be
executioners were being berated by their superior, Gallagher escaped
and jumped aboard the battered train as it was leaving. 
30
The train itself left 45 minutes late, around 6.30pm. Despite the IRA
allowing the civilians to continue their joumey it appears that only a
few took this opportunity. In Clones itself IRA units from Monaghan,
Fermanagh and Cavan poured into the local area. They extinguished
street lamps and put out lights in local shops and houses. Tensions
were running extremely high. In Monaghan town a local girl was shot
accidentally by the IRA around 9pm. When the train finally arrived at
Lisbellaw, its carriages wrecked and covered in blood, the local
population exploded in riotous anger. The Belfast Newsletter reported
the sight of the train '...ridd1ed with bullets... pools of blood on the
floor of the compartment, in which were found some automatic
revolvers and some bullets'. 31
For those who had escaped only one, Robert Henry, was to encounter
the IRA again. He had jumped aboard another train shortly after the
shooting. On arriving at the next station he climbed out of the guards
29 Ibid.
30 Statement afR.W. Gallagher ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/1/11),
31 Belfast Newsletter, 14 February 1922,
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van where he had taken refuge believing he was safe in Northern
Ireland, However he was in fact in Monaghan town, even further
inside Southern territory. Immediately he went to the local Post Offce
to send a telegram to his newspaper of what he had witnessed at
Clones. He relates what followed: 'I then proceeded to a hotel, and in a
few minutes five men entered. One of them produced a revolver, and
told me to put up my hands. Under an armed escort I was taken to
the IRA headquarters, where I was kept waiting a couple of hours. The
original telegram which I had sent was brought to me, and I was told
that it was not an accurate account of the conflict. I was advised to be
very careful, to cancel my message to my paper in London, and to
send instead an account of the affair which was dictated to me.' Henry
was saved from this by the intervention of the local RIC District
Inspector who persuaded the IRA to release him and allow him to
travel back to the relative safety of Belfast the next day. 32
Henry had been held at the Monaghan courthouse which at the time
was the headquarters of the 1st Battalion of the North Monaghan
Brigade. In his statement he also adds: 'The IRA in Monaghan told me
the reason they could not allow the engine to couple on was that they
wanted to capture all the Specials and they were keeping the train
until reinforcements came up.' 33 This last point gives an intriguing
insight into the IRA's thinking, indicating that Fitzpatrick's intention
32 Statement of Robert Henry ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/1/11)
33 Ibid,
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may have been to imprison the Specials along with the other forty or
so loyalists taken a few days before.
That evening the injured Specials were held in Monaghan Infirmary
under an IRA armed guard. Some of the more seriously injured were
released so that they could receive more specialised medical attention
in the North. These included John Cummings who returned to
Enniskilen the next afternoon where his injured leg was amputated.
Those fit to travel were brought back to Clones from Carrickmacroos
under heavy guard in order to attend a hastily convened inquest
which would be held in a packed courtroom a few days after the
incident on 14 February, The bodies of the four dead Specials were left
over the border just outside of the town on the evening of the attack
after the IRA had telephoned the RIC Head Constable at Enniskilen.
Despite the small scale of the Clones Affray, and the fact that it is now
almost wholly forgotten, at the time it appeared that it would lead to
dire consequences and spark off a major confrontation between North
and South. The first ominous move in this rapid escalation was the
immediate suspension of British troop evacuations from the twenty-
six counties and the intensification of violence on the border between
the IRA and the DSC. The Northern government also requested
immediate army reinforcements from the British. At the time eleven
battalions were stationed in Northern Ireland, five in Belfast and three
each in South Down and the west. General Macready however decided
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that it was the Specials who should continue to guard the border
whilst the regulars remained at various strategic points inside the six
counties, a decision which would only lead to even more violent
confrontations over the coming weeks.
Craig demanded permission from Churchil to send 5000 troops over
the border to rescue the kidnapped loyalists and to occupy a portion
of Southern territory for each loyalist stil in the South, He also tried
in vain to get 230 police cars and lorries, 150 machine guns and three
armoured cars for his scheme from the RIC depot in Dublin which was
busy winding down its activities. The order however was stopped by
Churchil who was worried over the rapid escalation of the situation
and fearful for the stabilty of the Provisional government in the South
if such an invasion took place.34 Craig changed tack and on 8 March
called for twenty new USC mobile platoons of 'A' Specials and for the
recruitment of 2000 more 'B' Specia1s.35 At the time it seemed that the
Clones Affray would not quickly be forgotten.
In order to appease Craig three extra battalions of British troops were
sen t to the North and a Border Commission was established on 16
February. The commission was to be based at C10gher near the border
between Monaghan and Fermanagh and to act as an ad-hoc peace
keeping agency offering arbitration in any future border disputes. It
34 Correspondence between Craig and Churchil, 11-13 February (PRONI, CAB 11/1). See also
Correspondence between Churchil, Cope, Craig and Collins, 11-15 February 1922 (PRO, CO 906/20).
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consisted of three representatives: one from each of the parties
involved. The Provisional Government appointee was Cornelius Ward,
the Liaison Offcer for Monaghan.36 The commission itself achieved
very little and eventually faded out of existence by the end of ApriL.
Macready was sceptical from the start: 'To those who knew anything
of two of the component parts of the Commission, the IRA and Ulster
representatives, the scheme was foredoomed to failure, though no
doubt it looked very attractive in WhitehalL.. From the first, in spite of
the loyal efforts of the British offcers, the whole affair was a farce,' 37
In spite of these new initiatives border attacks would increase during
February and March. On the 21st of Februar the British, in a final
attempt to solve the impasse, released the Monaghan Footballers from
Derry Gaol whilst the IRA responded by allowing twenty-six of the
captured loyalists to go free, The British released Hogan and his
offcers, once again overriding Craig, although prisoners from the six
counties such as Patrick Maguire, were left in gaoL38
Despite these compromises six of the Specials injured at Clones were
stil in IRA hands two weeks after the event, The Northern Whig
reported on the condition of injured Special K. Morton as criticaL.
Henry Burnside who, although a Special, was not a member of the
party but had been travellng in civilan clothes on his way to join 25
35 This brought the totals up to 5,800 'A' Specials and 22,000 'B' Specials, See Fan'ell, Arming the
Protestants p,95,
36 For details on the commission see fie on Clones shooting ('Secret Series' fies, HA32/1/1 i).
37 Macready report quoted in Hopkinson, Green Against Green p. 81,
38 Farrell, Arming the Protestants p, 93-4. Patrick Maguire statement (BMH, NA, WS 693),
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Platoon at Enniskilen was said to have '...sustained terrible injuries
to his left arm which may necessitate its amputation... the doctor says
he must have been struck by about six machine gun bullets, George
Lendrum had two bullets removed from his back. His condition is also
very serious.' 39 By the end of February most of the original kidnapped
loyalists had been released but the Clones Specials were stil being
held. They were John Baird and Albert York of Clady County Tyrone,
Special Constable T,W. McBirney, an off-duty passenger on the train,
and constables Lendrum, Morton and Burnside who were all
recovering in hospitaL. Burnside eventually made a full recovery,
returning to his unit in Enniskilen by the end of March. The rest of
the Specials were released in batches throughout March. After careful
acts of diplomacy all prisoners captured since January were released
and the evacuation of British troops from the Curragh resumed on 27
February. The feared confrontation had been averted.
In many senses however the real victims of Clones were the Catholic
population of Belfast. Between the 6th and 25th of February 43 people
were kiled in Belfast (27 Catholics and 16 Protestants) and 95 were
wounded (69 Catholics and 26 protestants). Thirty-one of these deaths
occurred between the 13th and 15th of February. The deaths included
the horrific bombings in Weaver Street where, on 13 February, a bomb
was thrown into a Catholic schoolyard in the York Road area of the
city. Two children were kiled instantly, with four others dying later in
39 Northern Whig, 15 February 1922,
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hospital from their wounds, Father John Hassan called it '...a more
horrible outrage than any that had hitherto disgraced this savage
city.' 40 Other horrors were to follow the next day. A nineteen-year-old
Catholic man James Rice was attacked by a mob at 9pm in
Ravenscroft Street. His hands were tied behind his back and he was
shot several times whilst on the ground. His attackers then battered
his skull in with revolver butts for good measure, His mangled body
was found dumped in an alley a few hours later. The tension in
Belfast was further fuelled by the emotive funerals of the four Specials
kiled at Clones, all of which took place on 14 February in various
parts of the six counties. On 16 February the IRA added another
victim to the rapidly growing list when they shot dead another Special,
21 year old Hector Stewart in Edlingham Street, Belfast, The number
of victims of the Clones Affray and its aftermath had reached almost
forty within only three days of the incident.41
Despite the rising death toll and the alarming decline in North-South
relations the IRA border campaign proceeded, after a brief hiatus, with
renewed vigour during late March and early ApriL. Collns arranged for
the setting up of a Belfast City Guard consisting of 60 men from the
Belfast Brigade, fifteen coming from each of the city's four battalions.
This unit effectively replaced the old ASU of Woods and McCorley
which had been so active during the previous spring but had been
40 Kenna, Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom p. 69,
41 For details of the Weaver Street bombings and the numerous deaths in Belfast over the following two
days see Irish News and Belfast Telegraph, 14- 1 6 February 1922,
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seriously compromised by the arrest of so many of its members in
Cavan. It was the City Guard who would be the spearhead of all
offensive IRA operations in the city during 1922. Plans were also laid,
again by the Ulster Council, to strike at a number of strategic
barracks inside Northern Ireland. The attacks were organised by
Collns' close colleague Sean McEoin from his command in Longford
and, unlike the earlier kidnap raids, involved Volunteers from both
sides of the border.
The first attack occurred in the early hours of Sunday 19 March. At
around 2,30 am approximately twenty heavily armed Tyrone IRA men
under the command of Thomas Morris bluffed their way into Pomeroy
barracks after deceiving a guard into believing they were members of
the USC.42 After gaining admittance the men made their way silently
in stockinged feet to the garrison's sleeping quarters. The occupants
were quickly overwhelmed and tied up, Sean Corr recalls that every
member of the garrison was asleep when they arrived and he had
some trouble waking them in order to tie them Up.43 The RIC Sergeant
in charge of the barracks reported later that the leader of the IRA
party chastised him saying, 'You should be ashamed to remain here in
charge of an Ulster Garrison.' 44
42 The IRA part included Major Tom Morris, Frank Strong, Patrick McKenna, James McElduff Frank
Lynn, John Milvy, Tom Lucas, Charlie Gil1an, Frank Ward, Patrick Slane, Frank Donnel1y and Sean
Corr, See Sean Corr statement (BMH, NA, WS 458),
43 Sean Corr statement (BMH, NA, WS 458),
44 File on Pomeroy barracks attack (Miistry of Home Affairs files, PRONI, HA/5/179),
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The IRA then proceeded to loot the contents of the building including
seventy-five rifles, a large quantity of ammunition and numerous
other items including bedding, furniture and bicycles which they
loaded onto a lorry that had been commandeered from a local man,
Peter McCullough, the day before. Patrick McKenna who was involved
in the attack recalls that the lorry, which had been backed up to the
door of the barracks, was so laden down with booty that the men had
to give it a push to get it started,45 The raiders then drove off in the
direction of the Sperrin mountains as other IRA units moved in
behind them, blowing bridges and trenching roads, to halt any
pursing Specials.46 The attack on Pomeroy barracks was the last
operation to be planned by Charlie Da1y before he was replaced by
Morris as Divisional OjC, Da1y however would continue to retain the
trust of many men in his old Division and in April he was approached
to see if he could provide his old comrades with money and supplies. 
47
That same evening, at around 8pm, a second attack was launched
against the barracks at Maghera with similar results. Again no shots
were fired and the garrison were easily captured and locked in the
cells by the raiders. However one of the captives, Sergeant McKenzie,
recognised two of the IRA men as being from the local area, The
attackers had little choice but to take him captive and he was
blindfolded, tied up and driven over the border into DonegaL. After a
45 Patrick McKenna statement (BMH, NA, WS 911),
46 Bel(ast Newsletter, 20 March 1922,
47 Sean Corr statement (BMH, NA, WS 458).
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short period of imprisonment in an underground cell in Drumboe
castle he was transferred to Ballyshannon barracks where he shared a
cell with three captured anti-Treaty IRA men from Pettigo. McKenzie
was only released on 19 August when Joe Sweeney, commander of the
Provisional Government forces in Donegal, discovered him after
capturing the barracks from the Republicans during the Civil War.48
The final attack, on Be1coo barracks, did not take place until 28
March after an earlier raid on the barracks at Strabane was called off.
A local RIC constable Sean McHale, a close friend of McEoin, was
responsible for allowing the raiders to sneak into the building. 
49
Approximately fifty IRA men took part in the attack and again large
amounts of arms and ammunition were captured. Unlike the earlier
raids however the fifteen-strong garrison were all taken prisoner and
marched the short distance over the border into Cavan. They
eventually arrived in Athlone where they were to remain imprisoned
until 18 July. The attack was said to have lasted almost three hours.5o
Despite the success of these raids and the tireless attempts of Collns
and the Ulster Council to disguise their involvement, it soon became
apparent that the Unionist authorities were well aware of the key role
played by leading figures in the Provisional Government Army
48 Belfast Newsletter, 24 November 1925; see also fie on Maghera barracks attack (Ministr of Home
Affairs files, PRONI, HA5/179),
49 See letter from MacEoin advocating on behalf of MacHale in latter's pension application, July 1952
(Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA5/l96).
50 File on Belcoo barracks attack (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA5/196),
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leadership. Craig wrote to Churchil on 21 March: 'You will recollect
that Commandant McKeon, in his speech in Cork quite recently,
acknowledged that a Flying Column of IRA was organised for duty in
Ulster and offered to lead it himse1f...While some local members of the
IRA may have taken part it is certain the whole matter has been
organised and men imported from the Irish Free State to take part in
these raids.' 51 The secret conspiracy behind the border campaign had
been discovered and such revelations played no small part in
undermining nationalist credibilty when the British government
decided to conduct their own investigation a few months later into
who was responsible for the disturbed situation in the province,
Alongside the targeting of these specific barracks, general offensive
operations in border areas also began to increase, with IRA attacks
being recorded right along the vulnerable 250-mile long frontier from
Strabane in the west to Newr in the east. From February IRA men
from Armagh and South Down were moved over the border into camps
at Ravensda1e in County Louth and Cast1eshane in Monaghan. It was
from here that the border campaign and May offensive would be
planned. The camp at Cast1eshane was based in the commandeered
ancestral home of the local unionist gentry, the Lucas family. It
consisted of the house itself, a riding school and a few other buildings
which were turned into arms dumps and living quarters for over one
51 Craig to Churchil, 21 March 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/189).
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hundred Armagh Volunteers. 
52 The exodus of these men over the
border was to be followed in March 1922 when the headquarters of
the 4th Northern Division was moved to Dunda1k. John McCoy recalled
that many of his men had been reluctant to move from the old
headquarters at Newr: 'The most important reasons of staying so
long in Newr and with the danger of an attack by the British police
and miltary forces was the moral effect it had on the rank and fie of
our men in Northern Ireland territory. There was no justification
amongst our offcers or men to think that they were asked to take
risks by us whilst we were enjoying the security of Southem Ireland
territory.' 53
Despite this hasty evacuation IRA attacks began to increase
dramatically in border areas. On the same day as the raid on Pomeroy
barracks a 'B' Special, Joseph Stinson, was dragged off his bicycle
near Grangemore by a gang of six IRA men and shot seven times while
he lay on the floor. 54 Many others would also become targets merely
by straying too close to the border. Two such individuals, a Protestant
civilian Robert Miligan and a 'B' Special Joseph Stevenson, found
themselves surrounded by a group of IRA men near the frontier and
were both shot several times. Mulligan was kiled outright but
Stevenson managed to survve albeit with severe wounds. 
55 The
52 See statements of Charles McGleenan (BMH, NA, WS 829) and John Grant (BMH, NA, WS 658),
53 John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492).
54 RIC Bi-monthly report, 31 March 1922 (Ministr of Home Affairs fies, PRONT, HN5/152),
55 Ibid. See also 'Report on deaths in Norther Ireland, Nov, 1921-July 1922' (Ministry of Home
affairs files, PRONI, HN51219).
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following day sniping intensified in the areas of Aughnacloy and
Caledon which had not only suffered badly in the recent kidnap raids
but also witnessed mass expulsions of both Protestant and Catholic
civilians from both sides of the border. Glas10ugh Orange Hall and
Glasburgh Castle were also attacked by the members of the
Monaghan IRA who requisitioned the buildings and used them as
their headquarters for the duration of the border campaign. It was
from here that an attack was organised on Kilycarron House a few
miles from Aughnacloy that was being used as the headquarters of the
local USC platoon. 
56
Numerous bomb attacks were also reported in March particularly in
South Armagh with three 'B' Specials suffering severe wounds from
bomb splinters during a surprise IRA ambush. A few days later in the
same area a police patrol was also ambushed by the IRA resulting in
the death of two Specials and the severe wounding of another. The IRA
were said to have used machine guns in the attack. 57 On 31 March a
party of seven police were ambushed in Hil Street, Newr with one
Special being kiled.58 A further IRA ambush in the area on 6 April led
to the death of USC Head Constable Alexander Compston who fell
from his vehicle after being severely wounded. 
59 Further to the east a
unit of anti-Treaty IRA men in the Belleek-Pettigo area ambushed a
56 Belfast Newsletter, 20 March 1922, See also fie on Belcoo barracks attack (Ministy of Home
Affairs fies, PRONI, HA5/196),
57 File on Belcoo barracks attack (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/l96). See also RIC Bi-
monthly report, 31 March 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/l52).
58 RIC Bi-monthly report, 31 March 1922 (Ministr of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/152).
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USC patrol near Garrison in County Fermanagh leaving one Special
dead and three badly wounded.6o
Such attacks made the border campaign an intense and brutal affair.
Captured IRA orders made it clear that operations were to be
conducted with the utmost speed and ruthlessness. All property
owned by 'prominent Orange-men' was to be destroyed and 'All
reprisals must be taken at once. Reprisals must be six to one so as to
prevent the enemy from continuing same...Spies and Informers to be
shot at sight. No mercy to be given.' 61 The effects of this last order
were felt bitterly in many Catholic areas during the IRA campaign. In
one case a Catholic woman, Agnes Rafferty from Fintona, was
abducted from her home by a gang of IRA men who, after shaving her
head and tearing off her clothes, poured tar over her neck and back. A
police report stated: 'This was done as a reprisal, the women having
some days previously had two men from the locality arrested and
retumed for trial in connection with the Belfast Boycott.' 62 In Belfast
itself a Catholic man, Samuel Mullan of Havana Street, was shot dead
by IRA gunmen whilst waiting in a queue of expelled shipyard workers
outside a Hibernian hall on the Whiterock Road. It was believed that
Mullan had been passing information to the police.63
59 RIC Bi-monthly report, 18 April 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs files, PRONI, HN5/1 52).
60 Ibid,
61 Captured IRA orders, 2nd Northern Division HQ to brigade O/C's, 26 March 1922 in RIC Bi-monthly
report, 31 March 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HN5/152).
62 RIC Bi-monthly report, 15 February 1922 (Ministr of Home Affairs files, PRONI, HA/5/l52),
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Many of these attacks were little more than opportune assaults by
young Volunteers who roamed the border areas carrng out acts of
intimidation and bullying. Edward Boyle described his contribution to
the border campaign in South Armagh during April:
'...we saw a man passing near us with a basket of eggs. We
asked him for a few eggs and he refused us in a most offensive
manner. We then took the basket and the eggs from him. He
cleared off and proceeded straight into Newtownhamilton and as
we knew later reported the seizure of his eggs to the Specials.
After having a feed on the eggs we proceeded to the local Orange
Hall- Mulladuff-and broke in the door. In the hall we found a
number of wooden rifles which were apparently in use for dril
purposes. We broke them up. We also found a large banner in
the hall, with King Wiliam on one side of it, which we decided to
take with us as a souvenir.' 64
Despite the substantial increase in IRA activity of all varieties and the
undoubted success of the Ulster Council's policy of selective attacks
on isolated police barracks, the border campaign continued to prove
disastrous for the Catholic population of Belfast. March would prove
to be the most brutal month yet seen in the city with fifty-nine people
losing their lives. Thirty-seven of the victims were Catholics who
would again experience a severe backlash from extreme elements in
the unionist population unnerved at the increasing level of violence in
63 RIC Bi-month1y report, 31 March 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/152),
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the border areas. The RIC admitted in their report for the end of
March: 'The patience of the 'B' men is almost exhausted and it will be
very diffcult to exercise restraint if this state of affairs continues.' 65
March 1922 would also witness many of the conflct's most notorious
acts of atrocity. The most infamous of these occurred on Friday 24
March when a party of uniformed police broke into the home of Owen
MacMahon and his family on the Antrim Road. His nineteen-year old
son John, the only male member of the family to survive the attack
later reported his experience of the night from his hospital bed:
'This morning about one o'clock I heard the hall door being
smashed in. Five men rushed up the stairs and ordered my
brothers and myself and Edward McKinney out on the landing.
Four of the five men were dressed in the uniform of the R.I.C.
but from their appearance I know they were 'Specials' not
regular R.I.C. One was in plain clothes. They ordered us down
stairs. When we got down, they lined us up in the room below,
my father, my four brothers, Edward Mckinney and myself,
against the wall. The leader said 'you boys say your prayers' and
at the same moment he and the others fired volley after volley at
us. I think I lay on the floor for half an hour before the
Ambulance came. Three or four regular RJ.C came too.' 66
64 Edward Boyle statement (BMH, NA, WS 647),
65 RIC Bi-monthly report, 31 March 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs files, PRONI, HA/5/152)
66 Statement of John McMahon, 24 March 1922 (NA, S180l/A).
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His mother, who begged the attackers on her knees for mercy, was
struck on the side of the head and collapsed to the floor.
In all five men were kiled: Owen MacMahon and his three sons Frank,
Patrick and Gerald and an employee Edward McKinney. The
MacMahons were a respected family in the Catholic community and
owned a string of public houses across the city. None of the victims
had any involvement with Sinn Fein or the IRA and were committed
supporters of J oe Devlin who himself was a close friend of Owen
MacMahon. Over 10,000 people attended their funeral in Belfast
although despite the enormous sense of outrage and anger caused by
the attacks nobody was ever prosecuted for the murders. It was widely
believed however to have been the work of a combined gang of RIC
and Specials under the command of DJ. Nixon, who would later be
dismissed from the RUC in 1924 as punishment for his extremist
activities. 
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The horror of the MacMahon murders overshadowed many other
atrocities that occurred in Belfast during the following weeks, On 1
April the murder gang struck again after an RIC constable, George
Turner, was gunned down on the Old Lodge Road. The area was
flooded with Specials who proceeded to break into a number of houses
in Stanhope Street and nearby Arnon Street. Bernard McKenna, a
father of seven was shot in his bed. Wiliam Spallen suffered a similar
197
fate despite having recently returned from burying his wife, another
victim of the conflct. At number 18 Arnon Street Specials smashed in
the door with a sledgehammer and then used it to kil 39 year old
Joseph Walsh, a six-month-old child Robert Walsh was also shot
dead.68 A wounded survivor, George Murray, later recalled the savage
attack: 'One of the three policemen had a revolver and the other two
had guns. These men went out. Immediately after seven armed men,
five in police clothes and two in civilian clothes entered. They had a
cage car outside the door. On letting down the child I had in my 
arms
one of the party (who had previously decided as to which of them was
to do the shooting) fired at me. They then left.' 69
A local priest told Father John Hassan of his visit to the house soon
after the attack. He found Joseph Walsh upstairs in his bed:
'The skull was open and empty, while the whole mass of the
brains was on the bolster almost a foot away. On descending
they found a young lad, Frank Walsh, aged fourteen, crouching
in the bedroom. Him they kicked and shot in the thigh, but not
fatally. This was how Constable Turner was avenged, I asked to
see the room upstairs. The wife shrank from conducting me,
She had not ventured to enter it since that night, But the
brother, an ex-soldier, had stronger nerves and showed me all-
the bolster soaked with blood, and the two straw mattresses,
67 See fies on Dl Nixon ('Secret Series' fies, PRONL, HA/32/l/254-55), For further details of the
MacMahon murders and subsequent fuerals see Irish News, 27 March 1922,
68 Belfast Newsletter, 1 April 1922,
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deeply stained with it, He even raised them up and pointed out
pieces of the skull upon the floor, and fragments of dried brain,
How they managed to swing a sledgehammer in that narrow
space I know not. ' 70
Outside of Belfast similar reprisal attacks were carried out. In one
particularly unsavoury incident a Catholic man Hugh McEneany was
kiled on 11 March by a Protestant mob who were attending a funeral
near Greencastle, County Antrim. McEneany was driving his works
van home when he ran into a group of mourners: 'Someone shouted
out that he was an RC and members of the funeral party fired
revolvers at him wounding him in the body-He jumped off the van and
ran towards his house where his wife tried to save him. Other men
then came up and shot him dead.' 71 Rioting erupted in the nationalist
areas around Greencastle and the IRA made threats to kil some local
Protestant offcials. The threats were put down to the work of 'Belfast
Hooligans'.72
For the IRA in Belfast, the first phase of the border campaign had
been an unmitigated disaster. Not only had the vulnerabilty of the
Catholic population to revenge attacks been graphically exposed but
also the USC had markedly increased the number of raids and arrests
of suspected republicans. One of these raids in particular would prove
69 Statement of George MUlTay in report on Aron steet affair, (NA, SI80l/A),
70 Kenna, Facts and Figures a/the Belfast Pogrom p,80,
71 File on 'Incident at Whitehouse'(Ministry of Home Affairs files, PRONI, HA/5/176).
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to be enormously damaging to the long-term security of the Northern
IRA and its members. Around 7o'clock on the evening of 18 March, St.
Mary's Hall in the centre of Belfast was taken over by a platoon of 'B'
Specials. The hall had been used for assorted activities including the
arrangement of relief for the expelled Catholic shipyard workers and
was the base for various other pseudo-political organisations. It had
also been the headquarters of Eoin O'Duffy during his time as Chief
Liaison Offcer for Ulster during the early part of the Truce. On the
night in question a whist drive was in progress on the ground floor
and parties of Specials were dispatched to search the many offces
and small rooms in the building. The hall was said to be in a state of
'indescribable chaos', although in an offce which was used by the
Saint Vincent de Paul society a brief case was found containing
numerous IRA documents along with discarded ammunition, bombs
and signal rockets. 
73
The discovery of these documents was a triumph for the Unionist
authorities. Not only did they reveal collusion between Southern IRA
leaders in the recent attacks but also contained numerous reports
from training camps that had been set up by the 3rd Northern Division
during the Truce including the names and ranks of virtually every IRA
offcer in east Ulster. In one instance a letter from O'Duffy to 'Bob
McDonnell' (i.e. Thomas Fitzpatrick), OjC of the Antrim Brigade, was
72 File on incidents at GreencastIe (Ministry of Rome Affairs files, PRONI, HA/5/900).
73 'Documents found in 81. Mary's Hall' (Ministry of Rome Affairs files, PRONI, HA/32/l/130). See
also Be?fast Telegraph, 20 March 1922,
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found which made clear that '...a state of war existed and directing
this offcer to regard the truce as non-existent.74 The raid on St.
Mary's Hall had an immediate impact with many of the named
individuals being rounded up and imprisoned. Others were forced to
go permanently on the run.75 When internment was introduced later
in the year the St. Mary's Hall documents would provide a
comprehensive list of IRA suspects, a fact which explains why the
scheme was to prove such a success in bringing the IRA to it knees so
soon after its introduction.
Such attacks in Belfast meant that the border campaign achieved
little of its early promise. Despite its demonstration that the IRA on
both sides of the border could launch successful and damaging
attacks against the Northem government it had done little lasting
damage except to its own supporters in Belfast and the interior of the
six counties. The Provisional Government in Dublin were well aware of
the link between the violence on the border and Belfast but remained
confused over the nature of the relationship: 'It should be realised that
the seat of the trouble is in Belfast and that all incidents happening in
other parts of the six-Counties including those on the border are but
reflexes of the operations in Belfast.' 76 However, there can be little
doubt that it was the border violence which had provoked the savage
74 Ibid.
75 Thomas Flyn and other members of the Battalion staff, Joe Savage, Patrick McGarragher and John
Simpson, become immediate victims of the crackdown when they were arrested one week later. See
Thomas Flynn statement (BMH, NA, WS 429).
76 Provisional Government minutes, 10 June 1922 (NA, S180l/A),
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confrontations in Belfast, a pattern that would continue to dictate the
future direction of the conflct well into the summer.
The increasing brutality in the city and rising state of anarchy along
the border led the British government to insist on another meeting
between Craig and Collns at the end of March. The resultant
agreement, the Second Craig Collns Pact, was more far-reaching than
its predecessor and included calls for cross-community policing and
widespread relief projects. The lack of trust between both
communities however, especially after the savage violence of the
previous two months, doomed the pact to failure. Its proud first clause
stating that 'Peace is today declared' would ring increasingly hollow as
violence erupted again in the subsequent weeks and months. The IRA,
in line with Collns' carrot-and-stick diplomacy, scaled down their
offensive operations in order to give the pact a chance of working 77 In
practice however the agreement amounted to little more than what the
historian Desmond Greaves has called a series of 'promises, prospects
and uncertainties.' 78
The relative peace of late April, whilst certainly providing a genuine, if
unlikely, context in which some kind of political solution could
flourish proved to be little more than a brief hiatus. The blood letting
was not yet over and Collns' frustration would lead him to finally
77 For the text of the agreement see The Times, 31 March 1922, For the origins and implementation of
the pact see Hopkinson, 'The Craig-Collins Pacts of 1922: two attempted reforms of the Norther Irish
government' Irish Historical Studies, vol. xxvii, 1990.
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jettison any hopes he had of a negotiated settlement reverting once
again to his faithful old methods of intrigue and conspiracy.
Developments in the South would also mean that a peaceful solution
the crisis in the North appeared increasingly unlikely as the IRA
finally split formally over the Treaty. The only way to avoid a war in
the South it appeared would be to find a shared crusade behind which
the whole organisation could unite. That crusade, tragically as it
proved, was to end partition by force.
78 C, Desmond Greaves, Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution (London, 1971) p.305.
203
CHAPTER SIX
THE JOINT-IRA POLICY
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The split in the Volunteer movement, which finally became official
with the holding of the anti-Treaty Army Convention in Dublin on 26
March 1922, affected the Northern IRA like no other part of the
organisation in Ireland. National unity was a vital component of the
struggle in the North and any wavering in the extent of Southern
support would prove disastrous for the beleaguered Volunteers in the
six counties. As such the Northern IRA's experience in the spring and
early summer of 1922 would directly reflect events in the South.
Collns' political and propaganda war against the Northern
government of the first three months of the year had borne little fruit
and would be jettisoned in favour of exclusively miltary solutions. His
decision to wrng whatever concessions he could from the moribund
Second Craig-Collns pact and then to 'let it break' is testament to his
loss of faith in negotiated solutions. i The occupation of the Four
Courts by sections of the anti-Treaty IRA in March led to a further
emphasis on the growing divisions within the miltary side of the
movement. The North however would be the one area where GHQ
obsessively pursued army unity. The reasons for this are inextricably
bound up with broader attempts to avert civil war and the use of
partition as an issue that could unite the IRA overrding divisions over
the Treaty.
Despite the unique context in which the Northern IRA were operating,
and the assurances of both ideological and practical support from the
i See Hopkinson, 'The Craig-Collins Pacts of 1922',
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South the miltary split proved to be just as damaging as elsewhere in
Ireland. Almost immediately Joe McKe1vey, left to join the Executive
forces, eventually being elected as a representative for Ulster along
with Peadar O'Donnell at the second Army Convention in ApriL.2
However, McKe1vey's position as O/C of the 3rd Northern Division was
already under threat long before he made his decision to leave. He
alone was held responsible for the desperate shambles that had
ensued after the raid on St. Mary's Hall and as Woods declared:
'...many Brigade offcers demanded an enquiry into the circumstances
of the raid, and were asking the Divisional Commandant to resign.' 3
A meeting was scheduled for Friday 24 March, although McKe1vey
himself never retumed to Belfast to face the enquiry. Woods would
later claim that McKe1vey who had '...previously signified his intention
of remaining loyal to GHQ, tumed Executive when he heard of
operations going to commence.' 4 The effects of McKe1vey's departure
were devastating: 'Practically all the other offcers of the Brigade were
prepared to carry on. His action, however, had a very bad effect as it
amounted to desertion, and a large number of the men recruited
during the Truce followed his example and ceased to be "active"
members of the IRA. Two Battalions which had been formed during
the Truce were so badly hit that I have since disbanded them.' 5
2 See information on Army Conventions (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS 31 249 (2) ),
3 Woods to Mulcahy, 27 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77).
4 Ibid,
206
Several divisional meetings had been held at GHQ before the Army
Convention although Woods recalls that:
'...no officer in this Division (except the O/C) knew that such
meetings were held or what happened at these meetings. All
preparations had been made for delegates attending the
Convention, they were under the impression that the Convention
was being held with authority of GHQ, until they saw the M/D
(Minister of Defence) statement in the Press on the Friday prior.
When some of the senior delegates saw the statement they
decided even then to go on to Dublin, as they would probably
have an opportunity of getting into touch with GHQ for indeed
as two senior offcers remarked to me, GHQ as far as they knew
had practically ceased to exist for a long time.' 6
Two of these men were Roger McCorley, soon to be promoted to O/C of
the Belfast Brigade, and Thomas Fitzpatrick, the leader of the IRA in
Antrim. Their visit was not as innocent as Woods claimed, with
McCor1ey later confiding that he and Fitzpatrick were both actually
prepared to join the Executive: '...unless GHQ would make at least as
good an offer of supplies as had been made by the Executive, which
had been set up by the Convention, I would have no option but to
advise the Belfast Brigades that they should support the Executive.' 7
Again it was the issue of which side was most committed to
5 Ibid,
6 Ibid,
7 Roger McCorley statement (BMH NA, WS 389).
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overcoming Partition that finally settled the Northern IRA's attitude to
the Treaty, demonstrated graphically by McCorley's story of his visit to
GHQ in the spring of 1922. After attending the Army Convention both
men decided to visit Seamus Woods, who was working as Eoin
O'Duffy's ADC at Beggar's Bush barracks. After an amiable
conversation with their old friend, and soon to be Divisional 0/ C,
McCorley recalled:
'Woods then told us that the Chief of Staff, General Duffy, would
like to see us and asked us if we would agree to meet him. We
agreed. General Duffy then brought up the subject of our
attendance at the Convention and I informed him that since we
had been offered arms and ammunition by the Executive that I
intended to support them and would advise Belfast accordingly.
He told me that GHQ would be better placed to provide the arms
which we required than the executive would be. He said that
they had the markets of the world open to them. I told him that
I understood this was so but that so far GHQ had not been very
generous with supplies. I told him also that as far as I was
concerned I was in the market for the first time and that my
support would go to the people who would help us honour our
obligations to the Nationalists in Belfast. I said I would not allow
my personal opinions as to the rights and wrongs of the quarrel
between GHQ and the Executive to influence me in this matter.
He then made a definite promise that GHQ would provide all the
supplies necessary within a short space of time. I told him that
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if that were so I would be in a position to advise the Belfast
Brigade to support GHQ with whom my personal sympathies
lay.' 8
Indeed McCorley himself was an early supporter of the Treaty
although he admitted later that he hated the document and only
backed it because it allowed Ireland to have its own armed forces.
After this visit many other Northern offcers made their way south to
meet with O'Duffy where they received similar promises to those given
to McCor1ey. On their return, meetings were held across Northern
Ireland to discuss the situation with a majority of offcers deciding to
remain under GHQ which had made a substantially higher bid than
the Executive for the support of the Northern IRA. 
9
As such the key impact of the split in the North cannot be understood
in terms of measuring how many IRA men joined the anti-Treaty side
but rather who these men were. After McKelvey left other high-profie
departures would follow. Charlie Daly, OjC of the 2nd Northem
Division, also attended the Convention along with the Divisional
Quartermaster and the OjC of the South Derry Brigade, Sean Larkin,
who would later be executed with Daly in DonegaL. In the 3rd Northern
the OjC of the Belfast Brigade Sean O'Neil had walked out paving the
way for McCor1ey's promotion as did the Quartermaster of the 1 st
Battalion and the OjC of the East Down Brigade. On a divisional level
8 Ibid,
209
the Vice-Commandant, Intellgence Offcer and Divisional
Quartermaster would also follow as would two of the four brigade
O/C's of the 18t Northern Division. On the border the 5th Northern
Division remained loyal to GHQ, due largely to O'Duf:('s influence and
the 4th Northern under Frank Aiken declared its neutrality eventually
taking sides with the Republicans. 
10
Aiken's reaction to the wider divisions within the IRA is typical of the
confused response of many members of the organisation in the six
counties:
'I ordered all arms and war material in the Division to be
concealed and that if we finally broke with GHQ, all Miltary
posts and camps were to be evacuated, the Divisional
organisation to be kept intact on Volunteer lines, until an
ordered state of Govemment attaining in the South- we could
attack the North with a chance of getting a united Ireland,
which was always the immediate job to us as Northemers.' 11
His neutrality though was extremely fragile and was heavily
compromised in March when two battalions and the staff of the 18t
(Louth) Brigade under Patrick McKenna came out against the Treaty. 
12
9 Ibid,
10 See information on Army Conventions (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS 31249 (2) )
11 'Position ofthe 4th Northern Division from January 1922-17 July 1922' (O'Donoghue papers, NU,
MS 17143).
12 James McElhaw statement (BMH, NA, WS 634).
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However, the men in Armagh and South Down, the principal fighting
areas in the Division, remained loyal to Aiken. 13
The extent of these various defections meant that the miltary split in
the North was far more substantial than has been previously realised.
Indeed Florence O'Donoghue, an IRA Intellgence Offcer in Cork and a
member of the IRB Supreme Council, claimed that all three of the IRA
Divisions based inside the six counties came out in favour of the
Republicans.14 The split was certainly just as bitter as elsewhere in
Ireland. The Adjutant of the 3rd Northern Division wrote scathingly of
the anti-Treaty element in his area: 'Their ranks are full of men who
have been dismissed from the Volunteers, some have been tarred and
feathered by our forces, and some have been sent to jail by the late
Divisional Commandant (i.e. McKe1vey) who must have now ratified
the appointments of the same men as offcers in the Executive.' 15 The
Republican response was similarly harsh concentrating on the fragile
loyalties of many Northemers to the Provisional Govemment: '... they
got 300 men for the Free State Army, most of these would have been
prevented by propaganda and most of them would have been quite
willng to transfer to other areas as IRA men'. 
16 It was further argued
that the Northerners had only joined due to '...economic pressure and
in the hopes of fighting the Specials, they are at heart Republicans'. 17
13 John McCoy (BMH, NA, WS 492),
14 See 'List of Divisions, Brigades, Battalions' (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS31424),
15 3rd Northern Divisional Adjutant to Mulcahy, 7 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77),
16 D/Org to C/S, 22 Dec, 1922 (Twomey papers, UCDAD, P69/13 (80) ),
17 Ibid,
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In answer to these various resignations GHQ decided to install a new
leadership in the North. Seamus Woods, the previous Divisional
Adjutant of the 3rd Northern Division, took over from McKelvey in early
April following Roger McCorley's replacement of O'Neil as head of the
Belfast Brigade. The two young radicals of 1921 had finally ascended
to the top of the IRA organisation in east Ulster. Despite such bitter
feelings and the departure of so many key leaders, overall the rank
and fie kept faith with GHQ being persuaded by the assurances of
Collns and his IRB clique that the North would remain a key priority
for the Dublin leadership. GHQ, having played such a vital role in the
creation of the Northern IRA, had formed a strong bond with the
Volunteers in Ulster that would prove both difficult and undesirable to
break.
Collns' solution to the splits in both the Northem IRA and the wider
movement was the development of a plan aimed at securing the
loyalty of both wings of the IRA by carrng out a united and concerted
attack on the new Northern government. The policy had two general
aims: to aid the beleaguered Northem minority, although how was
rather unclear, and, putting it crudely, to avert a divisive war in the
South by instigating a unifying one in the North. Even after the
miltary split it was obvious that overcoming partition was the only
issue on which there was substantive agreement between both sides
of the Treaty divide, far more so than for Tom Barry's plan to attack
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the British garrison in Ireland or Dick Barretts call for a bombing
campaign in Eng1and.18 The IRA in the North were desperate to
encourage any moves which would place partition at the top of the
nationalist agenda; as John McCoy later stated: 'It was very clear to
most Northern Republicans that the Treaty was the last straw as far
as they were concerned and any rumpus that might break up the
Treaty position was good policy for them.' 19 Indeed by March 1922 the
situation in the six counties had deteriorated so badly that it appeared
more likely that civil war would erupt in the North rather than the
South.
For Collns overcoming partition had become a personal crusade. At a
meeting of Northern nationalist leaders he made it clear that
'...although the Treaty might have an outward expression of Partition,
the Government had plans whereby they would make it impossible,
and that Partition would never be recognised even though it might
mean the smashing of the Treaty.' 20 From now until his death Collns
would be increasingly overwhelmed by what Peadar O'Donnell called
his 'weakness for intrigue and conspiracy'.21 Sean MacBride later
made clear his faith in Collns' single-minded commitment to the
North: 'I do not think this collaboration by Collns with us, was in any
way a sham, or intended to mislead. Collns thought that way.' 22
18 F, O'DonoghueNo Other Law (Dublin, 1954) p, 249, Hopkinson, Green Against Green pp, 96-7.
19 John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492),
20 'Subject-Position of 2nd Northern Division in 1922' (Thomas Johnson papers, NU, MS17143).
21 P, O'Donnell, The Gates Flew Open (London, 1932) p,3 1.
22 Sean MacBride quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p,l17.
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Collns' means of gaining the consensus needed to instigate his joint-
IRA offensive was the IRB. The organisation, which one historian has
likened to Collns' 'extended family', had provided a key framework for
controllng provincial IRA units, with admittedly mixed results, during
the War of Independence.23 As such it was the only body stil
functioning which retained suffcient loyalty to bridge the Treaty
divide. Collns' position as President of the Supreme Council allowed
him to exploit his final tenuous links with anti-Treaty leaders such as
Liam Lynch, Rory O'Connor and Joe McKe1vey. His own close
confidants O'Duffy and Mulcahy would also be key players in
organising the conspiracy and the many covert meetings of the IRB
Supreme Council held during the spring of 1922 presented a ready
forum for these secret debates. Florence O'Donoghue who attended
many of these gatherings later confided that preparations for the May
offensive were being laid as early as the first Army Convention in
March.24
The planned attacks, referred to by IRA members variously as the
'May Operations' or the 'Rising', were to be a co-ordinated offensive by
IRA units on both sides of the border. Whilst the pro-Treaty side
would be largely responsible for supplying the arms and equipment,
the anti-Treaty IRA would provide the leadership. It was left to the
Northem IRA to supply the majority of the actual manpower to carr
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out the attacks. One of the principal leaders of this new 'Army of the
North' 25 was to be Sean Lehane, an IRA veteran from Cork, who had
been O/C of the Schull Battalion and a member of the flying column
of the 1 st Cork Brigade during the War of Independence. He was also a
close colleague of Liam Lynch, who had nominated him for his new
appointment, and a long-standing member of the IRB. Lehane was no
stranger to attacks on unionists and had been involved in various
operations against Protestants in his native Cork. In one such
incident a local Protestant man was shot dead and the farm of another
named Da1y, whose sister was believed to be an informer, was razed to
the ground. According to Sean O'Driscoll, one of Lehane's
subordinates in Cork, Lehane ordered him '... to bum out Daly's two
farm houses and let them know why so it was done.' 26
Many years later Lehane would explain how he came to be associated
with the combined operations in the North. Following some
preliminary meetings held soon after the Treaty was signed to discuss
the Northern situation he recalled that '...in the early spring of 1922
further conferences were held at which General Liam Lynch and his
staff and Michae1 Collns and his chief advisers were present, and at
one of these meetings the same general attitude was upheld, and in
order to remedy things both sides agreed to select offcers for Ulster. It
was decided that an IRA offcer be appointed from the South, and a
23 Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence p,18,
24 0' DonoghueNo Other Lawp. 249,
25 C,S. Andrews, Dublin Made Me (Dublin, 1979) p.238.
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staff of officers to assist him... and under the direction of the IRA
General Council to assist the present General Aiken...in war against
Crown Forces along the border and further in land in the Six
Counties.' 27
Lehane was appointed OjC of the 1st and 2nd Northern Divisions.
Ironically Charlie Daly, who only weeks before had been removed from
his Ulster command by GHQ, was made his second-in-command. His
other senior offcers were all from Cork and included the brigade
commanders Mossy Donegan, Sean Fitzgerald and Seamus Cotter.
The junior ranks were filled by Denis Galvin from Bandon, Jim Lane
from C1onakilty, Denis O'Leary and Bily O'Sullvan from Bantry, Tom
Mullns from Kinsa1e and John O'Donovan of Dunmanway. The
instructions given to these offcers were according to Lehane '... to get
inside the border wherever whenever. To force the British General to
show his real intentions; that was to occupy Ballyshannon, Sligo and
along down.' 28
Mossy Donegan, Lehane's trusted lieutenant, gave his version of
events as follows: 'We were ordered to the north by the Division or
through the Division maybe more correct...We left in May 1922, going
by lorry to Dublin and reported to the Four Courts. While there one
day Lehane and I at any rate- were briefed by Liam Lynch, in I think
26 Sean O'Driscol1 to O'Donoghue, 11 April 1962 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS3130 1(9) ),
27 Lehane to Military Pensions Board, 7 March 1935 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS31340),
28 Ibid.
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McKelvies (sic) offce. It was explained to us that our mission was to
make war on the Crown Forces in the North on and inside the border,
starting on the Donegal-Derry area and using Donegal as a base. We
were to get co-operation from the Pro-Treaty forces in Donegal and
were therefore to be careful to avoid any "incidents" with them which
might miltate against success in that direction.' 29 Roger McCor1ey
was also keen to concentrate on their real enemies in the unionist
population: 'The idea in our May 1922 attack was to smash the
Northern Government completely. As far as we could help it we didn't
attack the British.' 30 In his view the May Rising was aimed at nothing
less than the '...downfall of the six-county Government by miltary
means.' 31 Despite McCorley and Donegan's wish to confine their
attacks to the Specials and the new Northern Ireland police force the
RUC, regular troops under the control of the Provisional Government
and the British would play key roles in putting down the offensive.
Despite the involvement of so many IRA leaders in the conspiracy the
central role of the Provisional Government Army leadership was to be
kept secret for fear of compromising their already strained
relationship with the British government. Lehane later described the
complicated arrangements: 'Both parties- Republicans and Free State
were to co-operate in giving us arms and supplies, but General Collns
insisted on one thing, namely, that activities were to be in the name of
29 Donegan to O'Donoghue, 27 August 1950 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS 31423 (6) ),
30 Roger McCorley interview with Emie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/98),
31 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NA, WS 389).
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the IRA and that we were to get arms- rifles- from Cork NO.1 Brigade,
and that he would return rifles instead to Cork NO.1 from those rifles
handed over by the British. The reason for those stipulations was to
avoid embarrassment for General Collns in dealing with the British
Government in case a rifle fell into the hands of the British.' 32
Most of the weapons did indeed come from Cork although others were
acquired from various IRA units in Munster. The exchange of arms
however was a delicate operation to undertake and friction between
the mutually suspicious parties began to surface almost immediately.
Eoin O'Duffy complained bitterly that the Republicans were far too
slow in carrying out his requests leading Liam Lynch to respond:
'The CjS (i.e. O'DuffyJ and AjG (Adjutant General) phoned me
to forward 30 Thompson guns, 10,000 rounds. 303, and also
100 rifles, these latter to be exchanged as soon as could be
arranged. The following supplies of arms and ammunition were
forwarded within 36 hours; 30 Thompson guns, 8000 rounds
ammunition T.M guns, 10,000 rounds. 303, 75 rifles. I also sent
10 machine- gunners. Any of these supplied, I afterwards
learned, did not get to the North, and the gunners after being
detained for a week or so at Beggar's Bush, were ordered home
to their own areas after being so urgently required by phone for
32 Lehane to Military Pensions Board, 7 March 1935 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS31340),
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the North. It is very easy to judge where the responsibilty lies
for the situation which now exists.' 33
Numerous transfers of arms had been arranged with some arriving as
planned whilst others fell foul of the undercurrent of mistrust between
pro and anti-Treaty units. Martin Walton, a Southern IRA officer,
described his role in the arms-swaps: 'I was a member of a party that
was preparing to go to the North with a consignment of arms. They
were mostly guns that we'd got from the British. All the identification
numbers were fied off them...I don't know how many of us were to go
up there, but I knew over a hundred myself. But the guns never got
there.' 34 John Joe Philben of the 4th Western Division made a similar
attempt:
'...seven or eight of us under Paddy Duffy were ordered to effect
an exchange of rifles. Collns was badly put out at the attacks
on Nationalists in the North. Beggars Bush had got new rifles
from the British, and the idea was that if we handed over our
rifles they would give us new ones. Anyway, we drove to Boyle in
a Crossley tender with our rifles. When we got there we waited a
while, and eventually two Free State offcers arrived in a car and
said to Paddy, that the lorry with the new rifes had broken
down and that they would let us have them later on. Paddy said
"You will get no rifles until I get the new ones". The new rifles
33 Quoted in O'Donoghue, No Other Law p.252.
34 Martin Walton quoted in Griffth and O'Grady, Curious Journey p.275.
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never appeared and Paddy brought the old ones back to
Castlebar.' 35
Such abortive missions were commonplace and meant that a large
proportion of the material sent to the North came directly from the
British government's supply of rifles to the new Provisional
Govemment Army. Numerous Volunteers recall receiving new rifles
with the serial numbers scratched off and a USC raid on 12 May at
the home of Thomas Allen of Drumkeenan revealed '...evidence that a
considerable quantity of arms had recently been brought into
Armagh'.36 In the house also were found a number of large boxes that
bore the signs of being hastily opened. In one of the cases a new
Web1ey revolver was found as were materials and instructions for the
manufacture of mines. Patrick Casey remembered '... the tremendous
activity in and about Dunda1k. Thousands of rifles, sub-machine
guns, grenades, boxes of ammunition, land mines, detonators etc.
were passed over the border by various routes and dispersed through
the six counties.' 37 The arms were transported across the border in oil
tankers with others taken by sea and landed at selected spots on the
Down coast. The 3rd Northern Division received around 150 rifles for
each of its three brigades plus a similar number of revolvers for the
IRA in Belfast. 
38
35 John Joe Philben quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p.467.
36 RIC Bi-monthly report, 16 May 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs files, PRONI, HA/5/152),
37 Patrick Casey statement (BMH, NA, WS 1148).
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While a steady supply of arms found its way into Ulster preparations
for the offensive were well under way. Planning had begun in the early
spring and prior to Wood's appointment as OjC of the 3rd Northern
Division, a number of meetings of the five Northern Divisional
Commandants were held. The most important of these, and the first
which Woods attended, occurred at Clones Workhouse on 21 ApriL.
Each of the leaders outlined the equipment they needed and the GHQ
representatives assured them that it would be made available
immediately. A date, which appears to have been 2 May, was agreed
for the start of operations allowing almost a fortnight for the transport
of arms to various IRA units in the six counties. 
39
There had been a decrease in IRA activity all over Northern Ireland so
that preparations and training could be carried out prior to the start
of the offensive and to ensure that the arms transfers could be carried
out without undue attention from the Specia1s.4o The Unionist
authorities did note the unusual activities of the IRA in various areas
particularly in Down and Armagh where bands of Volunteers were
said to be gathering together for some unspecified reason.41 A letter
written to officers in the 4th Northern Division in early May makes
clear how thorough the planning was: 'You will see that when the fight
starts, there are one or two reliable men in each Unit or section, so
38 Roger McCorley statement (BMH NA, WS 389),
39 Woods to Mulcahy, 27 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77),
40 Charles McGleenan statement (BMH, NA, WS 829),
41 RIC Bi-monthly report, 16 May 1922 (Miistry of Home Affairs files, PRONI, HA5/152),
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that in case a leader was wounded there is a reliable man to take his
place. Train your men as speedy as possible.' 42
The plans for the offensive were indeed ambitious. John Cosgrave, an
IRA Captain in the 4th Northern Division, was given detailed orders for
his company in Armagh. He was instructed: '...first to take over a
newly erected house a residence for the local clergyman-as an
hospitaL. We were then to join up with the Lislea section of the
Armagh Company and to deal with any local opposition from the
Lisnadil B / Specials and from B / Specials in Markethil and Red Rock
areas. After dealing with any local opposition we were ordered to move
in the direction of Armagh city where we should join up with all the
other battalion units from Armagh, and when the local military
garrison was subdued we were all to move in the direction of Lough
Neagh from where the 3rd Brigade (i.e. North Armagh) would launch
an attack on the town of Portadown which we understood was a key
point in the British defences.' 43 On paper at least the offensive
involved a virtual full-scale invasion of Northern Ireland,
Such careful planning however was severely compromised when
Woods called on O'Duffy to postpone the start of operations for three
days as the arms and equipment being sent from GHQ to Antrim had
only reached Belfast and would not arrive until after the offcial start-
date. O'Duffy agreed to the request and called a further meeting of
42 Ibid,
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Northern divisional commanders on 5 May where a decision was taken
to re-schedule the start of the offensive. The 2nd Northern Division
however were unable to postpone their plans and were permitted to
proceed as previously arranged. Woods then added further confusion
to the situation when he visited O'Duffy in Dublin a few days after the
meeting and suggested that all of the planned operations should be
held off until he made an attempt to attack Musgrave Street Barracks
in Belfast. O'Duffy again agreed and promised that he would order out
all Divisions on the day after the raid was attempted. As such the
offensive was postponed for a further fortnight with the new start-date
set for 19 May 1922.44
The last-minute changes of Woods and O'Duffy would prove
disastrous. Co-ordination was vital for the success of any proposed
offensive in the six counties and the decision to allow the 2nd Northern
Division to proceed virtually alone allowed for the piecemeal defeat of
the Northern IRA by the Unionist authorities. Communication and co-
operation between IRA units in the North had never been strong; as
Tom McNally, a Belfast Volunteer commented: 'We had little
association outside of ourselves and we had no faith in other areas.' 45
The isolated position of the 2nd Northern was exacerbated by the
failure of the two pro-Treaty border Divisions to act. The reasons for
this remains unclear and Ernest B1ythe is the only figure who makes
43 John Cosgrave statement (BMH, NAI, WS 605),
44 Woods to Mulcahy, 27 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77).
45 Tom McNally interview with Emie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, PI7b/99).
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reference to it when he states rather vaguely that '...a decision
appears to have been taken that there would be no fighting on the
Border or around it which decision meant that there were no
"offensive" operations carred out by the 1st Northem or 1st Midland or
5th Northern.' 46 Unbeknownst to B1ythe however the 1st Northern were
effectively split between Joe Sweeney's local Provisional Government
forces, who made no attacks over the border and the Republican-led
'Joint IRA' which was poised to strike under Lehane. The inactivity of
these border Divisions and the delay in operations in east Ulster goes
a long way to explaining the harsh criticisms the 2nd Northem received
from the IRA leadership in Belfast. Roger McCorley later claimed that
the IRA in the west 'didn't go off at all', while Tom McNally was
harsher stating that the 2nd Northern didn't 'do a damn thing'.47
Such views however were far from the truth as the following RIC
report for County Londonderry makes clear: 'The really serious trouble
in the County originated early in the month of May. On the night of
2nd / 3rd. . . the Sinn Feiners carried out a wholesale attack on loyalist
property and a number of mils and other buildings were bumed or
damaged. The police were also attacked at Bellaghy and Ballyronan
and a sergeant and three constables were murdered,' 48 The report
added that the IRA were 'massed on the Border' and making frequent
incursions in the Strabane district. These latter attacks were the work
46 Blythe, 'Memo on the north-east Ulster 1922-26' (Blythe papers, UCDAD, P24/554).
47 Tom McNally interview with Emie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/99),
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of the men under of Lehane and Daly in Donegal who were finally
beginning to make their presence felt along the border.
The 2nd Northem began their offensive as arranged on 2 May with
attacks on police barracks at Bellaghy, Draperstown and Coalisland,
all of which were beaten off, although at Bellaghy one constable, John
Harvey, was shot dead and three others badly wounded. Various key
bridges and railway lines were also destroyed on the first night to
hinder the govemments attempts to move in reinforcements with over
sixty feet of railway track alone being removed near Carrickmore. The
following day three members of a police patrol were ambushed and
fatally wounded at Ballyronan and attacks intensified in the areas
around Cookstown and Annaghmore. Again, as in the days of the
Belfast Boycott, it was fire which was the principal weapon of the
offensive. Numerous mils and creameries were put to the torch, as
were the homes of local loyalists and Specials. In one such attack near
Annaghmore the IRA, after setting alight the home of one 'B' Special,
shot another who had arrived on the scene shortly after and was
tryng to put out the fire.49 Such attacks however could not be
sustained for long. The failure of the border Divisions to act, the
sluggish activities of the Joint-IRA in Donegal and the postponement
of the 3rd Northern offensive left the IRA in the west of the six counties
dreadfully exposed. These problems were added to by growing friction
48 RUC County Inspector's report (Londonderry), 26 Sept. 1922 ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA
32/1/290),
49 RIC Bi-monthly report, 16 May 1922 (Miistry of Home Affairs files, PRONI, HA5/152),
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between pro-and anti-Treaty units around Dungannon when elements
of NO.1 Brigade declared their loyalty to their former Divisional O/C,
Charlie Daly.50
Once again however it was the reaction of the Specials that proved
decisive. When the onslaught began it was relentless as the following
IRA reports makes clear: 'The morale of the population in the greater
part of co. Tyone and in the overwhelmingly Protestant areas in Co.
Derr is not good, Since the burnings and murders became general
several familes have been living in terror. Many don't go to bed at
night fearing they may be burned out under cover of curfew. Familes
whose homes have been burned depend for shelter on their more
fortunate Catholic neighbours or have fled to the Free State, while
several young men have gone to England and Scotland.' 51 On 6 May
two Catholics, John Carolan, a school-teacher, and his nephew Denis
Gilmartin, were dragged from their home by a party of armed men and
shot dead in the street; their bodies were later found dumped in a
flaxhole.52 Five days later on 11 May a gang of masked men entered
the home of James McKeown in Magherafelt and directed all male
members of the family down stairs. Three of McKeown's sons were
shot repeatedly before the gang fled. 
53 On 19 May the murder gang
struck again after the IRA burned a mil near Desertmartin. John
50 2nd Northern Division report, 10 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77),
51 2nd Norther Division report, 26 June 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD,P7/B/77).
52 RIC Bi-monthly report, 16 May 1922 (Miistry of Home Affairs files, PRONI, HA5/152). Belfast
Telegraph, 7 May 1922,
53 Ibid" Belfast Telegraph, 11 May 1922,
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Higgins, his son Frank, Henry McGeehan and James McGeehan were
all taken from their home and shot dead in the road, James
McGeehan's death was particularly embarrassing for the Unionist
authorities as he was an American citizen on holiday visiting his
family in the area. 
54
The offensive did little but to further increase the hatred between the
unionist and nationalist communities. As in the spring of 1921
violence and confrontation came to areas which had previously lived
harmoniously: 'In the Maghera district of Co. Derry a large number of
Protestants were in the habit of cutting turf at G1enshane Mountain (a
Catholic District) but this season only a few ventured to come near the
terrtory.' 55 This sense of fear was increased when the IRA took the
opportunity offered by the offensive to deal with its enemies in the
Catholic community. For example on 3 May the AOH hall in
Coalis1and was burned down and three days later a Jewish man,
Israel Sagarsky, was found dead with a label tied to his wrst reading
'Convicted Spy'. Sagarsky, a native of Manchester, was said to have
bragged that he was a 'Secret Service' agent although it appears
unlikely he had any connection with the security forces and may have
had mental health problems.56
54 Irish 
News, 22 May 1922; Derry Standard, 22 May 1922.
55 2nd Norther Division report, 26 June1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77),
56 'Report on deaths in Norther Ireland Nov, 1921-July 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI,
HA5/219), See also RIe Bi-monthly report, 16 May 1922 (Miistry of Home Affairs files, PRONI,
HA5/152),
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The intense pressures on the isolated 2nd Northern Division meant
that by the time the 3rd Northern offensive had got underway in late-
May the IRA in the west of the six counties had already virtually
collapsed. By the end of June the Division reported that all IRA
activities, both pro-and anti-Treaty, had ceased. A report from No2
Brigade pronounced vaguely and desperately: 'The Brigade is not
working properly.' 57 Many of the Volunteers chose to flee west over
the border and join up with the Lehane and Daly in Donegal adding
even further confusion to the increasingly tense situation in the
county.
While the offensive in the west of the six counties began to flag, and
its Volunteers were either arrested or fled west into Donegal, the 3rd
Northern Division began their operations on the amended start date.
The bold idea of Seamus Woods to attack Musgrave Street Barracks,
which had caused such confusion earlier in the month, was attempted
in the early hours of 18 May. The aim of the attack was to steal eight
Lancia cars and four armoured cars along with other weaponry for use
in the coming offensive.58 In preparation for the attack IRA drivers had
been sent over the border into Monaghan to learn how to operate the
vehicles.59 The IRA raiding party was led by Woods and McCorley in
person and consisted of twenty-one offcers from the Belfast City
Guard, the brigade's new Active Servce Unit.
57 2nd Northern Division report, 26 June 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77),
58 Joe Murray statement (BMH, NA, WS 412),
59 Thomas Fitzpatrick statement (BMH, NA, WS 395),
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Earlier the previous evening Woods led the iuen into a school across
from the barracks and hid there until 3.35am in order to avoid the
curfew. A sympathetic RIC offcer let them into the barracks through
the rear of the building. Woods split his men up into two parties. The
first, which he commanded himself, proceeded to the aims room
where an RIC Sergeant was captured whilst the second, under
McCorley broke into the guardroom where two Constables, Collns and
McKeon, were stationed. The careful planning of Woods however
would be compromised by the brutality of McCorley:
'The first party under CoL. Comdt, MacCor1ey succeeded in
disarming Const, Collns; Special Const, McKeon who is 6'2" in
height tried to drmv his revolver but CoL. Comdt. MacCorley got
into grips with him and beat him on the head with his revolver
causing terrible loss of blood. When Const. Collns saw this he
screEtmed Etnd Ett once the whole area was awakelîed~ ~ ~ Th_e
second party in the Arms Room had the Sergt. bound up and
were prepflTing to tie the rifes in bundles of sLx and put
revolvers into sacks. I ,,¡¡¡as at this time trying to get the
armoured cars and Lancias ready for travellng. \7lhen the firing
started Special Const. McKeon tried to draw an Auto from his
pocket and run but CoL. Comdt. MacCorley dropped him.
,.,...LL':'
Collns also tried to draw an Auto and run but Capt, Murray
dropped him- fatally wounding him.' 60
McCorley had been hit in the crossfire and with the garrison now
alerted Woods decided to cut his losses and flee with his men after
failng to capture any of the intended weapons.
The reaction of the Specials to the attack was predictably brutaL.
Woods and his party fled to the Lower Falls area arriving around
3,55am. He later reported: '".the area was flooded with Lancia and
Armoured cars filled v.rith Specials, They swept the streets with
machine gun fire and for three quarters of an hour the area was a
regular battlefield... The whole Loyalist population is at a loss to know
how such a raid could be attempted during curfew hours... They are
in a state of panic.' 61 It was the Catholic population of the city
however who would experience real panic \vith twenty-two people
being kiled over the next two days. From the start of the offensive
until the end of June the city would be engulfed in brutal mob
violence leaving 82 people dead (52 of whom were Catholics) and
numerous buildings damaged or destroyed by fire. The members of
the Belfast Cirý Guard were responsible for the arson campaign,
carrying out attacks on unionist businesses and symbolic targets
such as Orange lodges and the ancestral homes of Ulster's elite.
Warehouses, factories, m.ils, corporation buildings and stores,
tramway depots, distiHeries and railway goods yards were all targeted
60 Woods to Mulcahy, 19 May 1922 (Mulcahy papers, P7a/173),
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in the attacks.62 These activities were matched by those of the loyalist
mobs who continued to use fire to purge mixed areas of Catholic
families.
Despite the failure of the attack on Musgrave Street Barracks the 3rd
Northem began widespread operations on the following day although
co-ordination between Divisions was again the biggest problem.
Woods later reported: 'Each Brigade made a good start and the men
were in great spirits anxious to go ahead, but in a few days the enemy
forces began to pour into our area as no other Divisions were making
a move. Things became so bad in No.3 (East Down) Brigade where-
lorry loads of Specials were coming from Newr (4th Northern
Divisional area) that on the 24th May the Divisional V / C (Vice-
Commandant) went and saw the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff said
he would order out the 4th Northern immediately; we kept the men in
NO.3 (Brigade) under arms in the hope of the enemy having to bring
back their Specials to Newr.' 63
Indeed despite their detailed preparations the 4th Northern Division
had failed to act, The men had planned a co-ordinated strike on
Monday 22 May and were assembled in large well-equipped columns
throughout Armagh and South Down. However Aiken had a last-
minute change of heart and only hours before the planned operations
61 Ibid,
62 Joe Murray statement (BMH, NA, WS 412),
63 Woods to Mulcahy, 27 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, P7/B/77),
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were set to start sent orders cancellng the offensive in his Division,
John Cosgrave, the leader of one of these columns, stated that he and
his men were waiting in their assembly areas to move out on 22 May
when the countermanding order arrived just before noon.64
Patrick Casey, OjC of the South Down Brigade, was bemused by the
last-minute cancellation:
'I returned to Dunda1k that evening as directed and I saw Frank
Aiken, I asked him what was the position and he replied that
our Division was taking no part in the rising, but that there was
no cancellation so far as the remainder of the Northern counties
were concerned. He gave as his reason the fact that the Armagh
Brigade was not fully equipped and for that reason he felt
justified in withdrawing his Division from action. I pointed out
that the South Down Brigade was fully armed and that we
should be permitted to take our part, He was, however,
adamant and his orders were paramount. I told him also that
our failure (Armagh and South Down) would mean, if nothing
else, increased concentration of enemy forces in the other
northern counties, but this aspect of things did not appear to
interest him. On the following morning the rising in the rest of
the Six County area did take place and was quickly suppressed
with considerable loss of life and arms on our part. I could never
understand Aiken's real motive in not fighting his Division on
64 John Cosgrave statement (BMH, NA, WS 605),
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this important occasion. He remained in Dunda1k barracks
inactive and remote from his command and so petered out this
latest, and maybe the last, rising in the Ulster area,' 65
With the Northern government's introduction of internment on the
same evening that Aiken called off the operations the Specials were
able to pour into Armagh and South Down unopposed, making
numerous arrests of the inactive members of the IRA columns. Other
IRA units managed to flee south over the border where they set up a
number of camps in Monaghan and Louth, One of the main bases was
at Dungoo1ey in North Louth. From here around 150 full-time IRA
men would launch raids into South Armagh or attend weapons
training in Dunda1k: 'The objective aimed at in all this intensive
training was to turn out soldiers as well trained in the miltary sense
and fitter in the physical sense than the British Forces we hoped to
meet in the North,' 66 In Dungoo1ey a special column of fifty men was
organised, each member was fully equipped with a revolver and rifle
and as John Grant, one of its members claims, better equipped than
their British opponents over the border. 
67
Although the offensive had been cancelled these columns were
detailed to move into South Armagh and South Down to protect the
Catholic population. This defensive operation also involved once again
65 Patrick Casey statement (BMH, NA, WS 1148),
66 John Grant statement (BMH, NA, WS 658),
67Ibid,
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the kidnapping of prominent unionists in the area as hostages.
Numerous such men were taken to Dundalk only to be released by
Dan Hogan in mid-August after his pro-Treaty Division had taken
control of the town.68 Many of the attacks in Armagh were ad-hoc and
opportunistic with small parties of IRA men moving across the border
to await a chance to disarm, kidnap or shoot crown forces. The
attacks were effectively a resumption of the border campaign of early
1922 and similarly characterised as a constant, niggling war of
intimidation and reprisaL.
The 4th Northern Division therefore would only begin its limited
offensive in June, The failure of the IRA in Armagh and South Down to
join the offensive was quickly made up for however by the brutal
nature of these new attacks. The victims included not only the USC
but also members of the Catholic community and above all innocent
Protestant civilans, On 3 June two Newr Volunteers, Eddie O'Hare
and Edward Fullerton, shot dead James Woulfe Flanagan, a Resident
magistrate in the city.69 Two days later a Special Constable, Thomas
Sheridan, was shot dead at Annaghmore, In response the USC closed
all of the bridges crossing the Newr Canal, effectively cutting the
Division in two, and began a series of systematic and brutal raids in
the border areas, Many young Catholic men were forced to cross the
border each evening to sleep, with the poorest making do with barns
or farmer's fields, James McElhaw, an IRA offcer, commented: 'The
68 Ibid.
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whole atmosphere of the time as far as the civilan unionist and the
civilan nationalist was concerned was one of something unpleasant if
not horrible about to take place.' 70 He was right,
On 14 June the bodies of two Catholics, Thomas Craw1ey and Patrick
Creggan, were found on the Lis1ea road, four miles from Cam10ugh.
Both had been shot though the back of the head, A party of 'B'
Specials, some of whom were wearing plain clothes, had abducted
them the evening before from their homes at Derryore. Their bodies
were deliberately placed over two mine holes, which had been dug by
an IRA ambush party a few days previously, The shootings were
obviously a reprisal for the increased presence of IRA columns in the
area although neither Creggan nor Crawley was a member of the IRA,
Creggan's brother Michael, however, was an active local Volunteer. 71
The IRA response to these shootings was savage, It was decided that
an attack should be made on the small village of Altnaveigh, about a
mile from Newr. The vilage was believed to contain the homes of
some of the most miltant 'B' Specials in the area who it was believed
had been responsible for the kiling of Creggan and Crawley, Indeed
Michae1 Creggan had been arrested in the area in September 1920
and it appeared that the local residents had played a part in the
targeting of his brother Patrick.
69 Edward Fullerton statement (BMH, NA, WS 890),
70 James McElhaw statement (BMH, NA, WS 634),
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In the early hours of Saturday 17 June a party of IRA men dressed in
police uniform left their barracks at Dundalk and crossed over the
border into South Armagh. Around 2.40 am a series of raids were
launched on a number of isolated Protestant owned farms in the
Altnaveigh area. During the attacks six Protestants were dragged from
their homes and shot dead. The victims were John Heaslip and his
son Robert, James Gray, James Lockhart and a husband and wife
Thomas and Eliza Crozier. Four other men were also severely
wounded in the attacks, The IRA gang, stil in disguise, would
continue their reign of terror throughout the early hours of the
moming. Attacks were made on the homes of Margaret Reynolds and
her neighbours in Derrore where petrol bombs were thrown
through their windows, Bombs were also rigged to the doors of the
property and set to explode when the occupant fled from the fire
inside. Mercifully both of these devices failed to detonate. Sporadic
gun and bomb attacks were also made at Protestant homes in
Ballymacdermott although no casualties were reported. A local USC
platoon, under District Inspector Greenaway, was also ambushed by
the gang at McGilis public house in Dromintee leaving one of the
Specials dead. Three days later the bodies of two Specials, Wiliam
Mitchell and Samuel Young were found near Keady. They had been
detailed to defend local farms after the Altnaveigh attacks and had
71 RlC Bi-month1y report, 30 June 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONl, HA5/152), See also
Irish News, 15 June 1922.
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cycled into Keady for supplies where by all accounts they were
abducted by the IRA and driven a short distance away to be shot.72
The Altnaveigh attacks caused horror right across Northern Ireland
and in the ranks of the IRA itself, Patrick Casey was outraged by the
attack: 'I remember that my feeling at this reprisal was one of horror
when I heard the details, Nothing could justify this holocaust of
unfortunate Protestants, Neither youth nor age was spared and some
of the kilings took place in the presence of their familes. Writing this,
35 years later, I stil have the view that it was a horrible affair-
nothing could justify such a kiling of unarmed people and I was
surprised at the time that Frank Aiken had planned and authorised
this,' 73 John McCoy, later reflected on the Altnaveigh attacks stating
that they '...should be object lesson to the people of the North who are
led to take offensive action against their fellow countryen who have
a different political outlook or worship at a different church.' 74.
The kilings at Altnaveigh united moderate members of both
communities in grief as James McE1haw recalled:
'The fear inspired by A1tnaveigh and what had gone before was
not confined to anyone party or section of the community. All
were afraid of what was to come next. In neighbouring districts
around Newr, Bessbrook and Altnaveigh area all the male
72 Ibid, See also Irish News, 18 June 1922, Belfast Newsletter, 18 June 1922,
73 Patrick Casey statement (BMH, NA, WS 1 148),
74 John McCoy interview with Emie O'Mal1ey (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, PI 7b/l 16).
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civilian population evacuated their houses at night and slept
out in the fields, This state of affairs soon produced strange bed
fellows for the Nationalists which included Hibernians and
Republicans and the Unionists and Orangemen went together in
many instances for company when sleeping out and promised
each other protection, as for instance, the Unionists promised
their Nationalist friends protection if the Specials come along
and the Nationalists promised vice versa if the IRA arrived on
the scene.' 75
The sectarian character of the attacks in Armagh was an ominous
sign for the future and had already been preceded by similar IRA
actions in Belfast including, once again, attempts to bomb trams filled
with Protestant shipyard workers,76 Joe Murray believed that most of
the attacks were carried out by members of the Catholic mobs who
had joined the IRA during the Truce and whose only motive was
revenge against their enemies in the Protestant population, He was
unhappy about the poor discipline of certain members of the
Volunteers: 'These reprisals were generally unoffcial, there was a
tendency on the part of some of our members to take strong action
against the unionists and against offcial orders. For instance, a party
of nationalists on a reprisal for the sniping of a catholic woman in
York Street, Belfast, carried out a raid on the unionist quarters and
entering a cooperage they lined up the five employees and shot them,
75 lames McElhaw statement (BMH, NA, WS 634),
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Four of the victims of this attack died.' He continued: 'The offcers of
the IRA were now beginning to find some diffculty in maintaining
control of the rank and fie. This only applied to the post-Truce
element of our membership.' 77
With the offensive beginning too early in the west and not at all in
Armagh and South Down it was the 3rd Northern Division that would
have to bear the brunt of the fighting. Woods later reported to
Mulcahy that a fortnight after the attack on Musgrave Street Barracks
'...as nothing was happening in other areas, we found it necessary to
disband the Columns and leave the men in groups of three or more to
move about as best they could, in the hope of re-mobilsing them
when operations became general. After a period of over five weeks the
demoralisation has practically completed its work and the position in
Nos. 2 and 3 Brigades to-day is that the Miltary Organisation is
almost destroyed.' 78 The adjutant of the 3rd Northern Division echoed
this view: 'Owing to increased enemy activity consequent to operations
carried out during month of May, it has been almost impossible to do
anything in No.2 and NO.3 Brigade areas.' 79
The Belfast IRA felt isolated and alone: '... the men see no sign of
receiving any support from any of the other Northern Divisions inside
the Six-County area, and that they can get no guarantee from their
76 Belfast Telegraph, 12 May 1922,
77 Joe Murray statement (BMH, NAI, WS 412),
78 Woods to Mulcahy, 27 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, P7/BI77),
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offcers that these Divisions are going to assist in the future, in order
to withdraw the enemy activity... (This) is having a very serious effect
upon the morale of our troops in these areas.' 80 The failure of the
other Divisions to act he felt meant that '...the enemy were able to
pour in lorries of troops from the neighbouring Divisions, owing to the
latter's inactivity.' Three trainloads of Specials were pouring into
Belfast each day during the offensive and the bright evenings of May
and June made it diffcult for the IRA to travel to different areas to
provide assistance or to get help into Be1fast,81
Outside of Belfast and East Down the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Northern
Division in Antrim suffered a similar fate. Away from the grand
schemes of Collns and Lynch the reality of the combined operations
in May was one of small-scale attacks followed by a brutal backlash
from the Unionist authorities, Antrim was arguably the most diffcult
county in Ireland for the IRA to operate, Its population was nearly
80% Protestant and the small Catholic population of less than 40,000
were heavily concentrated in the Glens in the north of the county. IRA
activity in Antrim had been virtually non-existent until the time of the
May offensive. The focus of events had always been south in Belfast
and it was from there that the Antrim IRA drew its leadership. Thomas
Fitzpatrick and his close colleague Felix McCorley had been placed in
79 3rd Northern Divisional Adjutant to Mulcahy, 7 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77),
80 Ibid.
81 Roger McCorley statement (BMH, NAI, WS 389),
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charge of the brigade in 1921.82 Despite the title 'Brigade' the Antrim
IRA in June 1921 consisted of only 107 members and of these only a
small number were active. With the arrival of the Truce however the
brigade had over doubled in size reaching around 260 members by
August 1921.83
The offensive got under way as planned on 19 May. It was to last for
approximately one week with virtually all of the violence confined to
the first two days, more IRA activity than Antrim had seen over the
previous two years, Operations began with an attack on Martinstown
Barracks which quickly turned into a siege. The IRA column led by
Fitzpatrick drove into the town and broke into the Railway Hotel next
door with another group attacking the barracks directly. The assault
lasted for approximately two hours, from 11pm-1am, although a
combined force of RIC and Specials numbering seven managed to hold
out and send up Verey lights to call for help. Reinforcements soon
arrived from Ballymena, although they were delayed by an attempted
ambush along the way. By the time they arrived the IRA had fled and
the barracks remained intact, 
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The next day saw the most intense period of activity with attacks
launched on Ballycast1e and Cushendall barracks and a large number
of arson attacks and raids on banks and post offces. The telegraph
82 Thomas Fitzpatrick statement (BMH, NAI, WS 395).
83 Divisional Strengths, 27 August 1921, (Mulcahypapers, UCDAD, P7/N23),
84 Belfast Telegraph, 20 May 1922.
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offce, bookstall and stationmaster's offce at Ballymena railway
station were also burned in the early hours of 20 May. Antrim would
also see the largest number of attacks on 'big houses', the great
symbols of unionist authority. On 20 May Crebily castle was burned,
as was the home of Unionist MP Ronald McNeil. On the same night
Shane's Castle, the residence of Lord O'Neil, was also attacked.
Around twenty IRA men entered the watchman's hut and blindfolded
the guard. They then took his keys and removed Lord and Lady O'Neil
and all their servants to the kitchen where they were locked up. One
of the servants was shot and wounded for tryng to resist. The
residence was then burned to the ground,85
Such high profie attacks however were not sustainable. With Specials
now pouring into Antrim the 2nd Brigade began to disintegrate and a
decision was made to dump all arms and to go on the run. A small
number of die-hards held out for a few more days but to all intents
and purposes the offensive in Antrim was over. The attacks would be
paid for a month later on 23 June when three Catholics John Gore,
John Hil and James McAllster, only one of whom was in the IRA,
were shot dead by Specials in Cushendaii.86 Apart from sporadic
attacks in South Armagh and the as yet untried Joint-IRA units in
Donegal, Belfast was the only place in the North where IRA activity
stil remained a threat.
85 File on violence in Antrim (Ministry of Home affairs files, PRONI, HA/5/222 and HA/5/225).
86 FatTell, Armìng the Protestants, p. 163-6,Thomas Fitzpatrick statement (BMH, NAI, WS 395), See
also Felim MacGuil statement (BMH, NA, WS 609).
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The diffculties caused by the enormous rise in the number of
Unionist government forces in east Ulster were added to by the
increasingly extreme tactics of the anti-Treaty IRA in the city. The
forces loyal to GHQ now faced an enemy within who inspired as much
hatred as did their unionist opponents, a view expressed graphically
by one battalion offcer: 'The Executive forces in our area are
composed of men who were court-martialled for drunkenness and
various other offences and put out of the IRA. These men recruited
from the Civilian population several desperados, who are there merely
for the sake of getting a gun for a hold up and serve their own
purposes. Only six IRA men turned to the Executive forces from our
battalion. Some of them admitted they joined the Executive forces for
financial reasons.' 87
The activities of the anti-Treaty IRA would do even further damage to
the already fragile relationship between the Catholic population and
the IRA as noted in a report from the Divisional Adjutant: 'The
operations of the Executive forces have been the cause of trouble to
our troops since their formation. They have been il-timed and carried
out in places which afforded the least danger. The men who were
responsible have shown no consideration whatever for the civil
population, they have destroyed their morale and have turned them
against the IRA in general. The Catholic people in Belfast are not yet
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so far advanced as to be able to distinguish between the Executive
and the Offcial IRA and the present position of the Division we can
not explain it to them, consequently... the majority of the civil
population look upon all as the IRA and condemn all accordingly.' 88
These il-timed activities included an attack on two Specials in the
Milfield area of Belfast on 31 May, one of whom, Andrew Rou1ston,
died later in hospitaL. The brutal reaction to this attack would make
the final day in May one of the worst since the offensive began. Eleven
people were kiled that evening, nine of them Catholics with over fifty
others wounded. The Specials, as Woods later reported, '...ran amok
and shot up practically every Catholic area in the city... This was the
hardest blow the civil population had got and it almost broke their
morale.' 89 Indeed many members of the USC, angry and frustrated,
joined with loyalist mobs in looting and burning Catholic homes and
businesses. Around 10.15pm a group of Specials raided and looted
houses in King Street where three Catholic boys, the oldest of whom
was fourteen, were beaten up and put against a wall in a mock
execution, The Specials, having looted a Catholic pub, then stayed in
the street shooting and drinking into the early hours.9o In Grosvenor
Street, cheering crowds of loyalists burned down a number of Catholic
homes forcing many elderly people to flee to safety in their night-
87 Report from Adjutant, No,2 Battalion, Belfast Brigade, 26 June 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD,
P7/B/77),
88 3rd Northern Divisional Adjutant to Mulcahy, 7 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77).
89 Woods to Mulcahy, 29 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, P7/B/77),
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c1othes.91 Areas around the Lower Falls and Old Lodge Road were
subject to savage attacks by Protestant mobs. At the house of Dr
McSorley in Donegall Pass his housekeeper was covered in petrol and
set on fire after being brutally beaten.92 Over 100 Catholics were
forced to flee the Carrick Hil area, many leaving Belfast overnight for
Glasgow despite the vain attempts of local IRA units to hold off the
attackers.93
Further anti-Treaty IRA attacks occurred in June although their
targeting of Catholic civilans also rose dramatically, Financial gain
appeared to be the prime motive for their activities. Anderson's
feltworks in the Short Strand, a Catholic business, was robbed of
£350 by a gang of armed men. Similarly on the 13 of June the anti-
Treaty IRA burned down the business premises of a Mr. McLardy in
Russell Street causing bitter resentment in the local Catholic
community, many of whom were employed by the company.94 The
Noble stables in Seaforde Street were also burnt down kiling thirteen
horses. The IRA adjutant for the area later reported the effects of this
attack: 'This brutal deed has caused widespread hostilty to our forces
on the part of the Catholic population.' 95 The building had also
90 For these incidents and the differing perspectives of both sides on the violence in June see Belfast
Brigade report, June 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77), 'Incidents-June 1922' (Ministry of
Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/15lB),
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Report from Adjutant, NO.2 Battalion, Belfast Brigade (Mulcay papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77), For
details of the 31 May shootings and subsequent violence see Irish News, 1 June 1922.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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offered cover against loyalist snipers who could now fire right up the
length of Seaforde Street into the heart of the nationalist district,
Protestants also suffered severe attacks. In one instance the cottage of
a Mrs Thompson was raided on 6 June by armed men who demanded
money, When she refused she was dragged out into the street and
beaten up.96 Bank raids and attacks on postmen also rose markedly
and many Catholic businesses were forced to hand over their takings
to IRA gunmen. In response to these attacks the 'official' IRA arrested
some Republican offcers who responded in kind by kidnapping the
vice- 0/ C and Intellgence Offcer of the 1 st Battalion. The Divisional
Adjutant reported: 'This act almost led to bloodshed, as our troops
were forced to take precautionary aggressive measures in the event of
the offcers not being released.' 97
Whether such attacks were indeed the work of the anti-Treaty IRA as
Woods claimed was increasingly unclear and, in the unrelenting
savagery of late May and early June, increasingly irrelevant. The
enormous death toll and increase in the number of savage reprisals
meant that the days of the offensive were numbered although it was
the reaction of the authorities to the assassination of Unionist MP
Wiliam Twaddell on 22 May which would have the most far-reaching
impact. Twaddell was confronted by four men in North Street around
10,30 am after leaving his shop on Lower Garfie1d Street. He was shot
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in the chest and in the back and was finished off with six bullets
whilst lying on the ground.98 As with the assassination of Sir Henry
Wilson in London almost a month later, ironically similarly carried out
by an individual with a wooden leg, the kiling of Twaddell inspired
decisive action from the Unionist government. 99 With parts of the
province now descending into virtual anarchy, and fears increasing
over the apparent political unity in the South with the electoral pact
between Collns and de Valera, the Special Powers Act was brought
into full operation. 
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For the British government in London of far more concern were the
activities of the IRA far to the west in Fermanagh. The county had
remained extremely quiet during the offensive and it appears that the
paralysis which had gripped the border Divisions had put paid to the
possibilty of any concerted IRA attacks in the area. Ironically however
it was here that one of the most dramatic events of the offensive took
place around the small border vilages of Belleek and Pettigo. The
origin of the fighting over the small salient of land on the western side
of Lough Erne was the dramatic collapse of the IRA's 2nd Northern
Division in early May, The constant pressure on the Volunteers in
Tyone and Londonderry led to a decision by those IRA men not yet
96 'Incidents-June 1922' (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/151B).
97 3rd Norther Divisional Adjutant to Mulcahy, 7 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/BI77).
98 Belfast Newsletter, 23 May 1922; fie on Twaddell (Ministry of Home Affairs, PRONI, HA/5/224),
99 Michael Pratley, a Belfast Volunteer, was accused of the murder of Twaddell by a witness who
claims to have seen him escaping although the case was never proven. Seamus Woods was also
charged for the shooting although the case quickly collapsed. See Belfast Telegraph, 27 March 1924;
also see fie on Twaddell (Miistry of Rome Affairs fies, PRONI, HA/5/224).
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interned to head west into Donegal to regroup and seek assistance
from Lehane and Da1y. Many headed for Derry whilst others, mostly
from Tyrone, made their way to the border crossing at Pettigo. Since
the border campaign had started the frontier itself had become
extremely il-defined with border posts largely abandoned and small
parties of IRA and Specials roaming the frontier areas exchanging fire
and insults in acts of threatening bravado. The Unionist government's
decision to finally stamp its authority on its territory after the
shooting of Twaddell led to a reassertion of its territorial
responsibilties, This decision, along with the arrival of large numbers
of six county Volunteers in the area, would lead to a weeklong battle
for the Belleek-Pettigo triangle.
The Tyrone Volunteers who arrived into Pettigo in late May were
welcomed by the local anti-Treaty IRA leader Danny Gallagher who set
them up in the local barracks. Nicho1as Smyth, 0/ C of the newly
arrived Northerners attempted to contact Charlie Daly and made a
visit to meet him at Bundoran, Da1y however had already left on a
tour of Donegal with Sean MacEoin, obviously as part of the wider
planning for the attacks soon to be launched across the border; as
Smyth himself stated: 'I had great hopes they were planning
something big for the Six-Counties.' 101
ioo See T, Towey 'The Reaction of 
the British Government to the 1922 Coli ins-De Valera Pact' Irish
Historical studies, vol. xxii, no. 85, March 1980,
101 Nicholas Smyth statement (BMH, NA, WS 721),
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Life for the Tyrone men in Pettigo was dull and monotonous at first as
they patrolled the streets of the vilage and set about training for some
unspecified future time when they would move back into Northern
Ireland, On Saturday 27 May however this quiet situation changed
dramatically, A large party of Specials, numbering around 100,
crossed Lough Erne in a pleasure steamer The Lady of the Lake and
landed near Belleek. They proceeded to take over Magherameena
Castle as their headquarters only to be attacked by a large IRA patrol.
The Specials decided to retreat back over Lough Erne eventually
landing on Buck Island. The following day a relief column of Specials
attempted a rescue but they were ambushed and forced to pull back
with one casualty. The Specials then began to move on Pettigo whilst
the IRA moved to block all of the bridges crossing from Fermanagh
into the salient. 
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In Pettigo itself the IRA made hasty preparations to resist the attack
as Smyth himself recalls: 'The tension was great. The whole town had
become very quiet and you could hear a pin drop when suddenly a
shot rang out somewhere up the street. This was followed by three or
four more single ones, This seemed to signal, because the whole place
became alive with sound in a few minutes. Bullets were hitting the
wall just over our heads and large lumps of lead were dropping on top
of us. Our rifles were soon too hot to hold and the air was filled with
1021. Cunningham, 'The Struggle for the Belleek-Pettigo Salient, 1922' in Donegal Annual, 34, 1982.
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the smell of cordite. We had 100 rounds of ammunition each and
most of it was gone before the enemy withdrew.' 103
Sporadic gun battles continued around Pettigo throughout the next
twenty-four hours with the Specials eventually retreating, Over the
following few days British Army units began to arrive in large
numbers, On Thursday 1 June a combined force of Specials and
miltary made a concerted effort to take the town but fell back again
under heavy fire from the IRA. A group of Specials in an attempt to
enter the salient from the west moved into Donegal territory at
Waterfoot and shot two local girls in the villages of Lettercan. The 100
strong IRA garrison in Pettigo were by now virtually surrounded and
on Saturday 3 June the final attack came with the British launching a
heavy artilery bombardment on the vilage and a simultaneous
assault along the Belleek road. The British use of artilery proved
decisive with three IRA men dying in the attack. A number of
Provisional Government soldiers, who had moved in to occupy Belleek
Fort, were also shelled out of their position, The Northerners, around
fifty of who were forced to surrender, had little choice but to evacuate
the area and escape into DonegaL. 104
The fifty or so Tyone men who had managed to escape from Pettigo
were picked up by Provisional Government troops and driven to
103 Nicholas Smyth statement (BMH, NA, WS 721),
l04 Ibid, See also joint account of the affair by John Travers, James Scollan, Nicholas Smyth, Denis
Monaghan, Felix McCabe (BMH, NAI, WS 711),
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Donegal town where they occupied the workhouse as a temporary
barracks. After a few weeks they felt ready to go back on the offensive:
'...we made a plan to go back to the north and collect some rifles and
revolvers which had been dumped. It is very diffcult now to visualise
what our intentions really were in going to procure the arms in the
north. Our sympathies were with the republicans in their fight in the
south, but our keenest interest was our own job in the north.' 105
Before they could carry out this scheme however local Provisional
Government troops were ordered to place them under arrest and they
were moved en masse to the intemment camp at Finner.
In purely miltary terms the Belleek- Pettigo incident was the closest
the Northern IRA came to engaging in a pitched battle with regular
British soldiers. In itself, whilst having its dramatic moments, it was
little more than a local skirmish. As Moss Twomey later wrly
observed: 'There were quite a few "invasions" of Fermanagh.' 106 The
incident however was significant for a number of reasons. It was the
first time since the summer of 1920 that the British Army had become
directly involved in the fighting, a fact which led Collns to complain:
'British troops who have hesitated with commendable patience for
many months against savage anti-Catholic mobs in Belfast, have
shown an astonishing readiness to become involved with our troops
on the six-county border line.' 107 Its impact on the British
105 Nicho1as Smyth statement (BMH NA, WS 609),
106 Moss Twomey to O'Donoghue, 10 Sept. 1953 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS 31421),
107 Collins quoted in Phoenix, Northern Nationalism p. 231.
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government was also significant and it increased tensions between
London and Dublin dramatically. Lloyd George wrote to Churchil:
'Our Ulster case is not a good one', warning his colleague to '...keep to
the high ground of the Treaty-the Crown, the Empire. There we are
unassailable. But if you come down from that height and fight in the
swamps of Lough Erne you will be overwhelmed.' 108 Indeed Mossy
Donegan later wrote that the Belleek-Pettigo affair was exactly the
kind of incident that the joint-IRA policy had been set up to
provoke.109 It was the necessary involvement of British troops however
that caused most concem in London.
British frustration had been steadily growing at the excesses of the
Specials and the Northem govemments failure to establish peace in
the province. The Belleek- Pettigo incident seemed to confirm their
fears. Lloyd George complained angrily: 'We have surely done
everyhing that Ulster can possibly expect to ensure its security. Fifty-
seven thousand armed men ought to be equal to the protection of so
small a territory. If they require any more they can get them. It is our
own business as a great Empire to be strictly impartial in our attitude
towards all creeds.' 110
108 Quoted in Hopkinson, Green Against Green p.86, For an insight into the dramatic effects of the
crisis on the relationship between London and Dublin see The Times, 1 June 1922, An indication of the
extent of the pressure on Collns and a contributing factor to the Provisional Governent's subsequent
'peace policy' is obvious in his comments on the need to 'conciliate the Northern Unionists' in the
Irish News, 10 June 1922,
109 Donegan to Lehane, 15 Sept. 1950 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS31423 (6) ),
110 Quoted in Hopkinson, Green Against Green p,86,
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In response to such concerns, and by way of assuaging Collns'
constant demands for a public enquiry into the Belfast violence, the
British Cabinet instructed Stephen Tallents, a leading civil servant
and secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, to investigate the
workings of the Unionist government and the progress of the Second
Craig-Collns pact. On the latter point he concluded shrewdly that the
agreement failed '...because it dealt with minor issues before the
major issues, which really governed them, were decided. The future of
the Provisional Government seemed to be in the balance; the Northern
Govemment was not acknowledged by the Catholic minority in the
Six-Counties; Southern Ireland was unsettled; the Boundary
Commission under Clause 12 of the Treaty loomed, and stil looms
ahead and the organised conspiracy of violence to make the
Govemment of Northem Ireland impossible was intensified in May. In
currents such as these the light anchors of the March Agreement were
soon swept away.' 111 Tallents was also very critical of the 'B' Specials
and particularly of Dawson Bates: 'If I had to choose a precise wish for
immediate fulfiment in Northem Ireland, my first selection would be
the kindly removal of the present Minister of Home Affairs to a less
responsible ministry.' 112 Tallents' arrival in the North however
coincided with the apogee of the IRA offensive and as such occurred at
the worst possible time for a favourable response to the complaints of
the Catholic community. Churchil himself stated: 'The prime and
continuous cause of all the horrors which have taken place in Belfast
i11 Tallents to Masterson-Smyth, 4 July 1922 (PRO, CO/906/30),
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is the organisation of two divisions of the Irish Republican Army in the
Northern Territory and the continuous efforts by extreme partisans in
the South.' 113
The desperate brutality which the offensive had inspired in Belfast
had pushed the British government, as in 1972, to contemplate the
viabilty of the Northern Irish government and as such the Northern
IRA had by a circuitous route and almost in spite of themselves, came
very close to success. Seamus McGovern, the 3rd Northern Divisional
Adjutant, stated that middle-class Protestants were wary over the
excesses of the Specials and fearful that they would be the next
targets of the Orange mob. He also felt that Protestant businessmen
were concerned over the damage that the IRA's arson campaign was
having on the economy. This, he wrote, '...shows up how near we are
to victory provided that the Six County problem is concentrated on by
all concerned.' 114
However this was not to happen and it was the final act of Collns'
aggressive Northern policy, the organising of the assassination of Sir
Henry Wilson, the miltary advisor to the Northern government, in
London on 22 June, that would turn British attention away from the
internal workings of the Unionist government to the chaotic situation
112 Ibid.
11 Quoted in Coogan, Michael Collns p.364.
114 3rd Northern Divisional Adjutant to GHQ, 7 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77).
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south of the border.115 Under immense pressure from London the
Provisional Government ordered its forces to attack the anti-Treaty
IRA headquarters at the Four Courts in Dublin, thus beginning the
Irish Civil War. In the midst of this new conflct the political situation
in the six counties receded into the background. For the Northern IRA
itself what followed would be little short of tragedy.
115 Hopkinson, Green Against Green pp,l12-4, Peter Hart has recently challenged the vies that Collins
was involved in the plot; see P. Hart, 'Michael Collins and the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson', Irish
Historical Studies, xxviii, no,ll 0 (Nov, 1992),
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PART III
DEFEAT
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ARY OF THE NORTH
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Nowhere better was the tragic collapse of the Northern IRA
demonstrated than in Donegal, where the IRB's joint-IRA policy
collapsed in ignominy and brutal recrimination. The events
themselves are extremely confusing, mainly due to the presence of so
many different IRA contingents in the county: Sean Lehane and his
Cork offcers, the local Donegal IRA, refugees from the west of the six
counties and numerous other small parties and individuals from as
far afield as Kerr. All of these groups had come north to fight the
Unionist government although their conflcting loyalties and motives
would cripple the offensive almost before it began. It was the outbreak
of the Civil War that would finally seal its fate.
One of the major problems for the joint-IRA offensive was timing.
Although fundamentally a part of the same scheme as the May
Operations, which saw attacks launched within the six counties itself,
the Donegal part of the plan did not get fully underway until many
weeks later. Mossy Donegan, one of Lehane's key deputies, recalls
that he and his fellow Cork officers only left for Dublin in May. i By the
time operations began in Donegal the 2nd and 3rd Northem Divisions
were already virtually defeated and internment was well underway.
The main reasons for this delay were the ongoing discussions taking
place at the Four Courts between Michael Collns and the Executive
IRA leadership centring around a common policy on the North and an
end to the threat of civil war. These convoluted debates would
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continue right up to the hour of the attack on the Four Courts and
Lehane was forced to travel repeatedly between Donegal and Dublin in
order to obtain the final go-ahead. Lehane himself was a key
participant in these truce discussions. According to Sean MacBride,
his efforts to secure some kind of reconciliation led him to attend the
famous meeting of anti-Treaty leaders with de Va1era, Liam Deasy and
Gibbs Ross at Bea1 na Blath, held ironically only a few days before the
most important advocate of joint-IRA co-operation, Michael Collns,
was kiled at the same location. 
2
The day before the Four Courts was attacked the unified Northern
offensive was stil the great hope to avert confrontation. Moss Twomey
recalls Dick Barrett returning to the Four Courts after midnight and
'...his joyful reaction to the news that the breach was being healed,
and to give a push for full support of Lehane and the others who were
ready to leave'. According to Twomey an agreement was reached that
very night: 'I recalled they (the two Liams) (i.e. Deasy and Mellows)
saying that everyhing would now be fixed up again...! believe that
agreement revolved around a common policy of war on the British in
the Six Counties.' 3 The bombardment of the Four Courts however
would begin only a few hours later. One of the great ironies of this
event was that the huge explosion that destroyed the building was
i Mossy Donegan to Florence O'Donoghue, 27 Aug, 1950 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, M531421),
2 Sean MacBride quoted in McEoin, Survivors, p,257,
3 Moss Twomey to O'Donoghue, 5 July 1952 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS3142l).
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caused, at least in part, by the igniting of lorries filled with mines
preparing to head north to DonegaL. 4
Despite the delays, and the absence of key figures for long periods in
the south, many attacks had already been launched. Indeed the early
signs for the joint-IRA offensive seemed promising as the following
report in The Times for June 1 st makes clear:
'Reports continue to reach the city of the commandeering by
irregular IRA troops in Co. Donegal of food from Unionists, and
refugees from that county are arriving daily...petro1 is reported
to be running short for the LR.A. motors in Donegal, and I hear
that the authorities are considering the question of prohibiting
consignments of petrol leaving the Northern
area.. . Extraordinary rumours reached Derry to-day from
Strabane, describing a Sinn Fein attack on the town. The
position really is that trenches exist on each end of Lifford
Bridge, which forms, the boundary and that police replied to
Sinn Fein fire throughout last night and until 5 o'clock this
morning.' 5
The reporter also showed a keen understanding of the nature of the
forces engaged in these attacks: 'It is understood that at Lifford Bridge
the regular and irregular LR.A. forces are working together.' 6
4 Donegan to Lehane, 15 Aug, 1950 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS31423).
5 The Times, 1 June 1922.
6 Ibid,
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James McE1duff, a 2nd Northern Division offcer, himself took part in
these operations: 'Sean Lehane planned a series of attacks with mines
along the border. I can remember fillng them with the war flour. Sean
Lehane came in then, "are you fit for the border", he said, "I am fit",
said I, "we are attacking Bishmount and will try to push on as far as
Cast1ederg". Me and a chap called Ted Devlin went down to C1ady, but
something went amiss because the column was nearly surrounded
near Derry and we had to retreat again.' 7 Lehane himself later stated:
'We went as ordered and carried out our instructions as far as
possible. There were plenty of incidents to show that, it was for the
offcers concerned, a period of crowded active hostilty.' 8 Mossy
Donegan later complained that he had too few men to make the kind
of dramatic attacks he had envisaged: 'Hit and away activities at posts
on or inside the border, destruction of block Houses, upsetting
communications, such are the types of activities carried on.' 9 The
attacks certainly caused concern for the Unionist authorities. Even as
late as September the RUC at Limavady were reported to '...have
received information from a fairly reliable source... that a secret society
is being formed at present at Moville, the object of same being to send
small parties across the Foy1e to Ulster territory and burn homesteads
of Protestant people'. 
10
7 James McElduff quoted in MacEoin, Survivors, p.180,
8 Lehane to Military Pensions Board, 7 March 1935 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS31340),
9 Donegan to Lehane, 15 Aug, 1950 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS31423).
io County Inspector's report (Londonderry), Sept. 1922 (Ministry of Home Affairs files, PRONI,
HA32/l/290).
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Time however was not on Lehane's side. Even before the Civil War
began tensions in Donegal had been running high and members of
Lehane's forces were constantly harried and arrested by Provisional
Government troops. McE1duff was himself captured at Ballybofey
although as he recalls: We were not held 10ng...Lehane heard about
us in Raphoe, he sent a warning to the Free-State Captain, and we
were released. The Civil War had not yet started.' 11 Similarly Northern
security forces, having finally gained the upper hand in the east of the
six counties, could now turn their attention to their exposed western
borders. As such the majority of the fighting appears to have been
attacks on railways and communications and sniping at miltary posts
across the border. Whilst such attacks fell far short of the virtual
invasion of the North that was for some implicit in the aims of the
offensive it did keep the Northern situation on the boil and
theoretically at least provided a rallying point for the two bitterly
divided wings of the IRA.
The start of the Civil War however changed everyhing. Lehane noted:
'Hitherto our attention and activities had been confined to the
"Border" and the Truce between Beggar's Bush, and the Four Courts.'
12 Indeed he recalled that things had been going well '...until civil war
intervened, after that a good many Republicans took sides with the
National Army and consequently thinned our ranks'.13 He was totally
11 James McElduffin quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p18L.
12 1 sI Norther Division Report, 19 Sept. 1922 (O'Malley papers, UCDAD, P17a63).
13 Lehane to Military Pensions Board, 7 March 1935 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS31340),
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unprepared for the sudden change which came about amongst both
the Provisional Government troops and his own forces. His constant
visits to Dublin had assured him that the war could be avoided, later
stating that '... the expectation of a satisfactory settlement prevented
active organisation.' 14Indeed Lehane and his divisional staff were stil
in the south when the Civil War started and many of the offcers were
arrested by Provisional Government units as they made their way
north.
Even without such setbacks the joint-IRA allance was a difficult
coalition to maintain, made up as it was of southem anti-Treaty
elements and Ulster IRA units from both sides of the border. Lehane
had brought with him a staff of offcers and other Volunteers from
Munster numbering at most one hundred. Added to this were the
remnants of the 2nd Northern Division who had fled west after their
May offensive collapsed to escape internment in the six counties. The
majority of these men appear to have come from the anti-Treaty 1 st
Brigade who joined up with Lehane and Daly at their headquarters in
McGarry's Hotel, Letterkenny. A split in Tyone had led to the
amicable dividing of the remaining arms and equipment between both
IRA sections with the anti-Treaty element under Wiliam Kelly, Archie
McDonnell and John Ogle heading to Donegal to fight with Da1y. is
Training camps were set up for these men at Rockhil and G1enveagh
castle where Peadar O'Donnell amongst others made an appearance.
14 Ibid,
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The joint-IRA forces were completed by a number of local Donegal IRA
men who had remained out of the Provisional Govemment Army.
Facing this heterogeneous force were around two thousand Specials
and RUC based along the border and in East DonegaL. However it was
the large number of Provisional Government troops, numbering
around 2000, under Joe Sweeney who provided the greatest
opposition.
Sweeney's role in the joint-IRA offensive was a curious one. He and his
men, above anyone else, would do most to frustrate the possibilty of
unified action. The reason for this appears to be that Sweeney was not
party to the conspiracy; as he confided to Ernie O'Malley: 'I got no
encouragement from Collns or from GHQ about helping the North.' 16
However, this is not strictly true, as he would later plainly admit:
'Collns sent an emissary to say that he was sending arms to
Donegal, and that they would be handed over to certain
persons-he didn't tell me who they were-who would come with
credentials to my Headquarters. Once we got them we had
fellows working for two days with hammers and chisels doing
away with the serials on the rifles. Eventually I met Charlie
Haughey's father in Greencastle, in the hils above Omagh, and
he presented the credentials. About 400 rifles in all were taken
15 Sean eorr statement (BMH, NA, WS 458),
16 Joe Sweeney interview with Ernie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/97),
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to the Northern Volunteers by Dan McKenna and Johnny
Haughey.' 17
Sweeney certainly appears to have played a major role in equipping
the Northern IRA although it is diffcult to say exactly how much he
knew of Lehane and his Cork offcers. Whatever the truth however the
start of the Civil War would see a full-scale attack by Sweeney's troops
on the joint-IRA positions. 18
Before the attack on the Four Courts the joint-IRA units had control of
large areas of the Donegal border, with contingents at Castlefin,
Lifford, Raphoe, St. Johnstown, Buncrana, Camdonagh and
Carrigans, which became the base for those Volunteers who had fled
west from Tyone and Londonderr and also contained most of the
swapped arms. As one Volunteer from the 2nd Northern Division
stated: 'We had controlled much of Donegal before that, but now the
staters rolled over us and occupied the country. Our old tactics were
no match for them.' 19 On 29 June Provisional Govemment troops
took over Ballymacoo1 House. Buncrana and Carndonagh were also
occupied the following day. Lehane ordered the Joint-IRA garrisons at
Cast1efin and Lifford to retreat to Raphoe in preparation for a large-
scale withdrawal to a new headquarters at G1enveagh castle in the
mountains of West DonegaL. The men from Derry were also withdrawn
17 Sweeney quoted in Griffth and O'Grady, Curious Journey p.275,
18 The mystery of Sweeney's role stil persists. Thiry years later Moss Twomey told Florence
O'Donoghue to contact Sweeney and find out exactly why his men attacked Lehane. See Twomey to
O'Donoghue, 26 Aug, 1952 (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS31421),
19 Neil Gilespie quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p,163,
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from Skeog and St. Johnstown to Inch fort with only five men being
left to guard the post at Carrigans.
Whilst the joint-IRA men moved west into the interior of Donegal, the
0/ C of the 2nd Northern Division Thomas Morrs, later to be appointed
head of the new North-Eastern Command at the Portobello meeting,
declared neutrality and remained with his men at Lifford. This
complex situation was made even worse when Specials threatened to
move on Lifford if the attacks made by Lehane's men on the local
railways did not cease. In what seemed like a final hope for IRA unity
Morris declared his intention to hold the town against any such
offensive from the unionists. Lehane seized on this opportunity and
sent a contingent of his own men to Ballymacoo1 House but Morrs
immediately demanded their withdrawaL. Lehane stated that: 'Despite
his assurance of neutrality he later co-operated with the Staters and
also seduced our men at Ballymacool into joining up with him.' 20 In a
last desperate effort to avoid confrontation with Provisional
Government troops Lehane sent a force under one of his Cork offcers,
Seamus Cotter, over the border to attack the Specials at Strabane and
Clady. He later reported: 'This was moreover decided by the reluctance
of a good many of our forces especially those from the "six Co's" who
formed the majority, to become involved in a fight against the Free
State Forces. Ourselves, also having come North for the sole purpose
20 1 sI Northern Division Report, 19 Sept. 1922 (O'Mal1ey papers, UCDAD, P17a63).
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of fighting the "Specials" wished to do everyhing in our power, even to
the verge of what might appear weakness, to avoid such a calamity.' 21
Such hopes of reconciliation however were quickly dashed as
Provisional Government troops continued their offensive. By 5 July
Joe Sweeney's men had surrounded Cotter's column at Cast1efin. He
immediately issued his demands to Lehane's men: '...Sweeney's terms
were that if we agreed to evacuate all our positions and disband the
garrisons he would allow them (to) retain their arms. Men from the
South would get a "safe conduct" out of Donegal and could take their
arms.' 22 Such an agreement was wholly unacceptable to Lehane and
Da1y and an ambush by their men at Drumkeen on 11 July destroyed
any hope that a local truce could be agreed. Another column of
twenty-five men was sent to Skeog but was captured by Sweeney after
disobeying direct orders to withdraw. In the Skeog attack Lehane
recalled '...the gunners, if any, Sweeney had were unable to work the
guns and he asked for and got British gunners form the British fort at
Dunree'.23 The attack on Skeog and Inch fort was a disaster and half
of the swapped arms were captured by Provisional Govemment troops.
As the possibilty of attacking the North became more remote many
men from the six counties abandoned the struggle altogether further
thinning the ranks of Lehane's Volunteers and helping to redefine the
21 Ibid,
22 Ibid,
23 Ibid,
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conflct as one between pro and anti-Treaty units. Some Northern
Volunteers chose to remain with what was rapidly becoming the local
Republican leadership seemingly out of loyalty to their old 0/ C
Charlie Daly. Others however sided with the Provisional Govemment
and were sent south to train at the Curragh. One such Volunteer
commented: '...it was a case of join the Free State Army or get out of
Ireland altogether. I could not go back to the North, and if I stayed on
in the South I was liable to be interned.' 24 Many of the 2nd Northern
Division men who had joined up with Lehane and Daly were quickly
rounded up in large numbers. The famous ship the Lady Wicklow,
which landed Provisional Government troops in Cork during the Civil
War, was also used for the more unsavoury task of transporting these
captured Northerners to prison in Dublin. One of these prisoners, Neil
Gilespie recalled: 'We lay seven days in the Lady Wicklow, most of it
anchored in Dublin Bay and during that time we did not get a bite to
eat.' 25
There was now no going back and Lehane's new headquarters at
Glenveagh castle was evacuated on 10 August. The eighty strong
garrison, with all of their posts now taken, went out as a flying
column although he soon realised that maintaining such a large force
was impractical: 'After a week it was found impossible to bilet and
feed such a large body of men in such poor districts where they were
24 lames McElduff quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p, 1 8 1.
25 Neil Gilespie quoted in MacEoin, Survivors, p163,
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operating.' 26 The only option was for this large group to split up and it
was divided into three smaller units. Two groups of twenty were sent
to operate in west and north -east Donegal respectively and Lehane
himself led the other forty or so men, which included what remained
of his Cork officers, to South DonegaL. Even this latter group proved
too large and was again divided up, fifteen men were sent to the
south-east of the county but were quickly captured as was another
eight-man section who were rounded up near Ballyshannon.27
After learning of these disasters Lehane received a further blow when
the flying column originally sent to work in West Donegal, after
hearing of the capture of the other groups, ditched their arms and
disbanded.28 The captured men were all six-county Volunteers and
had shown little stomach for what to them was an irrelevant conflct.
Patrick Maguire later stated: 'Those Northem IRA had no interest in
the Civil War, as their concern was the protection of their kith and kin
in the Six Counties and the eventual unity of the country.' 29 Lehane
himself reported frankly: 'It must be admitted that most of the
prisoners, both armed and unarmed didn't show much fight or much
inclination to avoid arrest.' 30
26 1 st Norther Division Report, 19 Sept. 1922 (O'Malley papers, UCDAD, P17a63),
27Ibid,
28Ibid,
29 Patrick Maguire statement (BMH NA, WS 693),
30 1 sI Norther Division Report, 19 Sept. 1922 (O'Malley papers, UCDAD, P17a63).
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The once mighty joint-IRA was by now a shadow of its former self and
consisted of little more than a small group in the north-east under
Da1y and around twenty men with Lehane in the south. These units
were made up almost entirely of Southern Volunteers along with a few
local die-hards loyal to Da1y who Lehane reported '...except for the
destruction of communications is able to do little more than avoid
capture. This with the exception of a small section in the East and a
few scattered riflemen in North Donegal is the only body of men
operating in the Division. It is exceedingly diffcult existing at all. The
population is for the most part hostile and it couldn't be much worse
in the "Six Co's"- and is so poor that supporting a column of any
effective strength is out of the question.' 31 His only pathetic hope was
that 'the B(lackl and T(anl methods of the Free Staters' would help
turn the situation in their favour. 32
Aside from any military failures one of the principal reasons why the
joint-IRA offensive had collapsed so dramatically was due in large part
to the bitter hostilty that Lehane and his southern colleagues inspired
in the local population. One aspect of this virulent opposition was
straightforward political disagreement. Lehane reported in September:
'The Civilan population here is practically 90 per cent Free State.' 33
He added a month later: 'We have left no stone unturned...but the
people don't want a Republic. They want money and ease...'. Such
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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feelings were enhanced by a distinct local hostilty to the presence of
these troublesome strangers and as Lehane reported 'our southern
accents sell us'. He was led to conclude: 'There is not a fighting
chance as the people are out of sympathy with us because we are
strangers...and they have friends they would help in the barracks
rather than us.' 34
The church appeared to be one of the prime instigators of this local
opposition. Lehane would write to Emie O'Malley, the senior IRA
offcer for the region, in October: '...what does GHQ decide on for
dealing with the priests. I had a note from Daly...in which he states
that the confessionals are used for getting information. . . In East
Donegal (where we are at present) the Protestants are by far our best
friends, the reason being I suppose that they are free from church
tyranny.' Medical assistance for his stricken men was also impossible
to find and he was led bleakly report: '... there is no doctor going to
lose his job for me. We set up a sort of hospital first but it was raided
and wrecked and the patients made prisoners and the nurses badly
abused.' 35
This hostilty from the local civilian population was also expressed by
members of the Donegal IRA itself. In the whole county Lehane could
only find seven men who were prepared to join up with his column,
34 Report from 1 sI and 2nd Nortern Division field H,Q" 15 Oct. 1922 (O'Malley papers, UCDAD,
P17a65),
35 Ibid,
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The local units appeared to resent the presence of Lehane and his
offcers and some refused to take their orders or provide them with
any assistance: 'In South Donegal for instance they broke up the best
Coy. we had by arresting the Captain and 18t Lieutenant. The others
absolutely refused to help us or scout for us when we came back; as a
matter of fact, one of them went over to the enemy.' The local IRA were
not only unfriendly but also apparently incompetent as Lehane
reported to O'Malley: 'Last week the last batch of Donegal men I sent
to their native place for protection and in order that they might keep
barracks sniped in West Donegal, were taken two days after I saw
them last. Perhaps they were not to be blamed but what can I do with
them. I cannot keep a column as you see, and when I send them to
the areas they know, they are rounded up always in 2 or 3 days.' 36
The situation had become desperate and Lehane's isolated position led
anti-Treaty GHQ to order Frank Aiken to provide the men in Donegal
with supplies. Liam Lynch wrote to O'Malley on 18 September: 'I hope
you are pressing the OjC, 4th Northern Division to assist the 18t
Northem by letting them have some Arms, ammunition and
supplies... They should also let them have some clothing of which they
appear to have captured a large quantity. I see no reason why they
should not be able to equip and supply the small force now in the 1 st
Northem with anything they require... Therefore it is that I am anxious
that you get a report as to what can be done for them by OjC 4th
36 Ibid,
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Northern.' 37 Aiken, however, did nothing. Moss Twomey later blamed
such failngs on the '...confusion and lack of a general plan, when the
Four Courts were attacked. Aid after that could only be supplied
through 3rd Western Division (Pilkington). I am sure that Liam
(Mellows) did urge Pilkington...to send him (i.e. Lehane) supplies but
they were so full up of their own local war, that, true to tradition, they
were loath to spare supplies or stint themselves.' 38
By October Lehane had decided to dispense with columns and split
his remaining men into small groups travellng only by night. Da1y
went to West Donegal and Lehane moved into the east of the county.
Although it was now obvious that he had suffered a crushing defeat
Lehane felt a duty to remain and fight. He wrote to O'Malley: 'I don't
like the idea of leaving Donegal myself and most of the fellows don't,
but at the same time we are only part of an ary and in my opinion
we are only faking fight here and stealing about from place to place
like criminals. I suppose it is only a matter of time until we are
rounded up or more probably put out of action... I wish those others
from the South were somewhere else also. I honestly don't care to be
responsible for their massacre some fine morning soon.' 39
In November 1922 the anti-Treaty GHQ finally accepted the shambles
of the joint-IRA policy and ordered Lehane and his officers to leave
37 Lynch to O'Malley, 18 Sept. 1922 (O'Malley papers, UCDAD, PI7a63).
38 Twomey to O'Donoghue, 17 July 1922 (O'Donoghue papers, UCDAD, MS3l421),
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DonegaL. The situation had become impossible, especially after Liam
Deasy ordered Mossy Donegan to retum back to Munster. Lehane
wrote a last communication to his second in command Charlie Daly: 'I
have received an order from E.O'Maile (O'Malley) (advising) us to leave
Donegal at once and withdraw our men. I believe our work here is
impossible. We have to steal about here like criminals at night and it
gets on ones nerves.' 40 Daly, however, proved more optimistic than
Lehane and decided to remain with his small band of followers in West
DonegaL.
With the departure of Lehane this group of five or six die-hards was all
that remained of the joint-IRA offensive. Lehane and his officers made
their way south via the midlands eventually arriving back in Munster
where they were captured and imprisoned alongside O'Malley in
Mount joy Gaol. Denis McNells, the former Divisional Engineer of the
1 st Northern Division, became OjC of what was left of the local anti-
Treaty IRA. One of his first duties was to answer criticisms from Frank
Aiken who, after giving no help to the 1st and 2nd Northern Division for
the past seven months, wrote to McNells angrily: '...could you keep
Sweeney's troops occupied...if you only kept his communications cut,
both rail and road or sniped his posts occasionally'.41
39 Report from 1 st and 2nd Northern Division field HQ, 15 Oct. 1922 (O'Malley papers, UCDAD,
P17L65,
40 Lehane to Daly, 10 Nov, 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/86),
41 Aiken to McNellis, 27 Jan, 1923 (Twomey papers, UCDAD, P69/35(268) ).
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The final tragic act of the joint-Army policy came in March 1923 with
the capture and execution of Charlie Daly and three other members of
his column. Seamus McCann later related the story of their capture:
'Charlie and his little party were getting it tough with a large
well equipped army on his taiL. They would only spend one night
in any town1and, it was tough going. They had just arrved in
the townland of Dun10y and were dead beat. They had just lay
down with their boots on when the house was surrounded by a
large force of miltary. Charlie reached for his rifle half asleep.
But before he could do so he received a blow from a rifle butt.' 42
Da1y and six others were taken away and imprisoned in Drumboe
Castle. Three of the men later 'signed out'; Dan Coyle from Falcarragh,
James Donaghy from Dungiven and Jim Lane from Clonakilty, but
Da1y and the others refused. Joe Sweeney, the bane of the joint-Army
operations for so long, would be responsible for the executions. Tom
Heavy, a Mayo IRA man, noted Sweeney's brutal streak when
imprisoned with Peadar O'Donnell who felt certain he too would be
executed: 'It was Joe Sweeney, his old comrade, who would have to do
the job. And he would too. They were like that.' 43
Many years later Sweeney described the events surrounding the
executions:
42 Seamus McCann to O'Donoghue, n,d, (O'Donoghue papers, NU, MS31315).
43 Tom Heavy quoted in MacEoin, Survivors pA5L.
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'When we captured Charlie Da1y, who was O.C. of the
Republicans in my area of Donegal, and I remember there
wasn't a shot fired in this operation...The terrible thing was that
Da1y had to be executed. We had received word from Dublin
that anyone captured carryng arms was to be court- martialled
and sentenced to death. I had to do the job myself, to order a
firing party for the execution, and it was particularly diffcult
because Daly and I had been very friendly when we were
students, and it is an awful thing to kil a man you know in cold
blood, if you're on level terms with him...I wasn't present at the
execution myself, but to make sure there was no foul-up the
firing party were all picked men, and they were told that they
were to put them out of pain as quickly as possib1e...I didn't
agree with it, but they were orders and you had to do it.' 44
The decision to shoot the Republican prisoners was taken after an
ambush at Ballymacaward in West Donegal earlier that month.
Peadar O'Donnelllater claimed that Dan MacGee, a Free State soldier,
made an attempt to rescue Daly but failed.45 The four men who were
executed were ironically not from Donegal, showing perhaps
something of the nature of the unusual coalition that formed the
Northern IRA, and as Da1y's sister would later argue some of the local
hostilty to strangers which had earlier dogged Lehane: 'General Joe
Sweeney, himself a Donegal man, saw to it that they were not from
44 Joe Sweeney quoted in Griffth and O'Grady, Curious Journey p.306.
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that county.' Aside from Charlie Da1y the three others were Dan
Enright and Tim Sullvan, both Kerren like Da1y himself, and Sean
Larkin, 0/ C of the South Derry Brigade from Magherafelt.46
The story of the collapse of the joint-IRA offensive has an air of tragic
inevitability. While hopes of reconciliation between IRA units on both
sides of the Treaty-split remained, unified action in the North was a
viable alternative to civil war. Indeed more than any other issue it
provided a repository for the hopes of those wishing to avert
confrontation in the South. As such the Northern IRA were very much
the glue holding the two sides together. However when they finally
split apart at the end of June 1922 the joint-IRA policy became an
irrelevance overnight. Its passing would destroy not only the idealistic
hopes of those seeking to overcome partition but also the Northern
IRA itself.
45 0' Donnel1, The Gates Flew Open (Cork, 1965) p.160.
46 May D'alaigh quoted in MacEoin, Survivors, p.369,
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CHAPTER EIGHT
NEW POLICIES, NEW ENEMIES
278
Whilst the Northern IRA's May offensive caused enormous destruction
throughout the six counties, such a policy proved impossible to
sustain. The sheer scale of the violence in May and June had pushed
Northern Irish society to breaking point and a resolution to the
conflct, whatever that might be, was almost inevitable. In this
endgame it was the Northem IRA who would emerge as the emphatic
losers leading to what John McCoy called '...the rape of Republicanism
in Northern Ireland'.'1 Indeed their defeat was to prove so total that it
effectively crippled the movement in the North for decades after and
no serious attempt was made to challenge the Northem state again for
the next fifty years.
The outbreak of the Civil War in the South was a bitter blow to the
Northern IRA, transforming the situation almost overnight and
shattering the fragile allance that lay at the heart of the organisation
in the six counties. Conversely for the government of Northern Ireland
the onset of hostilties south of the border was a godsend, effectively
letting them off the hook and ending any chances of British
interference or the re-negotiation of the Govemment of Ireland Act. A
few months after the Civil War began the RUC were happy to report:
'The record of political crime for the past few weeks is practically
niL.. The improvement is undoubtedly largely due to the withdrawal of
militant Shinners to the Free State to join either the regular or
irregular IRA. "Fighting" is a more paying job there than here, and on
i John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492).
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the whole less risky.' 2 James Short, an IRA offcer from Armagh
commented: 'The outbreak of the Civil War had a most demoralising
effect on the outlook of the IRA in the Six Counties area. The Northern
Government were not slow to realise the weakening effect the Civil
War had on the position of the IRA within their area and they applied
the pressure.' 3 One Belfast Volunteer put it more simply: '...they
knew they had won,.4
A hasty withdrawal of Southern support would follow and it was the
Treaty rather than partition that now came to define conflct in
Ireland. In such a situation the Northern IRA appeared as little more
than a curious anachronism. In the words of Joe Murray they became
a 'lost legion'. 5 Desertion by their alles in the twenty-six counties was
added to by opposition from within Northern Ireland itself. A brutal
unionist reaction to the offensive crippled any lingering chance of
success although, perhaps more fundamentally, opposition began to
emerge from within the Catholic minority itself.
The Catholic population of Belfast, after two years of sustained and
brutal violence, of which they had borne the brunt, finally cracked
under the pressure of this new unionist onslaught. The following letter
from Seamus Woods to Richard Mulcahy tells graphically of the severe
collapse in civilan support for the IRA in the city:
2 RUC County Inspectors report, 26 Sept. 1922 ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/1/290),
3 James Short statement (BMH, NA, WS 534),
4 Peter Carleton quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p, 307,
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'For a period of three months previous to our resuming the
offensive, the enemy was running loose murdering and
harassing our people and as the Army was not very active the
people were gradually losing the respect they had for the IRA.
This respect had been won not so much out of sympathy with
our National aspirations... but more on account of the part the
Army had played in defending the minority against organised
attacks by... crown forces. When however, we commenced a
campaign of destruction of enemy property which hit the
authors and promoters of the Pogrom, and was having the effect
of stopping the murder campaign, the sympathy and support of
the people was slowly coming back to us... we kept our
campaign of burning, and in a short time the enemy realised
that they would require to change their tactics. They set about
establishing a series of block- houses throughout our areas, and
selected their men specially with a view to fratemising with the
Catholic population. This policy has met with quiet success as
the people, war- wom and long tired were glad of an opportunity
of peace. Unfortunately however, the anti- Irish element of the
population are taking advantage of the situation, and are giving
all available scraps of information to the enemy. Several of our
dumps have been captured within the last few weeks, and in
practically every case the raiding party went direct to the house.
In many of these raids Company and Battalion papers have
5 Joe Murray statement (BMH, NA, WS 412).
281
been found with the result that many offcers and men are
forced to go on the run necessarily in their own restricted areas.
They find it diffcult to get accommodation with the people now,
and in a particular area seventeen of our best offcers and men
had to sleep in a Refugees home,where they were all captured.' 6
One week later on 27 July Woods reported bleakly that '...practically
all over the Division the Police Barracks are stormed with letters
giving all available information against the IRA and their supporters.
We have captured some such letters and in most cases suggestions
are made to the Police as to how they could best cope with the
situation. In most cases they regret they did not give this information
two years ago.' 7 Seamus McGovem, the Divisional Adjutant, echoed
these views stating that the civilan population were 'only too anxious
to acquiesce' with the authorities. 
8
Such opposition was inspired by a variety of motives. For most a
desire for peace was paramount although others had less noble
motivations. One such, callng himself Mr X, and communicating with
the authorities through the personal column of the Belfast Telegraph,
gave two reasons for his actions, the first was revenge: '...1 have a lot
against them (the IRA) which I want, I will, get my own back for,.9 The
6 Woods to Mulcahy, 20 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77).
7 Woods to Mulcahy, 27 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77).
8 3rd Northern Divisional Adjutant to GHQ, 7 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77),
9 'Offers of 
rewards for information leading to arrest and conviction of wanted persons' ('Secret Series'
fies, PRONI, HA32/l/292),
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second was more prosaic and familar in the poverty-stricken enclaves
of the city: 'I want money bad1y'.1O The hardships, financial and
physical had finally proved too much to bear for many in the Catholic
community. The desperation and personal risks taken by such
individuals were apparent even to themselves and the informant
concluded ominously: '... the IRA could find out where the blessed
devil was, and what he was about, if he was not in hell when they
called'. 
11
Whilst the number of such covert betrayals rose dramatically in the
early summer of 1922, worryingly for the IRA, opposition was also
voiced more openly, demonstrating both the extent of Catholic anger
and the IRA's diminishing coercive powers over its constituency.
Woods described one such incident: 'Recently a number of men were
rounded up and detained in custody. The mother of one of the boys
when bringing him food shouted out in the presence of Crown Forces,
the name of the local 0/ C, and made a tirade against him for
misleading her boy into this movement.' 12 The Catholic Church also
became more vocal in its condemnation and some priests refused to
hear the confessions of Fianna boys or to give absolution to IRA
members. 
13
10 Ibid.
1i Ibid.
12 'Report on situation in No,1 (Belfast) Brigade', 20 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77)
13 Woods to Mulcahy, 27 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77),
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The situation was so bad that the IRA were forced to contemplate
employing desperate measures to stem the flow of information and
regain the acquiescence of the people. Seamus McGovern concluded
that '...were operations started on a general scale throughout the six
counties and a policy of war decided on at present, I'm afraid that we
would be compelled to mete out Capital Punishment amongst the
Catholic Civilan population'.14 Such an aggressive policy however was
felt to be suicidal as Woods observed: 'Without the civil population our
position is hopeless.' is Aside from coercion other solutions were
suggested to win back Catholic support: 'The only hope for anything
like a big organisation is on something like sectarian lines. We could
take advantage of that and work that in connection with the National
movement.' 16 Such an extreme idea involved the virtual instigation of
a civil war in the North and if implemented would have led to an even
greater loss of life than in the previous two years. The very fact that
such a move was under consideration shows up how desperate many
in the Northern IRA leadership were becoming although it is unlikely
that even such extreme measures would have healed the deepening
rift within Northern nationalist circles: 'In the whole Division area
there is a feeling to recognise the Northem Govemment. The National
Spirit amongst the people is practically dead at the moment.' 17
14 3rd Norther Divisional Adjutant to GHQ, 7 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/BI77),
15 Woods memo, 3 Aug, 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/BI79).
16 Ibid,
17 Ibid,
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The familes of some IRA men were abused or boycotted by their
nationalist neighbours, angry at their role they had played in
instigating the violence of the past two years. In one such case John
Shields reported that the wife of one intemed IRA member '...found
that even the local Roman Catholic clergyen, who had once been so
friendly with herself and her husband and family, had now cut adrift
from her and treated her family as outcasts'. 18 Similarly Charles
McG1eenan recalled a meeting he had with an RUC Sergeant while in
gaol: 'He showed me a bundle of papers he had with him which he
said were all complaints levied against me by neighbours of mine who
did not want me back near them.' He did eventually return to his
farm, which he found in a state of disrepair. Ironically the only people
who would help him to fix it up were his unionist neighbours. 
19
With the collapse of IRA control many members of the Catholic
community were also far more prepared to approach the Unionist
authorities for protection. The RUC could report: 'The nationalist
Justices have in most cases resumed their places on the Bench, and
their co-religionists have now no hesitation in making reports to the
Police, and in coming forward to have their grievances dealt with in
the Courts. Four months ago, such was not the case, Northem Courts
being boycotted while S(inn) F(ein) courts were stil secretly held.' 20 In
Newr the police were pleased to report that large numbers of
18 John Shields statement (BMH, NA, WS 534).
19 Charles McGleenan statement (BMH, NA ,WS 829),
20 RUC County Inspectors reports, 28 Sept. 1922 ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/1/290).
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Catholics had attended the police sports day which three months
earlier was unthinkable.21 In Rostrevor, County Down the RUC stated
that a Catholic woman reported a robbery to the IRA '...who referred
her to the R.U.C. stating that the LR.A. police organisation was
broken up'.22 The RUC themselves also appeared happy to foster this
new conciliation and were critical of extreme elements in the unionist
community tryng to upset the new peace: 'Now that the LR.A. have
ceased operations and the people are disposed to settle down, it is
deplorable that attempts are thus made to stir up sectarian strife. I
am of the opinion this is being done in pursuance of a concerted
scheme by persons in high quarters to serve their own selfish ends,
and they use low class Unionists as their instruments.' 23
Inevitably with the loss of Catholic support the morale of the Northern
IRA itself also began to plummet. As Woods confided to Mulcahy: 'In
No. 2 and NO.3 Brigade Areas ¡i.e. Antrim and East Down) the position
is if anything worse but with the difference that the loss of morale
commenced not in the people but in our own troops.' 24 In Belfast
itself the situation was little different: 'The men are in a state of
practical starvation and are continually making applications for
transfer to Dublin to join the "Regular Army"... Under the present
circumstances it would be impossible to keep our miltary
21 Ibid,
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 3rd Norther Divisional Adjutant to GHQ, 7 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77).
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Organisation alive and intact, as the morale of the men is going down
day by day and the spirit of the people is practically dead.' 25
It was the Unionist authorities who would be the prime beneficiaries
of the breakdown in IRA relations with the Catholic community.
Intemment without trial, the cornerstone of the Civil Authorities
(Special Powers) Act, enacted on 7 April 1922, was introduced in full
after the assassination of Twaddell in late May and would prove
extremely successful in quellng IRA activity. Unlike the similar
experiment of the 1970s, the suspects arrested were, with few
exceptions, all active IRA and Sinn Fein members. This success was
due not only to the increased flow of information from within the
nationalist community but also to the IRA's rather woeful intemal
security, typified by the capture of huge numbers of documents in the
raid on St. Mary's Hall in March. The Northem govemments brutal
and methodical use of internment goes a long way to explaining why
the chaotic situation of May and June was so quickly brought to an
end. As an RUC report made clear: '...in Belfast the spectacle of the
floating intemment palace before their vision acts as a waming to
Sinn Feiners to curb their enthusiasm for their evil activities'.26
Round-ups and mass sweeps of rural areas began only a matter of
hours after the shooting of Twaddell on 22 May. Over three hundred
were taken in the first two days, only twelve of who were Protestants.
25 Woods to Mulcahy, 20 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77).
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In Tyone Nicho1as Smyth states that around half of all IRA members
were arrested.27 Three camps were set up to imprison the internees:
Derry Gaol, Larne Workhouse and the Argenta prison ship. Internees
began to arrive on the Argenta from 20 June, the last of them being
released in January 1924, when the final 101 men were moved to
Larne Internment camp. Ironically Seamus Woods himself was the last
prisoner to leave the ship. The Larne camp itself was occupied from 20
September 1922 when 68 men were transferred there from the
Argenta. It finally closed on 23 December 1924 when the last internee
was released.28
The conditions of the three camps were by all accounts dreadfuL.
Father John Hassan gave a vivid account of the state of the prison
ship: 'This floating house of fith and misery is called by the splendid
name of the Argenta. Probably nothing so vile could be found, even in
Turkey, at the present day. The unfortunate prisoners are huddled
together in sections of forty like cattle in a pen. The food is execrable,
and has to be eaten off the floor. The lavatory accommodations consist
of a few buckets placed openly at the end of the apartment.' 29 An IRA
circular from Conor Lacey, the Director of Medical Services in Dublin,
stated that '...conditions in these (camps) are even worse than in other
Irish prisons... men have been manacled in unsanitary cells...in some
26 RIC Bi-monthly report, 30 June 1922 (Miistr of Home Afairs files, PRONI, HA5/152),
27 Nicholas Smyth statement (BMH, NA, WS 721), For details of the arrests throughout the six
countries see D, Kleinicher, Republican Internment and the Prison Ship Argenta, 1922 (Dublin, 2001)
pp.24-40,
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cases to the wall of the cell for days... (and) cruelly beaten and
maltreated by their jailers'.3o He went on to claim: 'Promiscuous firing
into cells containing prisoners has been indulged in by jail guards.
Many prisoners were wounded in this way, some fatally.' 31 Patrick
McCallen, an internee from Omagh, would later write to his wife:
'... the Specials are a bad lot entirely and wouldn't ask better than
doing some of us in'.32
Despite the harsh conditions, for some IRA men intemment proved to
be something of a relief and an escape from years of extreme poverty
and unemployment. The Governor of Derry Gaol reported: 'Candidly
speaking, the food was really appreciated by the poorer class and I
heard an intemee remark on one occasion he didn't care how long he
was kept in goal where food was good and plentiful and where one was
always sure of a bed and the question of employment needn't be
considered.' 33
For the majority of intemees however vigorous resistance and escape
were the only options. Under the energetic command of the O/C of the
Argenta Intemees, James Maynes, an IRA offcer from Cookstown,
numerous attempts were made to smuggle arms and escape materials
28 'Reports on internents during 1922-24' ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/1/46), Between 22
May 1922 and 31 December 1924 a total of 728 people were intered in the various camps,
29 Kenna, Facts and Figures of the Belfast Pogrom p,97,
30 Captured IRA circular by Conor Lacey, Director of Medical Services, IRA HQ Dublin ('Secret
Series' files, PRONI, HA/32/1/120).
31 Ibid,
32 'Documents found on interee Patrick McCrossan' ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/l/77)
33 'Reports on internents during 1922-24' ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/l/46),
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aboard the ship. Priests were used to pass messages to the outside
and the Governor of the Argenta expressed constant fears that the
ship was about to be attacked. Indeed evidence exists to suggest that
such fears were justified and plans were being laid by the IRA to blow
the Argenta out of the water. Internee Patrick McCrossan was found
with a letter on 24 August callng for large quantities of war flour
adding '...we are putting her in the air...it is very important and it is
offcial.. for christ's sake don't forget this is no joke...'. 34 Even after
the internees were removed the Northern authorities stil feared that
the Argenta would be destroyed by the IRA in an act of symbolic
revenge. Despite such resistance however the fact remains that no
internees ever escaped from either Larne or the Argenta and no attack
on the ship was ever seriously attempted. 
35
Whilst escape proved impossible, and direct attacks unrealistic, the
IRA resorted to its traditional method of resistance, the hunger strike.
By October 1922, 229 men had joined the protest (123 in Belfast
Prison, 69 in Larne Workhouse and 27 in Derry Gaol). However, less
than two weeks later only one internee was stil refusing food although
he too gave up after seventeen days.36 A second wave of strikes would
not be attempted again until October 1923 when 131 men refused
food on the Argenta, later being removed en masse to Belfast prison.
34 'Documents found on interee Patrick McCrossan' ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/l177). See
also Belfast Newsletter, 15 Sept. 1922,35 The numerous ingenious attempts to escape from the internent camps are dealt with in detail in D.
Kleinrichert, Republican Internment and the Prison Ship Argenta, 1922 pp, 162-7,
36 'Reports on internents during 1922-24' ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA/32/1/46),
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They were joined by sixty-five others in Lame although ominously for
IRA solidarity over one hundred others refused to take part and the
strike quickly fizzled out.37
The failure of unified resistance and the deprivations of internment led
many to look to their own personal salvation. In return for signing a
declaration to recognise the Northem Irish govemment, and in some
cases accepting movement restrictions and periodic reporting to the
police, internees could secure immediate freedom. As with Republican
prisoners in the South the taking of terms from the Northern
govemment would be a constant cause of conflct. As early as 29 July
the OjC of the internees wrote to Mulcahy: 'I personally together with
a few of my officers would be glad if we could have from you some
indication of the policy we are expected to adopt. I have reason to
believe that the lead given by myself and my offcers will be suffcient
for the majority of the men and your suggestion will be treated
absolutely in confidence and as unoffciaL.. I would suggest you wire
to M.O'Kane SS Argenta, Belfast Lough "Nora getting worse case
hopeless" to indicate we are to recognise the authority of Craig & Co.
or "Nora slightly better, wait for letter" will tell us to hold on as we
are.' 38 Mulcahy's reply was immediate and uncompromising: 'Glad
able to say Nora slightly better wait for letter.' 39
37 Ibid.
38 O/C Interees to Mulcahy, 29 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/78).
39 Mulcahy to OIC Internees, 1 Aug, 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/78).
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The IRA internees were allowed to take terms only if they had
dependant familes or health problems. Such releases were viewed as
useful in 'keeping up the aims and traditions of Sinn Fein' in the six
counties although few would ever engage in overt political activity
again after re1ease.4o As a government report later made clear: 'The
great majority of the released intemees are living in Northem Ireland,
and with hardly an exception are reported by the Police to be behaving
peaceably and making no attempt to revive ilegal organisations.' 41
Those internees who contemplated defying the orders of their offcers
and the Dublin leadership by accepting terms were ostracised by their
fellow prisoners. D.P. Moore, an IRA medical offcer from Downpatrick,
wrote in August 1922: 'If I ever have to give an understanding or take
on oath, I will do so as a free man and not as the price of freedom. A
few weaklings did appeaL.. What was their fate? It is now more than
three weeks ago. Instead of being asked to give an undertaking they
were put through a regular inquisition. They are stil here. They
remain in their cage all day as none of the other men will speak to
them or have anything to do with them.' 42
However, in reality such hard-line declarations rang increasingly
hollow. Indeed terms were not unpalatable to those IRA men who had
gone on the run to avoid internment, A USC report stated: '..,since the
40 'Reports on internents during 1922-24' ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/46),
41 Ibid,
42 'Documents found on interee Patrick McCrossan' ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/l177).
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month of July 1922 I have had various visits from people who had
relations on the run in the Free State, asking if they would be allowed
to return and if they would be free from molestation.' 43 Even the
Northern authorities themselves, not noted for their belief in the
possibilty of IRA redemption, believed that '...a great many of the
intemees would have agreed to the terms of release offered but were
afraid of the hostile attitude of certain sections of the public, in
agreeing to take terms from a Government hostile to Sinn Fein
Policy'.44 However, when the final internees gained their freedom in
1924 public acclaim was notable by its absence even to the Unionist
authorities: 'The release of internees has had very little effect on the
people generally. The intemees in some cases have been disappointed
at the reception they received on release, and generally very little
notice is being taken of the persons released.' 45 Seamus McGovem
admitted on his return to Belfast: 'There is no sympathy for anyone,
only the cold shoulder.' 46 The cheering crowds who had greeted the
internees released from Ballykin1ar camp in December 1921 had gone
and most often men would retum to anonymity and the harsh
realities of unemployment and constant police surveilance.
With the waning of the Northern IRA its leadership also appears to
have began to lose its authority and control over rank and fie
43 USC report, 9 Nov, 1922 ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/306),
44 'Londondery Prison Advisory Committee report', 13 Feb. 1925 ('Secret Series' files, PRONI,
HA/32/1/46).
45 Wickham report, 24 Nov, 1924 ('Secret Series' files, HA32/1/46).
46 'File on James Heron' (Ministry of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA5/2167).
293
Volunteers. This was noted in Derry Gaol where it was reported that
as the IRA leadership '... were not recognised by the prison authorities
their influence gradually began to decline and eventually ceased
altogether'.47 Division between the intemees would also emerge over
the Treaty issue especially in the Larne camp. Peter Carleton, a
Belfast Fianna member, recalled: 'Before we were arrested we had
been warned by our Battalion Commandant that there was trouble
among the prisoners themselves. If we found ourselves there, not to
take part in this trouble. We were very surprised to hear that there
could be dissension among our own men, but there was...,.48 John
Shields, an internee on the Argenta, himself witnessed these violent
divisions between the prisoners:
'Many of the men had taken sides for or against the Treaty, and
differences of opinion and disputes on this question caused
bitter arguments. This bitterness was much increased and
renewed by the arrval of these Civil War participants from both
sides amongst us. These men, immediately on their arrival on
the boat, started a bitter vendetta against each other. In fact,
getting together on the boat afforded an opportunity for them for
continuing their previous Civil War fight. To add fuel to this
unfortunate position, these new elements attracted partisans to
47 'Londonder Prison Advisory Committee report', 13 Feb, 1925 ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI,
HA32/1/46)
48 Peter Carleton quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p.306,
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their different sides and many miniature battles royal took place
from time to time.' 49
Although the IRA threat had been dealt a fatal blow by internment the
Northern government refused to relent in its offensive. They persisted
in the belief that the IRA were not defeated but merely holding off in
order to promote an ilusory peace and secure the release of the
internees after which widespread operations would start up again.
Such attitudes go a long way to explaining why the internees were
kept imprisoned long after any real threat had receded. Arthur Solly-
Flood, the Miltary Adviser to the Northern government, was the most
vocal prophet of impending doom continuously warning his colleagues
of the dangers of relaxing their aggressive posture. He wrote in August
1922: 'It would appear from int(ellgence) sources that reorganisation
of enemy units is now well in progress. The quiet situation is in a
great measure due to an organised scheme to get the Northern
Government of Ireland to release the internees, and a great amount of
success is attending their efforts in this direction.' 50 The intellgence
he spoke of was based on a misreading of captured letters written by
Henry McGorm of Derryacash, a member of the 4th Northern
Division, who spoke of his unit's good relations with both sides and
their commitment to neutrality in the rapidly escalating Civil War.51
49 John Shields statement (BMH NA, WS 534).
50 'Report from Military Adviser', 16 Aug, 1922 ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/1/257),
51 Ibid.
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Amongst Solly- Flood's wilder schemes was a plan to create
institutions '.. . for boys and girls on the lines of the Borstal institutions
in England'.52 Such an idea effectively meant the internment of
suspect nationalist children. The Ministry of Home Affairs response to
such ideas was dismissive and scathing: '...it can hardly be seriously
proposed to send children to an institution of the nature indicated
under internment orders'.53 Despite such reasonable attitudes in
unionist circles, the round-ups and arrests stil continued in a manic
and paranoid fashion with suspects being dragged in under the
flmsiest of evidence. One such example was the arrest of Ancient
Order of Hibernians member Thomas McGrory on 20 August after two
Hibernian books were found in his home and mistaken as IRA records
as they used the word 'Division' to describe the structure of the
organisation. 
54
Whilst such skewed perceptions drove the everyday activities of the
security forces the Northern government showed greater insight when
analysing the nature of the opposition they were facing. Despite the
IRB's attempts to conceal the extent of Provisional Government control
over the IRA in the North the authorities were well aware of the reality.
A report from the Ministry of Home Affairs in August stated: 'The Free
State army in Ulster is what we have most to fear... They are neither
Republican nor Free Staters; they are awaiting their time to
52 Solly-Flood to Ministry of Home Affairs, 3 Aug, 1922 ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA/32/1/252),
53 Secretary of 
Ministry of Home Affairs to Solly-Flood, 9 Aug. 1922 ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI,
HA32/1/252),
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attack...'.55 One Belfast Volunteer even admitted under interrogation:
'Yes the 3rd Northern Division is controlled by GHQ Dublin.... We are
under Michae1 Collns... We do not get any pay until we get our
uniform.' 56 For the Northem IRA also it was their relationship with
their Southern alles which was now of most concern,
The combination of the collapse in support from the Catholic
community and the implementation of harsh security measures from
the Northern govemment proved disastrous for the future of the
Northern IRA. As one Volunteer commented: 'North em men could no
longer stay in the North...The IRA there never recovered.' 57 In such a
desperate situation the beleaguered Northern IRA looked for support
from its most ardent supporters in the South although ironically it
was from there that its final defeat would be sealed.
Whilst the South had been instrumental in the creation of the
Northern IRA in the spring of i 921 they would also prove to be the
authors of its destruction. Sean McConvile, a battalion 0/ C from
Armagh, stated that the divisions over the Treaty '...accelerated a
feeling of despair in the IRA in the Northem Counties. We looked to
the South for help and assistance. On our own we were faced with
54 'Raids on Ancient Order ofHibernians premises' ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/1/251).
55 'Report from Miltary Adviser on reorganisation ofIRA units in Northern Ireland' ('Secret Series'
files, PRONI, HA32/1/257),
56 Extact from interrogation ofPatrick Kane, Aug, 1922 ('Secret series' files, PRONI, HA/32/1/257).
57 Tom McNally interview with Ernie O'Malley (O'Mal1ey notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/99),
297
overwhelming odds.' 58 For the Provisional Government in Dublin the
start of the Civil War finally clarified their attitude to the North and
gave practical grounds to those callng for an end to violent opposition
to the Northem Irish government. Thomas Fox stated that after the
Civil War broke out '...the Six-County problem was shelved and
forgotten'. 59 Woods would later wrte scathingly to GHQ: 'Owing to the
position that has arisen in the rest of Ireland I take it the Government
feel that they are not equal to the task of overrding the Treaty
position with regard to Ulster.' 60 A committee of five was set up by the
Provisional Govemment to consider its future strategy and a 'peace
policy' was subsequently adopted offcially in August. This however
was merely the final act in what had been a steady period of Southem
disengagement already underway many months before. As early as 3
June it was decided that a policy of '...peacefu1 obstruction should be
adopted towards the Belfast Government and that no troops from the
twenty-six counties, either those under offcial control or attached to
the Executive, should be permitted to invade the six-county area'.61
Two weeks later on 16 June the South further repudiated its
responsibilty for the Northern minority by its adoption of a new hard-
line policy on Southem aid to Northem refugees concluding that '...it
is the desire of the Ministry to discourage by every means in their
power anything approaching an exodus of the Catholic population in
58 Sean McConvile statement (BMH NA, WS 495).
59 Thomas Fox statement (BMH NA, WS 365).
60 Woods to Mulcahy, 29 Sept. 1922 (NA, S1801/A).
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affected areas... it is essential that the Catholic and national position
should not be weakened beyond the limit of absolute necessity by the
terrorism... which Catholic residents in the affected areas are
subjected. It is therefore, more desirable every point of view that any
necessary relief should be provided in or near the homes of those who
are being deprived of employment...'.62
Help for the refugees from Belfast had been supplied since March by
the Executive IRA leadership in the Four Courts who, under the
influence of their new Chief of Staff Joe McKe1vey had also renewed
the Belfast Boycott. Emie O'Malley later described how the IRA had
commandeered the headquarters of the Orange Order in Dublin,
amongst other buildings, as a temporary shelter for those fleeing the
North. He later wrote of the Ulster refugees: '...they had to depend on
charity; offcially they had not been cared for. Some had a dazed,
hopeless look in their eyes. They carried little bundles; their nerves
had been shattered during the period of waiting, always expecting that
their houses would be attacked by rifle fire and burned by the mob.' 63
John McCoy estimated that as many as 30,000 Northem Catholics
had passed through his base at Dunda1k on their way to Dublin
during 1922.64
61 Minutes of Provisional Government meeting, 3 June 1922 (NA, SI80l/A).
62 Memo on Belfast Refugees, 16 June 1922 quoted in 0' Halloran, Partition and the Limits of Irish
Nationalism p. 132,
63 E, O'Malley, The Singing Flame (Dublin, 1978) p,67,
64 John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492),
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The Provisional Government was also less than keen to provide aid to
the Northem internees. Seamus McGovern wrote to GHQ on 20 July:
'A number of internees on the ship have been offered their freedom if
they give baiL. Some of these are post offce offcials and their jobs are
at stake. They have sent a message to get instructions from Mr
Collns. They are not in the Army but want instructions from M.O'C
(i.e. Collns) so that if they lose their jobs here they can look to him to
fix them up in the Free State.' 65 No such assurances were ever
provided and although a decision was taken to set aside £1,500 for
interned Volunteers in the six counties the money was never made
available. 
66 The Southern leadership, whilst seemingly remaining
committed on the level of dogma and rhetoric, was evasive on any
practical help which they would provide.
On Sunday 9 July Seamus Woods met with Richard Mulcahy in
Dublin to ascertain exactly where the IRA in the six counties stood in
this rapidly changing political situation and to have their '... position
as a unit of the IRA under GHQ defined'.67 His constant visits to GHQ
however led him to suspect that he and his men were being sidelined
and his reception was anything but welcoming: '...for the past number
of weeks I have noticed a marked change in the attitude of some
members of the GHQ staff towards me, particularly the Adjutant
General, the Quartermaster-General and the Director of
65 Seamus McGovern to Adj, Gen" 20 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/l),
66 Blythe 'Memo on north-east Ulster 1922-26' (Blythe papers, UCDAD, P24/554),
67 Woods to Mulcahy, 14 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77).
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Organisation... It was only on Friday last the 15th that I got from
Seamus McGovern...a bit of information which had reached him in
some direct way to the effect that there is some suspicion among
certain offcers of GHQ that I am an irregular.' 68 Woods would later
angrily state: 'The army then... was seemingly a mob under Dick
Mulcahy's control.. .he certainly surrounds himself with "yes" men.' 69
Indeed Woods' relationship with his fellow commanders was often a
rocky one. When Dan Hogan captured Frank Aiken in Dundalk, he
wrote to Mulcahy that '...it was an outrage...He should release Aiken
at once for Dan Hogan is a mutineer'.7o Woods and Hogan later met
again in Dublin and discussed the Dunda1k situation. Woods recalls
the angry encounter: ' "I wish you were there" said Hogan meaning
that he wishes he had been able to take me prisoner...Hogan put his
hand on his gun and drew it and I put my hand on mine.' 71 Luckily
Piaras Beaslai was there to break up the argument. Woods put
Hogan's hostilty down to jealousy over his close relationship with
o 'Duffy.
In order to heal these growing rifts Mulcahy proposed that a joint
meeting of senior Northern IRA offcers and the Dublin leadership
should be held to finally decide the fate of the Northem Volunteers.
On 24 July Mulcahy wrote to Collns suggesting what the agenda of
68 Woods to Mulcahy, 21 Sept. 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/287).
69 Seamus Woods interview with Emie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17bll 07),
70 Ibid.
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such a meeting should be arguing that '...the people (are) on for a
Peace Policy, and for a recognition of the Northem Govemment...our
offcers seem to realise that there is no other policy for the North but a
Peace Policy of some kind, but the situation for peace or war has gone
beyond them, none of them feel that they are able to face the policy of
one kind or the other'.72 His answer to this perceived helplessness was
to provide the Northern IRA with a definite policy to follow although
this was little more than a smoke screen for the severing of all ties
between the IRA in the six counties and the rest of the organisation,
involving as it did, 'Organising our men in the North under a
command co-terminus with the six-county area (and)...p1acing
responsibilty for the actual command on six-county men...'.73 He also
made it clear that the Northerners should be steered away from any
perception that the meeting was a forum within which to air their
grievances, fearful perhaps of an over-emphasis on the vagaries of
Southem support. Considering the enormous responsibilty the South
had in shaping the Northern conflct his message to Collns was one of
breathtaking audacity: 'It is most important to keep the meetings to
the discussion of definite constructive work and future policy, as there
will be a definite tendency to bemoan their position and look for
explanations, etc, as to how they got into it.' 74
71Ibid,
72 Mulcahy to C-in-C, 24 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/BI78),
73 Ibid,
74 'Memo on meeting of six-county officers' (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/BI77).
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The meeting itself was held on 2 August at Portobello Barracks. GHQ
was represented by a high-ranking delegation including the old IRB
triumvirate of Collns, Mulcahy and o 'Duffy. Also present were the
Adjutant-General Geroid O'Sullvan, Quartermaster-General Sean
MacMahon and Diarmuid O'Hegarty, the Director of Organisation. The
Northern IRA representatives were Woods and Roger McCorley for the
3rd Northern Division, Thomas Morris and J. Malln for the 2nd
Northern and J. Casey the vice OjC of the Newr Brigade. The first
decision taken, as outlined before the meeting, was to immediately
cease all IRA operations in the six counties and for the Volunteers to
'...avoid any conflct with Specials or the British Forces in the area... A
Peace Policy essentiaL..', although IRA activity in the North had
already virtually ground to a halt by this time anyway.75 A small
number of offcers were retained and kept in the six counties in order
to organise what was left of the Northern IRA. They were to be paid
out of Old Dail Funds although they achieved very little and many
were quickly arrested by the Unionist authorities. The Belfast City
Guard which Collns had set up in February was disbanded and it
members paid only until 5 August. 
76
The next item on the agenda was '...the re-organisation both of
Divisions and Brigades to make the Northern area co-terminus with
the six-county area,.77 This new North-Eastern Command would
75 Ibid.
76Ibid,
77 Ibid,
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consist of only two Divisions: the 2nd Northern covering Tyone,
Londonderr and Derry City and an expanded and unwieldy 3rd
Northern made up of Antrim, Belfast, Down, Armagh and Fermanagh.
Who exactly was to lead this new command proved to be a matter of
some debate. For the Northern offcers there was only one choice:
'They want that O'Duffy would be the man who would be G.O.C North-
Eastern Command. And in the matter of appointing a man to act
temporarily in charge of the command, in an organising, or any other
capacity, they would not suggest any man...'.78 The Northern
leadership obviously retained some faith in O'Duffy from his days as
Ulster Liaison Officer during the Truce but were wary of any other
candidate. The name of Frank Aiken appears not to have been
mentioned at the meeting despite the fact that he commanded the
only functioning IRA Division in the six counties and was stil
nominally in charge of both the Ulster Council and the joint-IRA
offensive. Eventually the GHQ leadership decided on Thomas Morrs,
the 0/ C of the 2nd Northern Division, who had replaced Charlie Da1y
in March. The appointment of Morris was a shrewd move, as he would
prove himself to be a GHQ loyalist ably demonstrated by his later
activities in DonegaL.
This decision to allow partition to define the command structure of the
Northern IRA, although to some extent bowing to provincial realities,
can only be interpreted as a total Southern disengagement from the
78Ibid,
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North and the end to all but rhetorical attacks on the Northern Irish
government. As Seamus Woods wrote in September: 'The breaking up
of this Organisation is the first step to making Partition permanent.' 79
The later actions of the Dublin leadership would do little to convince
Northern republicans that they had not indeed, in Cahir Healy's
tellng phrase, been '...abandoned to Craig's mercy'.80
For those Northern IRA men not yet interned a decision was taken to
accept 8-900 of them at the Curragh in order that they could be
trained and readied for future action in the north-east. Despite such
claims however the unit would never again operate in the six counties
and it would rapidly become a source of official embarrassment to the
Provisional Govemment. The men were to be drawn from all of the six
counties except for Armagh and Fermanagh. They were placed under
the command of the 0/ C of the Belfast Brigade Roger McCorley and
were unavailable for drafting into the regular army unlike the
thousands of recruits pouring into the Curragh from the rest of
Ireland. Their numbers fell from a high of 628 in November 1922 to
only 233 by January of the following year.8I The unit itself was il-
defined and as far as is known never given an offcial title, being called
variously the 'Northem Volunteer Reserve', the 'Northern Division' or
even more vaguely the '3rd Northern Unit'. Tantalising clues to other
names for the Curragh unit also exist. One captured Volunteer John
79 Woods to Mulcahy, 29 Sept. 1922 (NA, S180l/A),
80 Cahir Healy, 30 Sept. 1922 quoted in Hopkinson, Green against Green p.88.
81 Details of Northem men in the 'Curragh reserve' (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/50),
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Duffy, an offcer in the Belfast Brigade, was captured in the North
after leaving the Curragh on 8 August and under interrogation
claimed that he had recently been appointed as the O/C of a new unit
called the '6th Northem Division'. Whether this referred to the Curragh
men however is diffcult to say.82
The Northem Volunteers who arrved at the Curragh would receive
little sympathy from the Provisional Government Army leadership.
Diarmuid O'Hegarty for one found their presence intolerable, wrting
to Mulcahy that he was,
'...not prepared to recommend that they should be supplied with
rifles, and I am strongly of the opinion that the Divisional
Commander (i.e. Woods) should be compelled, in all matters
relating to the Curragh, to deal through Commandant General
McMahon. These people are suffciently irregular already
without allowing them to add to their irregularities by accepting
communications direct from them in regard to the Curragh. I
am awaiting a decision on Government Policy before suggesting
to you that it will be definitely put to these gentlemen to either
join the Army or go back to their homes.' 83
In a letter of 4 August the Chief of General Staff made it clear that the
Northern men were becoming a nuisance: 'With reference to the
82 Letter from Vol. 'Cewsealey', 6th Northern Division, Free State Ary, Curagh Camp to Patrick
Deery, Falls road, Belfast, intercepted by RUC on 16 Aug, 1922 ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI,
HA3 2/ 1/25 7),
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question of the North- East men who are at present in the A.S.C
barracks in the Curragh, this barracks is in the very centre of the
camp, and it is most desirable that this state of affairs should not
continue. C'mdt Gen. McMahon wants the North Eastem People put
into the Hare Camp, which is on the extreme west side of the Curragh.
This would undoubtedly be much better. In order to relieve Cmdt- Gen
McMahon from the necessity of appearing to do something unpleasant
in relation to these men I promised that we would send an order that
Hare Camp was to be used for these particular men.' 84 Hare Camp
however was in a ramshackle condition and the huts required
numerous repairs before they were habitable.
The men themselves were also in a sorr condition. Mulcahy wrote to
O'Hegarty: 'Curragh men in awful state... I am given to understand
that some of these men who are in the Curragh, are very badly off for
clothing.... The D / Organisation will note that I told Comdt. McCorley
today that Comdt. McMahon would receive instructions today that
authority existed for providing them with underclothing.' 85 The fact
that the above letter was sent in July also raises new uncertainties
about the Provisional Government Army leaderships' motives, as it
clearly demonstrates that the policy decided on at the Portobello
meeting weeks later was merely rubber-stamping decisions which had
already been taken.
83 D/Org, to Minister of Defence, 16 Sept. 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/287).
84 Report on 'Hare Camp for North-Eastern Units', 4 Aug, 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/50),
85 Mulcahy to D/Org, 26 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/78),
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Such views of conspiracy had long been expressed. A 2nd Northern
Division report stated that it became '.. . evident that the objective was
to absorb all the units in the National Army and sever connection with
the Organisation in the six counties. From this time on, a good many
of the officers and quite a number of the men resented what they
termed "this sale" and at once showed antagonism to the
Government'. 86 The Curragh decision and attendant 'peace policy'
had left the Division 'badly split'.87 James Mallon, the Divisional
Intellgence Offcer, was only allowed to join the Free State Army in
March 1923, the reason being that he was '.. .left with the Division
until it was disbanded for the purpose of advising the men and
keeping them out of the Irregular ranks'.88 It seems that one of the
Provisional Government's prime motives in bringing men to the
Curragh was to stop them from siding with the anti-Treaty IRA. One
Volunteer painted the situation as even more murky stating that his
only reason for going to the South after the offensive was that his 0/ C
'.. . 
made it appear that anyone who stayed at home would be shot'. 
89
Such feelings of betrayal and anger amongst the Northem IRA were
widespread and in many senses justified. Felim MacGil, an IRA offcer
from Antrim, returned to the North on a reconnaissance mission in
the autumn of 1922: We found the Republican population in a most
86 'Subject-Position of 2nd Norther Division in 1922' (Thomas Johnson papers, NU, MS17143),
87lbid,
88Ibid,
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depressed mood. The feelings that the South had let the North down
was widespread, and as the Civil War was raging in the South the
prospect of having any further miltary operation in the North seemed
madness.' On 17 August GHQ ordered the OjC of the 2nd Northern
Division to '...make arrangements for the transfer immediately to the
command of Comdt. Sweeney, the posts that you now hold in his
area... You will report at once the number of your men that are in
those Posts, and arrangements will be made to have them brought
forthwith to the Curragh.' 90 The Division's weapons and ammunition
were also to be handed over to Sweeney for 'storage'.
After the Portobello meeting the divisional staff were ordered to leave
the six counties and the remaining men were confined to barracks in
DonegaL. Soon after they were ordered to the Curragh, following an
advance party of forty who had already left. In July a Catholic man,
Dominick Wilson, was dragged from his home near Desertmartin and
shot dead on a nearby railway line. The RUC originally believed that
the attack was carried out by the 'B' Specials although the report
added: 'The crime...is surrounded with mystery and many people are
now inclined to believe that Wilson was executed by the LR.A. as a
deserter because he went to England instead of the Free State when
the Sinn Feiners were called up for training.' 91 A 2nd Northern
Division report later stated: '...our general impression of our
89 Statement of Anthony O'Neil, 6 Dec, 1922 ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/l/307).
90 'Subject-Position of211dNorthern Division in 1922' (Thomas Johnson papers, NU, MS17l43).
91 RUC County Inspectors report, 26 Sept, 1922 ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/290),
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supporters in the North was, and is, that the Treaty created a serious
thorny position for the six counties at first, but the misleading and
uncalled for tactics of those in authority in the first year were
responsible for the wholesale evacuation of the Nationalists...'.92
The anti-Treaty IRA, in a response to a communication from a number
of disgrntled Northern Volunteers after the Civil War, summed up
such feelings of betrayal: 'I expect the reason they kept you in the
Curragh was to keep you from taking part on the IRA side, and the
campaign now over I suppose they will show you the door.' 93 This
assertion proved correct in almost every respect. A number of men
from the 4th Northern Division who had decided to join the Provisional
Government Army after Hogan captured Dundalk were also sent to the
Harepark camp for training. However they felt like many others that
they had been duped. One of these men, Edward Fullerton, recalled:
'...we staged a sort of mutiny and, as a result, we were all placed
under arrest'. 94
Harepark camp itself would, tellngly for some, be used to intern
Republican prisoners in the later stages of the Civil War. Ironically a
number of Northern IRA men from both sides of the Treaty divide were
present at Harepark at the same time. Charles McG1eenan, a
Republican internee, recalled a poignant conversation he had with a
92 'Subject-Position of 
2nd Northem Division in 1922' (Thomas Johnson papers, NU, MS17143),
93 IRA C/S to P.O'hUigin, Adj. Norther Volunteers, Curragh Camp, 30 Nov, 1923 (Twomey papers,
UCDAD, P69/35 (103)),
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fellow Northerner who was acting as his guard in the camp. After
being told by his captor that he had recently seen the Free State
customs huts being put up along the border, McGleenan recalled:
'I said that erecting those huts was recognising the border as it
was then. He said that the Boundary Commission would soon
sit and define the border. I said that when they erected Customs
huts they were recognising the border as it then was- that
would be as far as it would ever go. He, however, maintained
that when the Boundary Commission sits we will get in the
counties of Tyone, Fermanagh, South Armagh and South
Down. I then said: "Wil you resign from the army if "South
Down doesn't get in seeing that you are a 'South Down Man' ?".
His reply was that he would not have that to do and after some
further discussion in which he got a bit heated, he walked away
and left me, and afterwards he never bothered about me
again.' 95
The situation was further clarified with the death of Michael Collns in
August. The conspiratorial nature of Southem control over the IRA in
the six counties meant that Northern Volunteers had little option but
to appeal directly to Collns and his IRB clique for support. With his
death their plans would receive little sympathy from those in the
Provisional Govemment callng for a peace policy who were now very
much in the ascendancy; as Seamus Woods later wrote to Mulcahy
94 Edward Fullerton statement (BMH, NA, WS 890),
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'... the attitude of the present Government towards its followers in the
Six Counties, is not that of the late General Collns'.96 Roger McCorley
confided many years later: 'Wen Collns was kiled the Northern
element gave up all hope.' 97
The death of Collns was a bitter blow made worse by the manner in
which his aggressive Northern policy had been carried out. Typically
he acted virtually alone trusting only a few close colleagues and letting
others know only as much as he felt they needed to know. Although
this gave him huge scope in terms of the nature of his policy, with
little dilution from democratic accountabilty, something that would
have limited his typically fast-moving instinctive approach, it allowed
little chance of a long-term Southem policy being forged. His isolation
from reality meant that he reverted to his usual conspiratorial
methods relying increasingly on a futile and costly miltary solution.
The Northern IRA were a blunt weapon and il suited to an
increasingly sophisticated political situation. Despite Collns'
undoubted importance however it was also obvious that Southern
policy was already changing long before his death. His sudden demise
merely helped to accelerate the process and the Northern IRA lost the
one sympathetic supporter they had in the Provisional Government.
95 Charles McG1eenan statement (BMH NA, WS 829).
96 Woods to Mulcahy, 29 Sept. 1922 (NA, S180l/A).
97 Roger McCorley interview with Ernie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/98),
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As one Volunteer later stated: '...if he were alive things would not have
gone so far '.98
Collns' death and Southern withdrawal from the North to concentrate
on the Civil War meant that the issue of recognising the Unionist
authorities was back on the agenda and became a matter of enormous
debate within nationalist circles. Elements in the Northern IRA found
the policy impractical especially in terms of their approach to the
Northern courts: '...1 want your advice with regard to what attitude
our men should adopt when placed upon triaL. Many of these charges
are false, and in some cases, a successful defence could be put
forward thus leading to the release of useful men...'.99 In October
1922 two meetings were held in Belfast to discuss the issue. At the
first meeting on 1 October Northern nationalist representatives met
with four Southem counterparts from Dublin. A report of the meeting
shows up the wide gulf and hostilty that now existed between
nationalists on either side of the border. The angr attitude of the
Northerners sums up starkly how many nationalists felt about the
hash realities of Southem involvement: 'Strong language was used by
various members, against the men that came from Dublin as to their
action in flying from Belfast when the serious trouble arose, and are
now comfortably situated there in business and jobs at the expense of
their fellow creatures in Belfast, and were they coming again to cause
98 Comments ofIRB member 'Watters', 5 Dec, 1923 (Twomey papers, UCDAD, P69/35 (120) ).
99 Vice OIC, 2nd Northern Division to O'Duff, 29 July 1922 (Mulcahy papers, UCDAD, P7/B/77),
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disruption when a favourable opportunity arose...'. 100 The anti-Treaty
IRA broke up a second meeting on the 4 October although '...the
recognition party were fairly strong and with the assistance of the
Nationalist Party...will be able to overcome the strength of the Anti-
Treatyites with little trouble.' 101
For the Northem IRA the compromise solution at the Curragh did not
last very long especially after the death of Collns. Ernest B1ythe later
reported, 'After a few weeks in the Curragh it became clear that there
was no likelihood of operations again starting up in the Six County
Area and the group began to break up.' 102 Joe Murray explained how
the Curragh plan for the Northern IRA soon began to unravel: '...as
time went on and Belfast remained peaceful, the numbers who left for
the Curragh increased and by the time September came there was
very few of us left in Belfast.' Murray had remained in Belfast and in
October was ordered to close all IRA offces and dismantle the brigade
headquarters in the city after arranging dumps for all the remaining
arms and equipment. 
103 B1ythe himself was one of the prime
architects of the 'peace policy' and Sean MacBride blamed both him
and Cosgrave for undermining Collns' authority, later adding: 'I think
Ernest Blythe was one of the real vilains of that piece.' 104 Indeed
B1ythe had little seeming respect for the Northern IRA men at the
ioo Police reports on IRA and Nationalist meetings ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/l/295),
101 Ibid,
102 Blythe, 'Memo on north-east Ulster 1922-26' (Blythe papers, UCDAD, P24/554).
103 Joe Murray statement (BMH NA, WS 412),
104 Sean MacBride quoted MacEoin, Survivors p,l17,
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Curragh referring to them scornfully as a 'Special "Refugee" unit'. 
105
Nearly three hundred of the men would join the Provisional
Government Army and were posted to various commands around the
country. The rest were allowed to remain in the Curragh until the end
of the Civil War when in B1ythe's words '... they were told to either "join
the Army" or "clear out". 
106
Roger McCorley himself paints a similar if less harsh picture: We
stayed in the Curragh until after Collns was kiled. They held a
meeting there the Divisional O/C's and staffs and we decided that any
man was free to go where he wanted, either to go home or join the
Free State Army.' 107 Some Volunteers however recall that it was
coercion rather than choice which was the major policy of the
leadership. Patrick Maguire, who had been sent south for the sole
purpose of training for later activities back in Ulster as agreed at the
Portobello meeting, recalled: 'Pressure was put on the 2nd Northern
IRA in the camp in co. Kildare to join the National Army... by Tom
Morris. This effort failed generally as only a very small number joined
the Army. The remainder were forced to leave the Curragh. Some to
emigrate to Great Britain or USA. A small number- five or six-were
arrested by the Free State Govemment and intemed in prison camps.
None of those men returned to their homes in Northern Ireland for
105 Blythe, 'Memo on north-east Ulster 1922-26' (Blythe papers, UCDAD, P24/554),
106 Ibid,
107 Roger McCorley interview with Emie O'Mal1ey (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/98),
315
years. Some are there now working at home in the North on their little
farms or in some cases as farm labourers or road workers.' 108
Those who decided to stay and join the Provisional Government Army
were placed under McCorley's command and sent to Kerry, ironically
as far away from the North as it was possible to go in Ireland, in order
to help quell Republican resistance. These Northem IRA men would be
present in Kerry during the period when the worst atrocities of the
Free State Army were being carred out although their implication in
such events is far from clear. Tod Andrews, imprisoned on a trip to
Munster in the spring of 1923, recalls that the atrocities in Kerr were
carried out by '..."tough" men of the Dublin and Northern units who
emulated the methods of Cromwell or the Yeos of 1798'.1°9 The only
thing Roger McCorley would say was that he was '...fed up. I came
back to the Curragh. I wanted to get out of the army or get out of
Kerr.' 110 What was left of the unit was formed into the 17th Battalion
and sent to the Workhouse in Tralee under the command of Joe
Murray.i11
Many of the men decided to retum to the North after the August
ultimatum. After being unceremoniously dumped at Dunda1k they
were forced to walk back to their homes to face either intemment or
police interrogation which led in most cases to restrictions on their
108 Patrick Maguire statement (BMH NA, WS 693).
109 Andrews, Dublin Made Me (Dublin, 1979) p,313.
110 Roger McCorley interview with Emie O'Malley (O'Malley notebooks, UCDAD, P17b/98),
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movements and regular reporting to the authorities.112 One such
Volunteer was Anthony O'Neil, a surface-man on the railways from
Martinstown, County Antrim, who had joined the IRA during the
Truce like so many other young men. O'Neil had taken part in an
abortive attack on the local barracks in May after leaving his job to
stay full-time with the column. The attack had proved to be a disaster
and the men were forced to go immediately on the run: 'After the
attack twenty of us were in the mountains for a fortnight and almost
starved.' 113
Eventually O'Neil came south with a few others and after meeting up
with his brigade 0/ C in Dublin was sent to the Curragh where he
waited, bored and inactive, for the next three months: 'I was sent to
Pearse barracks, there were 28 of us there for two months, and I was
then sent to A.S.C. barracks. There were a lot of Belfast men came
and we driled, we were then changed to Hare Park and were taken
back to Pearse Barracks and kept there til I was discharged.' 114
Bitter and disilusioned O'Neil decided to go back home along with
what was left of his unit. He reported to the local police barracks
where he and his friends admitted they had been foolish to ever join
the IRA and would never again get involved in any political movement.
His Battalion Commandant admitted 'I was fooled and led astray'
III Ibid,
112 RUC District Inspector (Belfast) to Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, 5 Feb, 1923 ('Secret
Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/l/l68). For further examples of the poor treatment of norther recruits in
the Free State Army see file on 'Free State soldiers crossing the border in uniforms' ('Secret Series'
fies, PRONI, HA32/l/168).
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whilst another Volunteer Hugh Carey stated that he had only left
home for fear of what his brigade commander would do to him if he
didn't go to the South.115 O'Neil1's mother also arrived to plead on her
son's behalf. The local RUC Sergeant, Owen Gallagher, later reported
that she was '...a sensible woman and told me how the people were led
astray...I am confident with the exception of a few familes the people
are sound and will give me every assistance... The IRA is dead in this
sub-district...I know the feeling of the people.' 116 Many of these men
would remain under suspicion and constant surveilance for decades
after the conflct. Patrick Maguire had his home raided so often in the
1930s by the RUC and Specials that he decided to emigrate to Dublin
in 1939 never to return. 
117
For many Northern IRA men however returning home meant inevitable
arrest and internment. These hardened Volunteers also felt that
joining the Provisional Government Army was a compromise too far.
One Belfast Republican referred scathingly to his old comrades who
had joined the pro-Treaty side arguing that '...their motivation seemed
to be twenty-four shilings a week and a dyed khaki uniform.' 118
Indeed poverty and unemployment were the main motivating factor for
the thousands of men who went south to join the Provisional
Government Army. Most of the recruits were recorded as 'out of
11 Statement of Anthony O'Neil, 6 Dec,1922 ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/1/307),
114Ibid,
115 File on Hugh Carey (Ministr of Home Affairs fies, PRONI, HA5/ll77),
116 Report from RUC Sergeant Owen Gallagher, 6 Dec, 1922 ('Secret Series' files, PRONI,
HA32/1/307),
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workers' and large numbers rejected due to their poor physical
condition.l19 Between April 1922 and March 1923 over 3000 men
made the journey to Dublin. Of the 1685 who left before December
1922 only 246 would ever retum.120 The Unionist government were on
the whole pleased with this exodus to the South and decided not to
interfere with the work of Provisional Govemment Army recruiting
agents, believing that these men already had doubtful loyalty to the
Northem Irish govemment.121
Those men who were accepted often received shoddy treatment at the
hands of the Provisional Government agents who had offered them a
new life in the South. One Volunteer wrote of his torrid experience in
February 1923:
'I was one of 236 that paid our own fares to Dublin and
marched into the square, formed up again and marched back to
the station and were put into trains for Dublin. We were kept in
the station at Amiens Street under armed guard until 8-15a.m.
the following morning, and the same train took us back to
Dunda1k. Arrived there, we went back to barracks, formed up
on square, were kept fooling about the barracks all that day
until 7 -30pm, when we formed up again, were told nothing,
marched out of barracks, and kept marching for about a mile,
117 Patrick Maguire statement (BMH NA, WS 693).
118 Peter Carleton quoted in MacEoin, Survivors p.306,
119 'Reports on Recruits leaving Norther Ireland to join Irish Free State Ary' ('Secret Series' files,
PRONI, HA32/l/168),
120 Ibid, See also Irish News, 31 Jan, 1923,
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before we found out we had been fooled. Apparently the man in
charge of us was told that when the last section of "fours" had
passed out of the gate, he was to dodge back into barracks and
let us march where we liked. Then we found out our position
and it was too late for a train home, supposing anyone had his
fare. A priest went for an offcer to the jaiL. He wired to the
barracks. A Crossley came down, and an offcer jumped out. We
were formed up and marched back to town. The A.O.H. Hall was
commandeered and a private house also, and we were formed
into two parties, put there for the night, and kept until Monday.
In the meantime more men kept pouring in by every train. They
were kept in the street. Some started tramping home, others
wiring for their fares. We were mostly ex-Servicemen, and
respectable. On Tuesday I left for home. The last news was that
they did not want recruits, and we were left to go home as we
liked.' 122
Many Northern IRA men, either on the run from the Unionist
authorities or disilusioned deserters from the Curragh, joined up with
various Republican units in the South. Tom Heavy joined such a
column under Neil Boy1e (a.k.a. P1unkett) a Donegal IRA man
operating in Wicklow, 'There were about twenty in the Column, which
was a mixture of Northerners, a few from Dublin and a few Wicklow
121 'Reports on Recruits leaving Northern Ireland to join Irish Free State Army' ('Secret Series' files,
PRONI, HA32/1I168).
122 Belfast Evening Telegraph, 1 Feb, 1923,
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fellows.' 123 The men got their arms from Belfast although it was
ironically a Belfast offcer, Felix McCorley, who would brutally pacify
them. Shortly after the column was surrounded in a safe-house at
Vallymount, Boyle went out to talk to McCorley. The events that
followed were horrifying as Heavy later explained: 'Suddenly McCor1ey
raised his revolver and shot P1unkett in the eye, the bullet passing
through his upraised hands. For good measure he shot him again in
the head. He just shot him, I saw it all. It was cold blooded murder.'
124 The rest of the column were quickly captured and Heavy met
McCor1ey again who '...went on with the usual bluster of having us all
shot. As if I cared.' 125
In the six counties itself the anti-Treaty IRA continued to launch
sporadic attacks against the security forces with shootings reported in
Newtownstewart, Dungannon and Aughnacloy. These token attempts
at offensive operations however were derided by the Unionist
authorities as merely '...the work of a few half-hearted isolated
irresponsibles'.126 Indeed, apart from a number of men in Belfast, who
had managed to escape intemment, only Aiken's 4th Northern Division
in Armagh stil retained any cohesion. Despite the collapse of the IRA
in the North, Aiken remained resolutely opposed to both of the new
governments in Ireland. He had pleaded with Northern IRA men to
make a final last stand and ',..not to join the Army of the Government,
123 Tom Heavy quoted in MacEoin, Survivors, p,454,
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
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with that oath in the constitution, no matter what the pay may be, or
that the altematives to joining are starvng or going back to Ulster to
fight at a time that the disordered state of Southern Ireland ensures
failure.' 127
Such idealistic appeals however were largely ignored by the Northern
IRA who had suffered extreme hardships with no noticeable reward.
John Hagan, the OjC of the 3rd Brigade in Armagh, received a letter
from Aiken asking him to appeal for recruits in the county but as a
police report on the incident stated: 'Hagan went to all the "Irregulars"
in Armagh for the purpose of persuading them to go. This appeal,
however met with no response and it is stated that all those Hagan
approached refused to go, or have anything to do with the "Irregulars"
across the border. Some of them said that they would rather suffer
burning or shooting in their own homes rather than go, as they were
'fed up' with the "Irregulars". It is quite evident that Aiken must be
hard pressed for men and must feel sorely disappointed when his
appeal was turned down. The Police were informed that no one left
Armagh to join the "Irregulars".' 128 Hagan himself was later arrested
which he was reported to be 'very glad' about as '...he was in a very
diffcult position owing to the fact that he was drawing pay from IRA
funds and had nothing to show for his money.' 129
126 RUC County Inspectors report (Tyrone) 26 Sept. 1922 ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/290),
127 'Position of the 4th Northern Division from January 1922-17 July 1922' (Thomas Johnson papers,
NU, MS17143),
128 RUC report, 19 February 1923 ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA/32/1/281),
129 Ibid.
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After Aiken's escape from Dundalk, Tod Andrews was sent north by
Ernie O'Malley to meet him in order to discover Aiken's future
intentions. His account of the meeting, in a farm labourer's cottage,
outside of Dunda1k, shows graphically the feeling of despair which
pervaded the leadership of the Northern IRA's only functioning
Division after the outbreak of hostilties in the South:
'He was sitting on the bed and made no attempt to make me
welcome. There was a chair in the room but I wasn't invited to
sit down. He did not ask what I wanted. He looked at me in
what he may have thought was a questioning manner but the
muscles of his face did not appear to move. Finally a grunted
"well?" indicated that discussion should get under way. I
explained the purpose of my visit. He told me as laconically as
possible to go back and tell O'Malley that he intended to attack
and re-capture Dunda1k. I asked-feeling, but I hope not
showing, some scepticism- "When?" "In a few days" was the
reply. The conversation was beginning to resemble a Red Indian
pow-wow. I asked him if I might stay to take part in the
operation. The reply was "Ah, no. You'd better go back to
O'Malley". In a relatively lengthy speech, I shifted the tone of the
conversation from a Red Indian to a Chinese dialogue...he
relented to the extent that I was allowed to stay but only in his
own immediate company. He said I could sleep with him head to
toe and to this I agreed.
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'The elderly woman of the house gave us tea with
homemade bread and butter before we turned in. Aiken never
uttered a word. We rose very early next morning and got more
tea and bread and butter with boiled eggs for breakfast. Stil no
word came from Aiken. After a while he took up a knapsack into
which he had put his shaving kit, socks and change of shirt. He
indicated by signs that we were about to leave and I was
surprised to find a small Ford car with a red headed driver
waiting outside the cottage door. The driver- who was named
Peter Boyle- turned out to be a kind of Man Friday to Aiken. But
beyond a monosyllabic direction to him, Aiken did not speak.'
130
Andrews proceeded with Aiken to take part in the attack on Dundalk
that night leading to the release of hundreds of Republican prisoners
and their replacement by a similar number of Provisional Govemment
troops. The attack finally ended what little chance the 4th Northern
Division had of maintaining a neutral position in the Civil War and
with the death of McKenna in the fighting left Aiken as the principal
focus of Republican discontent in the Division. He would not however
embrace his new role and his participation in the Civil War would be
ha1f- hearted and as enigmatic as ever, His eyes were stil fixed firmly
on the North. Andrews would later write: 'Nobody on either side liked
130 Andrews, Dublin Made Me pp,258-9
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having to take part in the Civil War, but I never met anyone who was
so totally horrified or saddened by it as Aiken.' 131
Due to increasing hostilty from Free State troops, especially after the
reoccupation of Dundalk, Aiken could only make sporadic attacks in
the North and many of these were the accidental result of his escaping
the attentions of the Provisional Government Army. Kevin O'Higgins
would later perceptively sum up the anomalous position of the 4th
Northern Division during a speech in the Dail: 'Mr Frank Aiken
presumably is a Republican...I do not know whether he is a
Republican for thirty-two or twenty-six counties, but what I do know
is that he is very glad of the benevolent protection of the border and of
the Government in North-East, which, presumably, he does not
recognise.' 132
Aiken's position was made even worse by growing co-operation
between the Provisional Government and Northern Irish authorities
both of which exchanged intellgence on his whereabouts and saw him
as a menace to their future stabilty. Ironically Aiken now found it
easier to launch attacks on the South from over the border in Armagh,
a complete reversal of the tactics of the border campaign in the spring
of 1922. Armed men were said to be roaming South Armagh and
visiting houses where they demanded money and foodstuffs. It was
reported: 'Numbers of Irregu1ars...are taking advantage of the border
13 Ibid, p.261.
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situation by attacking Free Staters in Southern Ireland, retreating into
Ulster, dumping their arms and living as peaceable civilans til they
"get their breath" so to speak. Their sojourns in Northern Ireland
though, are sometimes utilsed in attacks on Specials.' 133 As late as
February 1923 it was reported of Aiken that '.. .he was recently in
Armagh city disguised as an old beggar man'.134 Aiken and his rapidly
diminishing column would continue to roam the border searching for
targets both north and south.
To his anti-Treaty colleagues it appeared strange that Aiken and his
well-equipped Division had made few concerted attacks in the South
since the attack on Dundalk. Their explanation was that he stil
maintained the Northern IRA's belief that the real enemy lay in the
North: 'Aiken's position is extra-ordinary. He has over 2000 men and
must have 6 or 700 rifles and about 20 machine guns...it seems to me
that Aiken's eyes are on the Six Counties in which he has almost 1500
men and his is saving himself to attack the Special who are not doing
us any harm at all.' 135
Indeed Aiken's enigmatic role in the Civil War is largely explained by
his wish to stay focused on the issue of overcoming partition much to
the dismay of the Republican leadership. Many Northern IRA men
shared such a view. One Volunteer Henry McGorm wrote to his
13 Northern Whig, 8 Feb. 1923.
133 'IRA activities near Balls Mils, Co, Aragh' ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA/32/1/280),
134 RUC report, 19 Februar 1923 ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA/32/1/280),
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mother: '...I suppose you would rather I had joined up with the Free
State Army. Well I couldn't think of doing such a thing after the rough
handling we go at their hands in Dunda1k. Also I don't think that we
from the six-counties should go to Cork to shoot our own
countryen.' 136 Aiken's appointment as head of the Northern
command in November after the arrest of Emie O'Malley did little to
end his self-imposed isolation or to inspire him to communicate with
the only remaining Volunteers in Belfast: 'The 3rd Northem Division
are not aware of the formation of the Northern Command and Aiken
apparently has never paid any attention to Belfast except to ask for
arms and ammunition of which he has plenty already.' 137 Liam Lynch
wrote that he had communicated with Aiken in December conceming
'...his neglect in attending to GHQ orders and on the position of the
forces in the six-county area not being active in the present
war...When I interviewed Aiken he promised to use resources at his
disposal all over his Division particularly in the weaker Brigades. If he
does this I will not press him to send resources outside the Northern
command,138.
For the men in Belfast the Civil War appeared a distant conflct and
attempts to re-organise were continuously hampered by the activities
of the Specials. Most of their activities were attempts to steal money
and supplies. In September 1922 the RUC reported: 'All Catholic
13 D/org, to C/S, 22 Dec, 1922 (Twomey papers, UCDAD, P69/13 (80l).
136 Henry McGorm letter to his mother, 24 July 1922 ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA32/1/257).
137 D/Org to C/S, 22 Dec. 1922 (Twomey papers, UCDAD, P69/13 (80l),
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book-makers and Commission Agents in Ulster have been recently
notified that in the near future they must be prepared to make
substantial donations to IRA funds, to further operations against the
pogrom govemment' 139. The order however was a hollow threat from a
toothless organisation and RUC enquiries found that none of the
recipients of the letters had received any actual visits from the IRA.
The Republican leadership advised against attacking the Unionist
authorities not only due to the impossible odds the men were facing
but also because of continuing conflict with the old pro-Treaty IRA in
the city who were said to be informing on the Republicans. Such
problems it was observed meant that 'The men in the Belfast Brigade
are anxious to transfer to areas where they would be useful' and
despite a nominal strength of over 200 men, a brigade 0/ C had stil
not been appointed by December 1922.140 Only nine men were
reported to be active in Antrim with a mere seven stil working in East
Down. 
141
Ironically in November 1923 those Northern IRA men stil left in the
Curragh after servce in the Civil War sent a letter to the anti-Treaty
IRA: We the remains of the Northern Divisions in the Curragh camp
have organised a coy. of Volunteers for the purpose of taking part in
138 Liam Lynch memo, 31 Dec, 1922 (Twomey papers, UCDAD, P69/13 (76) ),
139 RUC intellgence report ('Secret Series' files, PRONI, HA32/1/277),
140 D/org to C/S, 22 Dec, 1922 (Twomey papers, UCDAD, P69/13 (80)),
141 Report on IRA strengths (Twomey papers, UCDAD, P69/13 (71) ),
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any hostilties in the 6 counties.' 142 In Belfast a Volunteer reported
his experience of meeting the disilusioned members of the Northem
IRA who had returned to the city from the Curragh: 'I have noticed the
change. There are a lot of the "Bows" home. I noticed a lot at 10
o'clock mass yesterday...what surprised me was that they are all F S
Army men and they were all "Diehards" now "hardy fellahs" as you
might say.' 143 Their shoddy treatment at the hands of the Southern
govemment had finally led them to belatedly throw in their lot with
the Republicans. However, such initiatives were far too late to make
any real difference. Well before the end of 1923, the combination of
unionist aggression, a decline in support from the Catholic
community and abandonment by their Southem alles had meant that
to all intents and purposes the Northern IRA no longer existed.
142 P,O'hUigin Adj, Northern Volunteers, Curragh Camp to IRA C/S, 18 Nov, 1923 (Twomey papers,
UCDAD, P69/35),
143 Hugh Hanna to Michael Watters, 4 Feb, 1924 (Miistry of Home Affairs, PRONI, HA5/2022).
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The violence and political upheaval that occurred in the North
between 1920-22 was on a scale virtually unmatched in the rest of
Ireland during the revolutionary period. Over 500 people had lost their
lives with thousands of others wounded and millons of pounds worth
of property destroyed. Despite this turmoil however the Northern IRA
had collapsed in ignominious and total defeat with the partition
settlement of 1920 emerging virtually unscathed. The defeat of the
Northem IRA in the autumn of 1922 was indeed so complete that it
would be another generation before miltant republicanism had
recovered suffciently to once again challenge the Northern
government.
In 1925 the Ministry of Home Affairs released the following
assessment of the IRA threat in the province:
'The strength of this force in Northem Ireland at the beginning
of 1922 was estimated at roughly 8,000 but the large number of
arrests and exclusions and the migration of members to
Southern Ireland and elsewhere has discouraged and
disorganised them to such an extent that at the present time no
actual miltary organisation can be said to have any real
existence in Northern Ireland although doubtless such may
exist on paper... it is doubtful whether at the present time 300
men could be mobilsed.' i
1 Intellgence memorandum, October 1925 ('Secret Series' fies, PRONI, HA/32/1/481),
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Even such a conservative estimate however was optimistic. By October
1925 only one Sinn Fein club stil existed in Belfast; named after Joe
McKe1vey, who had been executed in December 1922, its meetings
drew only around twenty activists many of whom were released IRA
internees such as Hugh Corvin, Patrick Thornbury and Art
O'Donneii.2 Outside of Belfast it was noted that despite '...strenuous
efforts to organise them, no clubs are known to exist', with the
remnants of the IRA tending, if at all, to join left-wing organisations
such as the Independent Labour Party. 
3
By contrast the Northem Ireland govemment emerged from the period
both victorious and surprisingly stable with Unionist domination of
the province ensured for the next fifty years. Indeed the upheavals of
the revolutionary era had been largely detrimental to the social and
political aspirations of the Catholic minority. The traditional siege
mentality of Unionism had been reinforced by the events of 1920-22
and did much to shape the ethos of the Northern govemment for
decades after. The retention of the 'B' Specials, long after the threat
from the IRA had receded, and the continued reign of the extremist
Minister of Home Affairs, Richard Dawson Bates, who only stood down
in 1943, is testament to the key role that fear and security played as
the foundation stones of the Northern Ireland. The Local Govemment
Bil of July 1922, ending the system of proportional representation
enshrined in the Government of Ireland Act, was introduced largely to
2 Ibid,
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prevent majority Catholic representation in any area of the six
counties. It was inspired by a need to avert the possibilty of local
authorities being used by nationalists to undermine partition as had
occurred in early 1920 and been a key precursor of the Northern
conflct,4
As such the violent events of 1920-22 played a vital role in bolstering
the repressive tendencies of hard-line elements in the Unionist
government and sidelining moderates and those with a belief in the
importance of some kind of rapprochement with the Catholic minority.
This short-term stabilty however was purchased at the price of long-
term survival with the torrid birth of the province creating the
enmities and hostilty between both communities in the North which
finally erupted into overt conflct in the late 1960s. It appears
increasingly possible that the history of Northem Ireland could well be
defined by two very similar periods of violent upheaval that will mark
both its creation and its future collapse.
The story of the Northem IRA is a tragic one although in hindsight
their failure appears almost inevitable. The dependence on unrealistic
Southern schemes, themselves based on the deeply flawed dogma of
Irish nationalism which held that unionists could be coerced into
unity, was fatal, especially when the Dublin leadership was faced with
a stark choice between furthering its own independence or
3 Ibid.
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maintaining Irish unity at its expense. While the South wrestled with
the irreconcilable nature of the 'Republic' and a united Ireland,
unionists viewed the revolution as final proof of its own long held
cultural identity as the front line against insidious Catholic
expansionism.
For the Northem IRA, an organisation essentially built on the ilusory
possibilty of political unity without compromise, it was inevitable that
the shaky allance on which it was constructed would quickly crumble
at the first serious demonstration of the limitations of nationalist
rhetoric in the Irish context. Indeed Southern nationalist rhetoric
proved itself to be too weak to either accept the compromises which a
real push for Irish unity meant and too strong to accept the inherent
contradictions of its own ethos and accept the inevitable. John McCoy
thoughtfully concluded many years later: 'The resort to force is a two-
edged weapon which in the last analysis seldom achieves anything
that could not be obtained by reason and peaceful means. The only
people who have thrived on discord in the North are a select number
of the trouble-making politicians who have climbed to offce and are
today engaged in the old device of creating the canard that men of a
certain religious persuasion are ipso facto "disloyal".' 5 When in the
summer of 1 922 both North and South finally retreated into their own
safe dogmatic cocoons the Northern IRA became an immediate
4 M, Laffan, The Partition of Ireland 1911-1925 (Dublin, 1983) pp. 106-110.
5 John McCoy statement (BMH, NA, WS 492),
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anomaly and an embarrassing symbol to the South of its failure to
either adapt to or confront the realities of partition.
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